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The following is a transcript of remarks made at the First Annual
Conference on Preventive Law held at the University of Denver College
of Law on May 8, 1986. The transcript has been edited by the Denver
University Law Review stylistically and organizationally in order to present
these remarks in a more readable form. The conference was the opening event of the National Center for Preventive Law which was established at the University of Denver on January 1, 1986. The participants
in the Seminar were:
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INTRODUCTION

Edward Dauer: Welcome to everyone and thanks very much for coming.
This meeting is the opening event of the National Center for Preventive
Law which was established at the University of Denver, School of Law on
January 1, 1986. Although it has been in existence for several months,
this meeting is the most important event to occur to date - the first
gathering of the Preventative Law family from throughout the United
States.
The National Center for Preventive Law has three goals. One is to
engage in curricular development - to see how the attitudes, notions,
theories and techniques of preventive law can be worked into law school
curriculum. We will be using ourselves as a test site for that, making our
materials freely available to other law schools. A second purpose of the
Center is to act as a catalyst as well as a site for research - to provide
funds for scholars, both from the academy and from practice, to engage
in research in Preventive Law, as broadly defined as possible, and to be a
place to nucleate and facilitate that research, where and when we can.
Our third purpose is to be a resource center to the profession.
More to the point, beyond those three purposes, is the fact that this
Center will provide a capability which several of us have felt for several
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years was needed, and that is an institutional home for Preventive Law.
A place where the field can have some identity. A central focus, if you
will, to which scholars from throughout the country can look whenever it
is useful to them to do so.
The idea of an institutional home leads quite naturally to what I
regard as perhaps the central, but at least the initial, problem in the
field. To put that problem in its boldest terms, it is: Is there a field of
Preventive Law, and if so, what is it? It is clear that we have under the
banner many people doing many different things in many different
places. Indeed, we will see some of that diversity here today.
Within the question of whether there is some such field is the opposite question: Is Preventive Law something less than everything? That
is, there were lawyers in the early days when Louis Brown and others
were first writing and talking about Preventive Law who would respond:
"I don't know what you are talking about. Preventive Law is what I do
whenever I'm not in court. What you have done is to describe all of outof-court lawyering, and of what use is that?" I think that is still a challenge. We must define what we are about, and see if we do have any
defensible thematic unity. Or to put it another way: Is it possible that
this is a coherent field, and one that has some values? Are there unifying theories or organizational structures which underlie its several
guises? Are there ideas which unite the procedures of tax planning, for
example, with those of estate planning or with real estate planning, or
which connect questions of delivery of legal services with products liability loss prevention techniques? The ambitions, therefore, of this seminar, are the following:
The first by way of our acting in the role of institutional home, is to
facilitate introductions among those of you who may not have been
aware of each others' work, yet who work in fields that touch, overlap, or
coincide. The second thing is to achieve, though I think not explicitly,
some sense of a definition of what we mean by this phrase Preventive Law.
What is it about? What unifying things underlie it? And thirdly, to propose or dream about a set of aspirations from which we can derive an
agenda for the future development of the field. That is, what are the
important things to be done? What can this institutional home, this
Center for Preventive Law, most usefully do to serve those people who
are working in many different costumes?

I.

THE SOURCES OF LEGAL CONFLICT

Edward Richards: My area of research and practice is medical law. In
keeping with our topic, Sources of Legal Conflict, I want to discuss differing
value systems and intellectual paradigms as a source of legal conflict.
Part of the high level of legal conflict in the United States arises from
our cultural heterogeneity. While businessmen often look wistfully at
the low level of legal conflict in Japan, few would be willing to live with
the shared value system that makes this possible. In my work, I see the
mischief that arises from the different value systems in medicine and law.
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This poses a difficult dilemma for physicians in the United States.
Physicians in the United States have great autonomy. Standards for
training and accreditation are set by voluntary organizations. In general, these are procedural standards. Knowing that a physician is a
"board certified" specialist tells you how he was trained, but not how he
practices. The licensing of physicians is done by the states. In most
states, this is a pro forma process. No state actually evaluates individual
competence. This laissez faire professional standards setting results in
the toleration of a great diversity of medical practice styles and levels of
competence.
Some of these tolerated practice styles are at odds with legal expectations. This leads to legal conflicts, but conflicts whose cure demands
that either legal or medical values be changed. Many physicians believe
that it is law that should change. This presupposes that legal values are
merely professional conventions, as is the case for medical values. I believe that this view underlies the fundamental paradigmatic conflict between medicine and law: law may be a profession, but its values are
extrinsically set by society, rather than intrinsically set by the profession.
Now I should tell you that I have a populist view of the law. I believe that the law, especially tort law, reflects societal values rather than
shapes them. There is considerable debate over the extent that these
values are shaped in an egalitarian manner. Irrespective of whether law
reflects the values of all society or a privileged subset, law is not shaped
by lawyers in the manner that medicine is shaped by physicians.
This is particularly true of tort law. Tort law is predominately common law. Common law is "found" by judges as they enforce the mores
of society through legal proceedings. A central theme in tort law is the
problem of reconciling personal autonomy with societal expectations,
the precise basis of law's conflict with medicine. Tort law reflects the
high value society places on personal autonomy - individual freedom of
action. It is this belief that has allowed medical diversity to flourish. At
the same time, we have a societal belief in the notion of accountability that an individual should be responsible for his actions. In a Holfeldian
sense, we opt for more rights, with their attendant responsibilities or
duties. Physicians, however, make the opposite assumption. They believe that increased autonomy should be coupled with decreased
responsibility.
The litigation over informed consent to medical treatment typifies
this mindset. The courts never debated the need for an informed consent to medical treatment. The legal debate has always been over the
standard for accessing the adequacy of the information. This is most
clear in the cases dealing with informed consent for arguably incompetent, psychiatric patients. In contrast, the medical profession seriously
questioned whether there should be a requirement of informed consent.
Physicians treat patients paternalistically. This is a paternalism rooted
in both superior knowledge and pre-scientific notions of the importance
of a secular faith in physicians on the part of their patients. This is not
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an unusual model for professional relationships. While not based on
science, law maintains its own body of secret lore. Moreover, lawyers
are often guilty of the same brand of paternalism as physicians. Even
preventive lawyers can wax omniscient when counseling clients.
The central dogma of this paternalism is that physicians believe that
they should make decisions for their patients. This decision-making is
seen as an onerous burden that has been lifted from the patient's shoulders. In an informed consent lawsuit, an ungrateful patient alleges that
the physician should be castigated for not forcing the patient to make
these difficult decisions. The physician is outraged that his doing this
favor for the patient is seen by the courts as usurping the patient's autonomy and thus shifting the responsibility for the consequences of the
decision from the patient to the physician.
The litigation of these suits is bitter because they are about intentional actions. Failure of informed consent is litigated as a negligence
issue, yet it is only negligence in a technical sense. Most informed consent cases involved physicians who told the patient precisely what they
intended. As a plaintiff's attorney, I plead that this disclosure was negligent, but the real issue before the jury is fraudulent inducement. I am
not challenging the physician's technical skills. I am challenging his values. Putting aside the elements of the tort, I must convince the jury that
the physician's values were wrong, that he had no right to withhold information from the patient.
From the physician's perspective, no amount of tinkering with the
formalities of obtaining the informed consent will substitute for modifying their underlying values. It is possible to develop legal strategies to
make it more difficult to prove a failure of informed consent. If, however, these strategies are only shams, the underlying value conflicts will
foster litigation in other areas. One of these areas is the tension between medicine as an art and medicine as a science.
Current medical practice is based on a scientific model, tempered
with subjective value judgments. This explicit acknowledgment of a
component of art serves to shelter medical practice from close scrutiny
by other branches of science. For example, when research money is at
issue, medicine wraps itself in the cloak of science, promising technological fixes for the maladies of life. Conversely, when questioned about
the scientific basis of fashionable therapies, the banner of art is floated
and the crude judgments of science are forsworn.
This duality is typified by the rhetoric that statistics do not apply in
the individual case. This rhetoric allows physicians to opt out of scientific analysis for individual treatment decisions. While this is an important safeguard against totally mechanical decision making, it destroys
the integrity of clinical decision making.
The acceptance of this escape from rational decision-making complicates the introduction of new technology into clinical practice. In intensive care medicine, the problem of the ad hoc introduction of new
technology has become so acute that it is difficult to rigorously establish
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that a stay in the intensive care unit (ICU) significantly improves either
morbidity or mortality. There is no doubt that many patients benefit
from ICU care and that much of the technology in the ICU is valuable.
The problem is that some patients are worse off in the ICU and some of
the equipment is not effective. The mix of patients and equipment is so
complex that it is difficult to sort out the winners and the losers. Tragically, it is probably impossible to do controlled experiments that would
involve withholding accepted (but unproven) technology from ICU patients. Once technology permeates the marketplace, it is very difficult to
dislodge.
This problem is not limited to machinery. It arises whenever personal anecdote is allowed to substitute for scientific validation. We are
currently witnessing the first objective evaluations of coronary artery bypass surgery (CAB). Since there is no regulation of surgical procedures,
a surgeon can market a new surgery without having to demonstrate its
efficacy. In the 1970's, this was done with CAB. By the 1980's, more
than 100,000 CAB's were being performed each year, without a proven
basis for many of the operations. As the results of various controlled
studies have become available, it has become clear that many people
underwent the procedure needlessly.
Drugs for AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) may be
the most poignant example of the perils of untested technology. The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) usually requires that drugs be
proven safe and efficacious before they may be marketed. Since safety is
poorly defined for sufferers of AIDS, the FDA is being pressured to be
"compassionate" and allow AIDS drugs to be marketed without full testing. The problem is that once the marketplace is filled with incompletely tested drugs, it will be impossible to perform the controlled
studies necessary to determine which drugs are effective. If a substantially more effective drug is introduced after several less effective drugs,
AIDS patients will die needlessly because physicians will not be able to
recognize the value of the new drug in the noise of the untested existing
drugs.
These problems appear to be technological in origin, but they actually reflect conflicts of values. The law, as a reflection of societal values,
expects medicine to make its decisions in a consistent, objective manner.
Medicine eschews this constraint, preferring to shift between a scientific
and prescientific frame of reference. The problem is that society is
asked to pay the costs of technology, both financial and human. These
costs have been inflated through medicine's opportunistic abandonment
of objective decision making. Societies' attempts to recoup these squandered resources will fuel both litigation and the legislative regulation of
medical practice.
W. 0. Robertson, M.D.
With a background in medicine and thus a stranger in your midst, I
believe I have been invited here because I have been involved in a pro-
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gram trying to persuade doctors to look at prevention as a solution for
much of the current malpractice problem. As a "black sheep" of a lawyer's family, with a father, a brother, and uncle already lawyers and a son
about to graduate from law school, I grew up with and maintain a sensitivity to the philosophy of the legal profession. I have been further "educated" in our television era by Perry Mason, Paper Chase and the like
- all emphasizing the adversarial element of the law as it addresses
dispute resolution of the individual case. In contrast to medicine, the
concept or the image of "prevention" seems conspicuous by its absence.
Implementing a nonadversarial approach toward dispute avoidance
ought to benefit both our society and every individual within it.
Be that as it may, I found my background and my familiarity with
the legal profession particularly valuable when, during my stint as president of the state medical association, we were confronted by the "first
malpractice crises." As a faculty member of the University of Washington, I am sure I was looked at to bring a sense of "objectivity" to the
discussion which followed. We had many meetings with the bar association, the insurance industry and the legislature. These interactions had
not been traditional; at first, all parties seemed more than a little bit
suspicious of the others. My troops - the physicians - were all too
anxious to have solutions and to have them right away! I favored
approaching the problem by extrapolating from experiences with the
traditional "medical model of disease" - recognition, definition, determination of cause, treatment and prevention. That model had been especially productive for infectious diseases, for nutritional deficiencies,
for accidents and trauma. To apply the model, one has to undertake a
number of steps. First, one has to gather some data about the problem
at hand, what has gone on in the past and what is going on at the present. Then, one has to subject the resultant data to analysis and interpretation; this permits one to consider a "diagnosis" - a tentative and
testable hypothesis as to "possible cause." Only after that point can one
suggest "rational treatment" or take the final step toward recommending avenues of "prevention." Moreover, such a progression of
steps enables us to "evaluate" the effectiveness of our deliberations such a critical step in implementing the aforementioned model. It
seems only logical to pursue such an approach in addressing the "medical malpractice dilemma."
In truth, that turned out far easier said than done. In the mid1970's, there was remarkably little data - and where it existed it was
carefully protected, hidden or declared "confidential" depending on
what you sought and from whom you sought it. I suspected then and
continue to think that most of the data that had been collected was almost exclusively applicable to the financial aspects of the problem rather
than its epidemiology. At the same time, when it came time to analyze
the paucity of data that was available, almost none of the parties involved had an operational awareness of the concept of statistical inference. Most of the parties seemed only too willing to accept trends to let
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them jump to obvious conclusions. Far too many of our physicians, relying on a single testimonial case, were ready to point the finger at the
culprits: some aiming at plaintiffs' attorneys, others at the "law," and
still others at greedy patients, the insurance industry and uncritical
juries. Far too few - at least in my mind - considered the possibility
that far too much "malpractice" was actually occurring, and that perhaps the increasingly complex "system" of health care was, in fact,
somewhat responsible. Of course, referring back to the "model," the
suggested treatment depends on the postulated cause and there was little agreement on that point. But there seems to be a lot of agreement
that the treatment ought to be a 100% cure and that it ought to be able
to be applied overnight! Furthermore, since we were talking about cure,
there was little need to worry about trying to evaluate the treatment to
be used. Would it work or did it work? The Government Accounting
Office's (GAO) recent five part series dealing with the malpractice scene
reports that in their six state sample, tort reform seemed to be of little
benefit and that not a single study had been initiated to see if it had
worked. As each of you know, many "solutions" were enacted on the
legislative scene and enacted quickly. In the first crisis, forty-six states
took action; to date, approximately forty states have acted in the second
crisis. But the problem has not gone away and, in the eyes of many, it
may even be worse.
With physicians' maintaining this mindset, it is of little wonder that
other groups - attorneys, insurance representatives, the press and
many legislators - acted in similar fashion. Reason should have told us
all that a "quick fix" to a problem that had been evolving for more than
half a century was most unlikely. Nonetheless, our Medical Association
went to the legislatures in 1975-76 and appealed for help; ten specific
bits of legislation followed - in those days we had yet to coin the catchy
phrase of "tort reform" with all its positive derivative images. As we
know today, the basic problem persists. In 1976, we joined with the
State Bar Association in cosponsoring data gathering by an independent
consultant actuary; both groups were dismayed to find out that the dollar amounts paid out in the state of Washington as a result of verdicts or
settlements in medical malpractice cases had been escalating at a rate of
twenty-two percent per year since 1962. Twenty-two percent per year!
And it continued to do so for at least the next six years in Washington.
This information, however, did not dampen our enthusiasm in going to
the legislature in 1984-85 as the second crisis loomed so large. And
again, at this last session of our legislature a remarkable paucity of data
was available; much of what was used by all parties was poorly defined
and usually unverified - and frequently exaggerated with much puffery
and posturing. Once again, the resulting confusion permitted all of us
to ignore the real potential of an effective prevention program as one
and all were deluded into believing that quick legislative fixes would
make the problem go away.
In actuality, a second strategy had been employed in our state and
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in a number of others beginning in the mid-1970's, the formation of a
physicians' insurance company. The concept was disarmingly simple:
creating such an entity would permit medicine to bypass those "profit
motivated rascals" in the insurance industry who carefully hide their real
profits, pander to their stock holders and maintain obscene and overbloated administrative expenses. While such insurance entities are now
operative in more than thirty-five states, their existence has not reversed
the malpractice problem. Their presence, however, has stabilized the
availability of insurance and made member physicians aware that insurance reserves are not simply dollars available from some bottomless pit
in Hartford, Connecticut to be squandered away for nonmeritorious
cases, but rather, the result of premiums and investment income. Unfortunately, they did not call for appropriate premium increases between 1976 and 1983. Instead, along with the commercial carriers, they
relied on high interest rates to satisfy payments for the ever-increasing
rates of losses going up at twenty-two percent per year. The result was
that when interest rates fell, the day of reckoning was here and sizable
increases in premiums provided the clarion call of the "second crisis."
At this point, I would shift to describe the third strategy we adopted
- and one that I am convinced is more likely to be productive. It called
for working to try to minimize those episodes that lead to allegations of
malpractice. A California study had warned us in the mid-1970's that
there were perhaps as many as twenty-three times the number of malpractice cases out there as were surfacing for action. Two studies from
Massachusetts confirmed the possibility. Consequently, we initiated a
study of closed claims in our state - seeking to itemize their bases and
then develop approaches to prevention. We sought to find out what
events lead to suits and were avoidable.
Groups of cases with common themes were developed; representative cases were summarized, recommendations for avoidance were made
and amended, and both were widely distributed to the profession. Specialty societies were enveloped into the process with particular success
being evident among the anesthesiologists. We went one step further
and distributed audit programs which we called Risk Management Review Units for use by the individual hospital medical staff initially and
subsequently by individuals or groups within office settings. This combination of approaches - case reviews, topic discussions and recommendations plus potential audit outlines - were supplemented by some
historical information and published in a book, Medical Malpractice: A
Preventive Approach (1985). Examples of items subject to concern included the thoroughness of tetanus immunization programs in our
state's Emergency Rooms, and on the record documentation of "informed consent" of any patient going near the operating room, scheduled for cancer chemotherapy or risky diagnostic procedures. The goal
was to heighten awareness about what had gone wrong in the past so
that one and all could avoid it in the future.
Consider the issue of physician availability. Until after the turn of
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the century, availability of the doctor tended to be a bit of a hit or miss
issue. With the arrival of the telephone, expectations began to rise; with
the advent of the beeper, expectations escalated significantly. Today,
physicians tend to function as members of a group, one of whom is expected to be reachable by patients of the group. Of course, the question
is how available is available? Ten minutes? Five minutes? Present in
the hospital? I serve as the medical director for our Pacific Northwest's
Poison Center - and with the aid of our nationwide beeper system am
available for consultation while I am here in Denver. A remarkable
change from as short as twenty years ago. Nowhere is a change in expectations more noticeable than in the public's expectations about hospitals today as compared to fifty years ago. As late as 1916, less than
half the patients who entered a hospital left it alive! The situation is
unbelievably different today - and physicians must take those changing
expectations into account as they deal with patients and their problems
in the 1980's. For many of the malpractice problems, the difficulty began as a problem in patient-physician, and sometimes in a physicianphysician, communication. For many others, the complexity of the care
system and the innumerable opportunities for something to go wrong
seemed almost out of control - but nonetheless had to be addressed.
Small changes can make an enormous difference when it comes to preventive measures. For example, fluoridation of water supplies has
brought about a plummeting of dental cavities and cut down on the production of dentists. Using "child resistant containers" on prescription
items and household products has helped bring about an eighty percent
reduction in morbidity and mortality from accidental ingestion.
In summary, change in the malpractice situation is only one of a
number of changes taking place in our profession. All such change, ideally, should stem from some data-based decision making process. Recall
that the specialist of the past was a specialist because he or she was a
storehouse of information; not so today. Instead, he or she is a specialist because of an ability to manipulate and interpret information that is,
in fact, stored somewhere else. Real progress is based on that data base
and so, I feel, most progress in solving the medical malpractice problem stems from an adequate data base of experience so that errors of the
past can be avoided in the future; it is referred to in today's parlance as
risk management. I will bypass commenting on how our society will resolve - or at least become comfortable in living with - the balance
between the rights of the individual and the rights of the society - or
some group contained within - except to note that the answer had better have a wide base of input or it is not likely to be "correct." Quite
clearly, change is underway in how our society will deal with issues such
as transplants, termination of life support measures, or "Baby Doe and
Baby No Dough" decisions, and the process is likely to bring about new
disputes - some of which will impact the medical malpractice scene.
While the "prevention" program based on avoiding repetition of mistakes of the past can and has assuaged the medical malpractice problem,
our two professions would seem to have an opportunity - and, I be-
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lieve, an obligation - to attempt to develop a comparable "prevention"
program to avoid some of the conflicts looming large on the horizon.
Absent such action, the worst may still be before us!
Murray Blumenthal: In preparing for today's conference, I asked my
son-in-law, an attorney with ten years experience, "What do you think
are the sources of legal conflict?" With a laugh he answered, "the seven
deadly sins." I looked them up, and as I am sure that you recall, they
were: sloth, anger, gluttony, envy, lust, covetousness and pride. My first
reaction was, well you cannot change human nature.
Then I began to wonder. Early in the year, the Dean had organized
a faculty seminar on law and economics with an eye towards encouraging economic thinking and analysis. Are the seven deadly sins amiable
to economic analysis? Indeed, they are. At first glance, with the exception of anger and sloth, the deadly sins reflect relative scarcity or an
unequal distribution of wealth and resources. Gluttony, envy, lust, covetousness and pride would be largely irrelevant if abundance prevailed.
On the other hand, sloth seems to be a by-product perhaps of superabundance. After thinking about anger, even that sin yielded to economic interpretation. If, as the psychologists claim, anger is a reaction
of frustration or threat, then with general abundance, frustration would
be minimized and the threat would be generally unnecessary.
Hume, in 1739, more recently paraphrased by Ophuls,l described
the role of scarcity far more elegantly when he
pointed out that if all goods were free like air and water, any
man could get as much as he wanted without harming others.
Men would thus willingly share the earth's goods in common
,as man and wife.' However, without a common abundance of
goods, 'selfishness and confined generosity of man along with
the scanty provision nature has made for his wants,' inevitably
produce conflict; thus a system of justice that will restrain and
regulate the human passions is a universal necessity. The institution of government (and thus law), whether it takes the form
of primitive tabu or parliamentary democracy, therefore has its
origin in the necessity to distribute scarce resources in an or2
derly fashion.
If we assume that scarcity of resources gives rise to competition,
and inevitably to conflict, and if law provides the framework for resolving these conflicts, then it appears that several avenues of theoretical
development for preventive law are available. These include searching
out specific conditions associated with the sources of scarcity, examining
the legal system's role in creating, maintaining or educing scarcity, and
investigating its role in the resolution of conflicts arising out of scarcity.
If legal rights and the accessibility and malleability of the legal system
are viewed as scarce resources, then a theory of preventive law could
usefully encompass the politics and the economics of the law. The fore1. W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1973).

2. Id.at 8.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

going analysis suggests that preventive law (or lawyering) can be viewed
from either a macro and policy perspective or from a micro and practice
perspective.
Assuming that subsequent legal conflict, 3 the avoidance of which is
a goal of preventive law, is preceded by contributing actions or decisions
by lawyers or their clients, then it seems useful to examine such behavior
or decisions. Marshall 4 proposes that human behavior can be placed on
a scale of intentionality. Building on Marshall, the following outline of a
micro analytic model proposes a scale ranging from "Act of God," and
"Pure Accident" at one end, to "Conscious Intent" at the other end. A
near midpoint on the proposed intentionality scale is "Action Where
Consequences Are Not Foreseen."
A

MICRO-ANALYSIS OF LEGAL-CONFLICT-RELATED BEHAVIOR

A. Act of God
B. Pure Accident
C. Reflex Action
D. Irresistible Impulse
E. Action Where Consequences Are Not Foreseen
1. Error, Mistake, Omission
2. Incompetence
3. Change in the law
4. Change in economic circumstances, i.e.,
bankruptcy
5. Change in physical circumstances
6. Change in enforcement policy
7. Change in political policy
8. Change in relationships
9. Unforeseeable consequences
10. Underestimation of risk
11. Misunderstanding the law
12. Inadequate dissemination of the law
13. Retroactive application of the law
14. Ambiguous law
15. Conflicting interpretations of the law
16. Mistaken prediction of legal and policy changes
F. Force Majeure
G. Coerced Action
H. Action Under Duress
I.
Action Under Stress
J.
Action Where Consequence Is Foreseeable
K. Conscious Intent
1. Attempted resolution of conflicting interests
2. Attempted resolution of conflicting values
3. Attempted clarification of the law
4. Attempted test of the law
3. "Legal conflict" can be defined as an attempt to resolve a difference concerning
substance, procedure or values, between or among two or more interests, with one or
more of the interests claiming legal support for their position and represented by an attorney or making use of a legal tribunal.
4. SeeJ. MARSHALL, INTENTION IN LAw & SOCIETY (1968).
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5. Attempted change in the law
6. Attempted resolution of perceived injustice
7. Pursuit of perceived rights
8. Perceived benefits greater than expected costs
9. Defense of perceived rights
10. Expected low probability of apprehension
11. Expected low probability of conviction
The items under "Conscious Intent" are a partial listing of motives
for deliberately engendering legal conflict. The list under "Action
Where Consequences Were Not Foreseen" contains conditions and circumstances contributing to the development of legal conflict, largely, if
not totally, without the conscious intent of the parties.
A suggested first step, aside from evaluating the usefulness of the
intentionality scale, is to add to, modify or subtract from the items listed
under sections E. and K. on the scale. A second step involves proposed
specific examples of the listed items. A third step consists of identifying
what a lawyer can do, if anything, to prevent the legal conflict, by changing his or her own behavior, the client's, or others.
The micro-model is an attempt to contribute to the systemization
and specificity of the preventive law concept. If the model survives critical scrutiny, it may find uses in teaching preventive law or in diagnostic
applications.
James Luce: I just have one question that bothers me all the time in
court. Is your scale relating to, for example, a conscious intent. Are you
talking about a conscious intent to do the act or are you talking about a
conscious intent for the result of that act?
Murray Blumenthal: I have been around the law school long enough to
say either or both. I see no reason at this point to rule out either in
terms of motives or consequences.
Edward Dauer: I would suggest two scales then because I think that law
has to draw a distinction and it is a fundamental distinction: there are
180 degrees between the conscious intent to do something as opposed
to the conscious intent of achieving a result that flows naturally from
that intent.
Connie Hauver: I am a lawyer in private practice in Denver, specializing
in estate planning, business planning and tax law. Murray is a hard act
to follow. Because presentations have not been rehearsed, many of my
thoughts parallel those of Murray's. I do not, however, have them on a
nice little scale. The other night as I was driving home, I heard on the
radio a report on doctors in Los Angeles who have made a list of patients to avoid who are most likely to sue doctors for malpractice. Malpractice cases are maybe what some people think of as preventive law.
There are also trial lawyers in Los Angeles who have made a list of those
doctors to avoid - those who have the most malpractice claims. Other
people might think that is preventive law. When I first talked to Ed
Richards, he indicated that the title of his presentation was going to be,
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"Why Don't the Swine Like Our Pearls?" I took him seriously. He indicated that he thought many lawyers were not very interested in preventive law. My experience has been quite to the contrary. The type of law
I practice may be largely responsible for that orientation. Any lawyer
involved in the planning process is involved in preventive law.
I would like to talk more about what is preventive law, rather than
sources of conflict. It seems to me there are two key words relating to
preventive law. Those two words are anticipation and education. While
we, as attorneys, have no greater ability to predict the future than any
other profession, or any other people, we are trained to try to foresee
the consequences of what one wants to do and to try and portray to
clients what alternatives are available and what might result from those
choices. We counsel clients on various alternatives, on human reactions
to choices that they might make, and on sources of conflict. An example
in estate administration practice is to forestall conflict that might center
on the disposition of tangible personal property. Psychiatrists and psychologists in the group may have an explanation for that conflict. I have
seen several situations in which family hostilities focus on this particular
part of the asset division even though the tangible personal property
may have a relatively small value. If a lawyer anticipates such an area of
conflict, steps may be taken to diffuse it.
Another issue that can cause family disputes is the disposition of a
closely held business, particularly where one or two children are involved in that business and other children are not involved. This is perhaps an example of the scarcity problem to which Murray referred.
There are not enough assets to go around. How do you satisfy all members of that family when you have that kind of situation? Another set of
circumstances which creates conflict is a division of assets between a second spouse and children of a prior marriage. If the potential conflict is
addressed by the client who knows the beneficiaries best, a workable solution may be achieved.
The other important concept in describing the parameters of preventive law is education - education of clients. Education of our clients
has not been in the forefront of our activities. Professional ethics have
discouraged solicitation of business and perhaps have oriented us to
solving the particular problem put before us. But there are many forces
at work which promote an educational orientation. They may not be
forces we like, but results could be quite beneficial.
The competition for clients is increasing, generating an increased
desire of attorneys to bind that relationship and to do so by offering
services that have not been offered in the past. These include providing
corporate clients with seminars on compliance procedures, introducing
clients to labor relations problems that might arise, and keeping clients
abreast of changes in the law. These things are very preventive in nature and should be quite beneficial to clients. Another factor in the shift
toward a more preventive type practice has been the change in ethical
rules which no longer proscribe outreach to clients. The greater degree
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of specialization among attorneys enables us to pursue problems in
greater depth rather than dealing with them in a general way. And I
think increased government regulations may also have encouraged new
ways to practice preventive law.
In conclusion, my experience has been that most lawyers are using
preventive techniques on a day to day basis. Preventive law is not a body
of law; it is an attitude, an approach to the practice. Certainly one of the
best tools of preventive law is a high quality of legal work. And we all
can continue to work toward that goal.
Robert Redmount: I am Bob Redmount. I am a psychologist, and also
have a law degree. I think what both Ed and Bill have done is to show
there is a need for a change in certain structures and emphasis in the
delivery of professional services. There is a need for changes in methodology to improve the consciousness of preventive law and of preventive issues. Murray is doing something different. He has thirty-eight
categories and subcategories for the analysis of a preventive law matter.
That is a little bit overwhelming. Using larger abstractions, I end up
with four analytical categories. Murray deals with conscious intent as
sort of the point of departure and I am lucky if I ever get to conscious
intent which will be apparent in a moment. I think that Connie offers an
even simpler system for reflection. She only had two categories: anticipation and education.
My four categories derive from some skepticism. I begin by asking
this question, "Why does the concept of prevention not have more currency?" This is a question to be asked not only of physicians and of
lawyers, but also of the average person. Why not think more
preventively?
First, there is the problem of awareness: awareness of conditions
having legal relevance and legal consequence. Take as an example a
physician who has been occupied with problems of diagnosis of illness
and treatment. His awareness has not lent itself to the idea that prevention was terribly important for himself, for the profession, or for this
patient. A simpler example would be if I want to buy a boat. As a layman, I am not sure I think very much about liability and lawsuits, or for
that matter, about buying boats and preventive law suits. There is just
no consciousness of these kinds of matters. So, one of the problems is
how does one generate awareness about preventive law either within the
individual or through a professional approach directed to the individual.
Another issue is risk taking. There are, however, different attitudes
about risk taking. At one end of the spectrum there are people we might
call obsessive. In other words, if they own something, they are going to
cover themselves in every possible way to make sure they are protected.
Or, they are going to look at every possibility to see what gain they could
get and what it is that they have or can work with. There are, however,
other people who say, and I think we are all this way: "I don't give a
damn. It's not terribly important. I'll take the risk or I won't even consider the risk, because this is what I want to do." Of course, some peo-
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pie just carry this to an extreme. Most of us may vary with circumstances
in our attitudes about risk taking. But, concern about risk taking, or the
lack thereof, is an important issue.
A third issue is motivation. Most of us who are reasonably successful,
busy, and talented or educated have a lot of motivations in our system
going on all the time, doing a lot of different things, thinking about a lot
of different things with different priorities. One of the lowest priorities
might be the issue of prevention. We might be occupied with having
success in a business or just generally having an awfully good time. We
may not think very much about the issue of prevention, not because we
are unaware, but because we will agree that there are other things which
take a priority in our interests and concerns.
A fourth matter is what might best be termed resources. In general, it
is more likely that people with more resources will be more preventionconscious and, if they have large resources, they may be more disposed
and better able to think and act preventively. Those people with few
resources for one thing just may not have discretionary means to spend
on prevention.
Edward Dauer: A question that I was hoping you would address is
whether prenuptial agreements are preparations for marriage, or are
preparations for divorce?
Connie Hauver: That is a big question. I was discussing this with John at
the luncheon. He said, "If I'd have gotten into that, I never would have
gotten married." Other people indicated this is happening on a nationwide basis. I think we are seeing more and more of it for obvious reasons. I certainly do not have the answers. It is a very tough
representation because you are forcing people to think about divorce
when they are about to get into a marriage. The idea on a theoretical
level of allowing two intelligent adults to regulate their own economic
affairs is a nice idea, but so often you are dealing with people that come
from very different positions of power and resources. I certainly have
not worked this all out in my own mind, but I hope that lawyers as a
group will try to keep some degree of fairness and perspective in getting
more and more involved in these types of agreements because I think
this area is open for great abuse.
Robert Redmount: There is a sharp distinction between first marriages
and second marriages. Very often, people coming into the first marriage
are young, they have relatively few assets and hopefully no serious
problems. Frequently in second marriages, both spouses have children
and accumulated assets where they really have serious decisions to
make.
Connie Hauver: There are so many different circumstances which arise
when you have a lot of inherited wealth, and it really is a parent who is
trying to put the pressure on the child to preserve those assets. Obvi-
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ously, the second marriage situation has created a great increase in this
type of representation.
Edward Dauer: Bob's four categories fit very nicely in these instances. I
have a question that I want to put to Connie, and that is in the area of
anticipation, with which I agree. The question is, where does the knowledge about the consequences of alternatives come from? Is it necessarily a function of the experience of the attorney who has been through
some of those alternatives in like cases? Is there a way of thinking about
the problem in some systematic way, accepting the notion that anticipating the consequences of various alternative structures is imperative?
How do you go about generating these possible futures? Where do you
draw them from?
Connie Hauver: That is a real good question, Ed. I have to say there are
some very nice things about getting older and one of them is experience. From my experience, I would attribute a lot of that ability to the
experience of the attorney. This is unfortunate because if that is the
main source of review of alternatives with the client, then there are going to be a large number of clients who are not going to have the benefit
of that kind of input. It also is very much a function of the client. I
mean very often the client will raise those kinds of issues with the lawyer
and that is terrific. But with some people you really have to draw them
out. However, to have some kind of technique or some kind of guidelines to create the awareness on the part of attorneys would certainly be
useful.
Bob Shafton: My name is Bob Shafton and I have a question for Murray
or Bob. From a psychological standpoint, why do people fail to think
preventively? My general thesis is: raw fear sometimes causes people to
do things. I would like you to comment on two examples. First, a director of a corporation who can no longer obtain director's and officer's
liability coverage might well act differently, particularly in today's era,
than he or she might have originally. Second, a financial institution executive who is under the gun by one of the federal regulators might
react differently when he or she is told, "You better have a compliance
program or we are going to put you out of business." Both those things
obviously raise preventive law issues. And I am not sure they fall exactly
within either of your scales but perhaps you might want to comment.
Murray Blumenthal: Bob, I defer to your practicality about that, initially.
Bob Redmount: Thanks for the hot seat. I am not sure whether the question has to do with whether this fits within the concept of prevention or
whether it reflects the fact that strategic choices may involve something
more than just the practices that lawyers normally deal with. There are
motivations for prevention other than the ones, for instance, that Murray mentioned or the ones that I mentioned. Bob Shafton mentions fear
and that is an important specific motivation that may engender prevention. Another specific motivation is desire. The problem may still be
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how to translate either or both into "preventive consciousness" and preventive action.
Bob Shafton: You have talked about awareness, risk taking, priorities,
and resources. What I think raw fear does if you are a director without
director's and officer's liability coverage is to say: cost be damned. I am
going to cause the company on which I serve as a director to do things
preventively because it may be my pocket now, not the insurance company's and not the corporation's. A similar reaction may develop if that
executive sees that the button is now not going to be pushed by the
stockholders, directors or the chief executive officer, but by the very regulator who has, with the flick of a pen, the opportunity to put a financial
institution out of business. So, I think fear of being put out of business
by a regulator, by a hit at your own pocketbook, may or may not fall
within Bob Redmount's categories, or may be within the seven deadly
sins. It is a different kind of emotion.
Bob Redmount: I think you have successfully identified some strong motivating influences and there are probably others as well. One generic
one, perhaps, for the area of prevention, is anxiety. Anxiety has an interesting impact on people, and fear may be one kind of anxiety. Anxiety causes over-reaction, so that a person may do some things that are
not very prudent if he or she is too anxious. On the other hand, anxiety
may cause construction and under-reaction so that imprudence may take
the form of not doing enough rather than doing too much.

II.

CLIENT EDUCATION AND THE DEMAND FOR
PREVENTIVE LAW

William Bolger: I am Bill Bolger. I am the Executive Director of the
National Resource Center for the Consumers of Legal Services, a small
research and education organization in Washington, D.C. I spend most
of my time trying to help people start and run legal services plans.
These plans serve mostly the middle class. My message is an upbeat
one. Although there is some sense among the pioneers in preventive
law, as Bob Redmount said, that prevention does not have much currency, I would like to suggest that, at least among the middle class, prevention does sell or can sell, but that it does have to be sold.
I wonder how many of you remember the Fram Oil Filter commercial from a few years ago. The punch line was, "You can pay me now or
pay me later." They were talking about changing an oil filter for four
dollars or paying the mechanic for a complete engine overhaul for about
$400. Obviously, it must have been successful, because Fram ran that
commercial for a long time. They were selling oil filters by selling preventive maintenance, though they did not use the term. Preventive law
is not yet a buzz-word with middle class consumers or their lawyers, but
I think it will be. Preventive maintenance, though, is a broadly accepted
concept. It is not just an accepted concept among people in transportation, industries or the military; it is accepted by automobile owners.
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Surveys of automobile owners have shown that most owners do follow
the maintenance schedules that their manufacturers suggest. In fact,
most people change the oil considerably more often than the manufacturers say they need to.
Preventive maintenance is not the only "preventive" concept that is
widely accepted. So is preventive medicine. It may mean different
things to different people, but everybody thinks it is a good idea. The
concept did not happen overnight; it took years. An even better example is preventive dentistry. The American Dental Association pushed
the concept of dental checkups for decades. It was done by the association, not by the individual dentist. Preventive dentistry was promoted in
a low key way over a long time. I grew up with twice a year dental checkups and I expect there are other people here who did as well.
But preventive law is not where preventive dentistry, preventive
medicine or preventive maintenance are. That we all know, or we would
not have a conference of this nature. I think mostly it is the fault of the
Bar, because they prevented lawyers from marketing. Lawyers, for socalled ethical reasons, were not able to tell people how they could be
helpful. Gradually, over time, people learned to go elsewhere or go
without when it came to legal services, except in certain narrow, traditional areas where everybody knew that you had to have a lawyer.
We need only look at the legal needs study done by the American
Bar Foundation back in the mid-1970's - it is still the best study of its
type around - to be reminded that two-thirds of American adults have
not used a lawyer more than once. Those infrequent uses fell into four
distinct categories that accounted for close to eighty-five percent of the
total. People simply did not go to lawyers if there was any other choice.
When asked why, they stated that their primary problems were: 1) Not
knowing which lawyer was interested in their problem and competent to
handle it; and (2) not knowing what it would cost. Their estimates, particularly for preventive services like wills, averaged well over the actual
costs. You still find that today. People over-estimate the cost of getting
a will done. But now I think we are well on the way to solving those
problems. We have been for several years and I think it is only a matter
of time before, as I said, preventive law becomes a buzz word.
The two keys are legal services plans and competition, and they are
not entirely separate. Legal services plans are reducing the transaction
cost of getting lawyers and clients together. The problem has been that
because the middle class individual was not a repeat customer and did
not have a continuing need for legal services, he got out of the habit of
finding one. From a lawyer's point of view, not only was he ethically
prohibited from going out and reaching out to that client, but it was not
cost effective because the person simply did not have enough legal
problems. Well, the legal services plan, by making an advance arrangement between a whole group of clients and a few lawyers, reduces the
costs of obtaining needed legal advice. That is one of the big advan-
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tages of the plans and one of the reasons why plans lend themselves so
well to preventive law.
Another way is alleviating the fear of the cost of legal services,
either by pre-payment of the lawyer, as in a traditional pre-paid plan, or
through a published fee schedule which may or may not include discounts. Just having a fee schedule out there alleviates some of the fear
of the cost and some of the fear of going to lawyers.
Competition is the other key, and advertising really enhances it. If
you can publish your fees, if you can publish the fact that you are available to do a certain kind of work, you will bring people to the door with
that kind of work. If you can advertise the fact that you practice preventive law, then you have a better opportunity to practice preventive law. I
suggest that if the bar association had spent forty years pushing legal
checkups we would probably have a far different situation than we have
now. But that did not happen. I think it will happen with the kind of
advertising, and the competition for clients, that we have now. There is
downward pressure on fees. There is a need to specialize. Just get the
word out what you can do for people. If you cannot tell them what you
can do, they are not going to come to you.
I think there are scattered pieces of evidence that preventive law
sells. I will highlight a half dozen. First, there is the popularity of the
telephone access plans. These legal services plans emphasize telephone
advice. "Pick up the phone and call your lawyer any time, 24-hours a
day. It is an 800 number, call it, get whatever kind of advice you need.
If we cannot answer it, and we can answer it in seventy percent of the
time, we will refer you to a lawyer on our specialty panel, and the fee will
be well below the going rate." These plans cost $70 to $180 a year,
even though the service can be provided on a true group basis for less
than $10 annually. The difference is marketing expense, adverse reaction and profit.
Some of these plans are doing very well. One of the investment
houses recently published a review of the financial services group. It
included some very well-known companies, like Dow Jones and American Express. They called it a "high flying group." The number one and
three positions on the list were held by two companies selling, through
credit cards or multi-level marketing organizations, legal services plans
at hefty prices. They are selling a new service that requires considerable
education of the consumer, but one that consumers will embrace when
they understand it.
A second piece of evidence that preventive law sells is that lawyer
use doubles when people have a legal services plan, but litigation increases hardly at all. This is true even in true group plans where the
members have not chosen to pay for a plan. If using a lawyer is made
easy and inexpensive, people will bring questions to lawyers that they
otherwise would not have, and are more apt to contact one earlier in the
course of a problem.
A third piece of evidence is the growing popularity of legal services
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plans with particular special interest groups, whether it is a trade association, a particular field of law, or a legal services plan directed at a particular membership group such as doctors or insurance agents. Another
is focus groups done by the insurance industry and by consumer marketers. They confirm people's fear of lawyers, and ignorance of what they
can do. They uniformly reveal a desire for expert assistance.
People would like to have a legal expert on call. That is born out
not only by the focus groups, but by the success of experiments like Tele
Law. The usual failure of Tele Law programs is publicity. The taped
information program is popular with those who know of it, but there is
not enough money to mail enough brochures, so they are relegated to
bar associations headquarters, library bulletin boards, and places like
that.
A.A.R.P. recently did a telephone advice hotline experiment in
Pittsburgh using staff lawyers. They have not published their final report yet, but the utilization of the plan was very high. They found out
that, depending how you measure it, somewhere between 1.5% and 3%
of all the people who receive a little postcard announcing the service
responded in the first few months with a call for legal information. Finally, some unpublished consumer research explored the appeal of an
ombudsman service and found that people liked the idea of having
panels of experts available, particularly in the areas of financial and family counseling. I believe we are going to see programs combining legal
and financial services, and ones combining counseling and legal services
in the near future. I am surprised there are not some now.
What does all this tell practitioners out there? That there is plenty
of opportunity to get involved in preventive law. I see three excellent
ways for the typical general practitioner who is interested in individuals
as clients to do preventive law. One is through free legal services plans.
Not the ones where you try to get people to pay for a service they have
never used before. That's too difficult; it requires too much education.
No, a free plan where you simply make an advance arrangement to provide free consultations and certain follow-up services in return for endorsement by the sponsoring group. There is a lot of potential there,
and there are already thousands of plans like this.
A second way to do preventive law is to promote legal checkups,
whether of the thorough type advocated by Louis Brown or the simpler
type some others have advocated. Finally, I really think lawyers need to
consider combining their services with those of non-lawyers, whether
they are real estate agents, investment services, or social workers. I am
really at a loss to explain why that process is not further along.
James Luce: I have been asked to speak on the topic of client education
and demand for preventive legal services. Dean Dauer has stated that
our task here today is to reach a working definition of "preventive law."
The following thoughts are those of a commercial litigator. I must warn
you that I enjoy litigation. The process of distilling an ounce of truth
from a ton of facts and then mixing that ounce with a few years of civil
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procedure to produce a just result is exciting. But, I am not a trojan
horse in your midst. The litigation process is too expensive and time
consuming to be cost-effective in most disputes. Thus, litigators have
been called upon in recent years to use private arbitration, judicial arbitration, alternative dispute resolution and endless settlement conference
and other procedural "cut-outs" to avoid trial. In the San Francisco bay
area it is not uncommon for a Superior Court commercial case to take
four years just to get to trial. In municipal court, commercial cases almost never get to trial and the parties end up settling out of sheer
frustration.
A.

What is Preventive Law?

It is a different system, outside of the judicial system and outside of
the arbitration system, or is it inside the system? In either case, is preventive law likely to change the existing systems that are not working or
is it just a band-aid being applied to a mortal wound? Is it a transactional guide whereby businesses and lawyers use check lists to avoid
problems or is it a behavioral modification technique whereby lawyers
teach business personnel how to anticipate and prevent problems? Is it
designed to merely increase compliance with law or is it something
designed to creatively use the law? Is it a system to be used offensively
or defensively? That is, do we teach our clients preventive law so that
they may be more responsible, law-abiding and organized entities, or do
we teach them preventive law so that they may be better able to compete? Is preventive law a tool to be used in the ivory tower or is it a
weapon to be used in the trenches? That is, are we developing preventive law to aid society in general or our clients in particular?
I am hopeful that this conference and the research and development which follows from it will generate answers to these questions.
B.

Why is Demand Low?

The demand for preventive law services is low for two basic reasons.
First, there is a perception in the business community that it will not
work. There is a lack of predictability in the law and how the law will be
applied in any particular case. Preventive law is perceived as not being
cost effective, and is viewed as an unwanted interference with business
operations. (Who wants another efficiency expert?).
Second, there is a lack of an appropriate "delivery system." A preventive law system requires the expertise of a C.P.A., a transactional attorney, a litigator, an environmental law specialist, a labor law specialist
and an estate planner. A small business usually cannot afford the normal preventive law audit. The medium-size business either cannot afford or cannot find a law firm with these capabilities to represent it. A
large corporation usually has an in-house counsel staff that is understandably reluctant to seek the assistance of a preventive law audit. Even
when willing to suggest an audit to management, in-house counsel is
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frequently not sufficiently independent of management to effect the
changes suggested by the audit.
C.

How To Increase Consumption

Obviously, the major task is to convince business people that preventive law is both affordable and effective. There are three basic means
by which this can be accomplished. First, the lawyer must take the risk
with the client and point out that the decision to not use preventive law
services in today's world is fiscal insanity. The cost of one complex commercial trial exceeds the cost of the average legal audit. Thus, if the
legal audit prevents one suit, it will have paid for itself. The mere fact of
the existence of pending litigation raises the threat that competitive information will be lost during the discovery process and that the company's management personnel may be held hostage by that same
discovery process. Since every commercial case today has the potential
of becoming a tort case with tort damages, it has become more imperative than ever to avoid even the filing of a law suit. Furthermore, prejudgment attachment remedies can cause severe dislocation. In short,
the days when the judicial process of hide and delay could be used as a
substitute for planning are over. We have reached a point in our legislative and judicial history where the mere filing of a lawsuit can be as devastating as the losing of a lawsuit was in the not-too distant past.
The second method for us to use in increasing consumption is publicity, in its various forms, in the business world and otherwise to make
the general public aware of the existence of preventive law. It is always
easier to have people change their behavior to that which they perceive
as conforming rather than to that which they perceive as unfamiliar.
The major difficulty with publicizing preventive law is that from a typical
press perspective, preventive law is a non-event. One simply does not
see headlines reading: "Law Firm Avoids the Filing of a Five Million
Dollar Suit."
The third task is to make the law sufficiently predictable in outcome
and limited in scope so that it is possible to make plans concerning it.
The lack of judicial predictability has become a crisis in California, a
crisis which is spreading to other states. One need only compare the
holding in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. ,5 with Sun and Sand Inc. v. United California
Bank, 6 to see the seriousness of the problem. In Li, the California
Supreme Court negated California Civil Code § 1714 and changed California from a contributory negligence state to a comparative negligence
state, without the help of the legislature. The supreme court justified
this blatant intrusion into the legislative domain on the grounds that the
court had the inherent right to interpret the common law and that California Civil Code § 1714 was "merely a codification of the Common
Law." Li clearly recognized that the court had no right to negate legisla5. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
6. 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978).
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tive enactments in the guise of interpretation. Less than three years
later in Sun and Sand, the court imposed comparative negligence principles on Article 4406 of the California Commercial Code. This decision
is insupportable in light of the fact that the Commercial Code is expressly not a codification of the common law, as is made clear in Commercial Code Article 1103. More recent examples include the
application of tort damages to contract cases and the abolition of the five
hundred year old common law rule that a landowner is not liable for
natural conditions on the owner's land.
The lack of legislative restraint need no more proof than the fact
that one can rarely find the law in the bound volume of any annotated
code, state or federal. Most of the law must be found, if at all, in the
pocket parts.
This lack of predictability has created a growing disrespect for and
distrust of the law. This lack of predictability is also the major problem
facing this conference. Education of the public on the subject of preventive law will prove impossible if the public does not perceive the law as a
dependable guide to behavior.
My concerns are shared by many people in the business community.
I have been authorized to quote from a presentation made by Mr. A. C.
Markkula, Jr. of Apple Computer, Inc. at the recent conference on Alternative Dispute Resolution at the University of Santa Clara:
In general, most of my concerns have to do with a fear that
providing a short-term solution that is divorced from the existing system, may reduce the motivation to correct the fundamental problems, and thereby prolong the implementation of
sorely needed improvements. I believe that we have the best
legal foundation in the world; we've just let it get out of control
in certain areas. In addition, I think we may not have adopted
modern techniques as rapidly as some other areas of society.
Harold Brown: My name is Harold Brown. I am in private practice in
Los Angeles. I thought I would spend a couple of seconds on the problem of why corporate delivery of preventive law is so difficult.
From my experience, preventive law is basically long range planning. At best it is sold to upper management, but it is implemented by
middle management. Middle management tends to be, too often, a
short term, short-sighted position. Middle managers often do not look
beyond a short term employment with this company, although they may
expect longer term employment with the next. They concentrate on
preventing the short term problems which can effect performance and,
thus, their employability at other jobs. They are less interested in the
long range solutions that preventive law provides.
I have four suggestions for the resolution of this conflict. One, the
short term or the middle manager cannot be asked to pay the fee for the
long term plan. Whether the fee is an hourly arrangement or a retainer
fee, the short term middle manager will resist it, cut it and eliminate it.
Second, the middle manager must be required to consult with a preven-

1988]

PREVENTIVE LA W

tive lawyer. It cannot be left to his or her discretion, because too often
the long range planning will interfere with the short range goals, and the
long range legal health will be sacrificed for short term profitability.
Third, except in emergencies, there cannot be a direct channel between
the preventive lawyer or the provider of the legal services and upper
management. Or if there is, it must be silent. What happens when there
is such a direct channel is that the middle manager sees the preventive
lawyer as more of a snoop or a spy for upper management than as an
assistant to the middle manager in his or her management. The result is
that problems do not get shared. The middle manager views the preventive lawyer as simply one who creates problems with upper management and not as a problem solver and, consequently, refuses to give the
lawyer the necessary information to discover a problem and reach a suitable solution. Finally, the preventive lawyer must understand the short
term goals of the middle manager and help deliver services which not
only effectuate long term solutions, but also short term solutions required by the middle manager.
Forest Mosten: My name is Forest S. Mosten and I am in private practice
in a very small firm near the Los Angeles Airport. The focus of our firm
is to provide quality legal services to middle income persons. Our firm
is a direct access service provider on a fee for service basis. Our clients
are individuals who are not part of a group or prepaid legal services
plan.
Our main substantive areas of the law are family law, general civil
litigation and small business and real estate transactions. In addition to
stressing the important nature of the client consultation in all matters,
we attempt to improve service in two ways: utilizing a preventive approach, in both symptomatic and asymptomatic situations, and utilizing
alternative dispute resolution in both the planning of transactions and
resolution of disputes.
Before I develop these themes, I was asked earlier to share some of
my own professional odyssey to give some background to my commitment to preventive law for middle income people. You might notice
that I said people, not clients. Clienthood is not a genetic nor a permanent characteristic, and people touch the law in their daily personal and
business transactions much more often than they consult with lawyers.
My involvement with legal services for middle income people
started when I was a founding partner in the firm Meyers, Jacoby and
Mosten, also known as the Legal Clinic of Jacoby and Meyers. We had
two main goals: first, making lawyers more accessible and affordable to
middle income people, and second, to improve the quality of representation that middle income people received. After four years, just as we
were about to expand outside of Los Angeles, I felt that we were on the
verge of accomplishing the first goal of improving affordability and accessibility. However, I felt that the heavy focus of achieving this goal
conflicted with improving the quality of representation. I resigned and
spent two productive years as a law professor at Mercer University con-
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centrating in the areas of client counseling, negotiation and professional
responsibility.
In 1978, I received an appointment from the Carter Administration
to head-up the area of consumer protection for the Los Angeles Regional Office of the Federal Trade Commission.
A.

Preventive Law Application in a Small Law Office

I heard it rumored that I was invited to this conference because I am
the world's most notorious example of a walking failure in making preventive law work. I have advertised in the Yellow Pages: "Prevention
Saves Money" and offered services such as personal periodic checkup
and small business legal audit. I have spoken about preventive law to
many lawyer and business groups and to the general public in media
appearances. Despite these efforts, I can honestly report that I have
never had a client retain my firm on a first visit to perform asymptomatic
legal services. My failures do not end here. On at least two occasions I
have had hot leads to provide preventive legal services for groups of
middle income consumers only to have the leads fizzle.
Let me relate one of those aborted attempts. I had a client in a real
estate transaction who was Administrator of a credit union of a Fortune
500 Company. I had been representing him for several weeks before he
brought up the subject of preventive law after seeing some literature in
our waiting room. He said that he thought that a periodic legal checkup
would be a wonderful benefit for credit union members. I mentioned
my collaboration and friendship with Louis Brown and told him that we
would submit a proposal for the plan. Louis was even prepared to pay
for the checkup booklets and mailing costs. I was willing to have my
firm perform the checkup at no charge. Armed with our well thought
out proposal and our generous inducements, my client approached his
Board of Directors and found the proposal nearly unanimously rejected.
Grounds: the board could not see the benefit to its members of having
them spend the time filling out the questionnaire when perhaps no
problem existed; if it did exist, it might be bearable, or if unbearable, it
might be still too expensive or wrenching to solve. Also, it was felt that
the checkup was intrusive and threatening and it might cause some
needless discomfort among the membership.
It must be said we have had much better results using preventive
approaches with our existing clients - but still in symptomatic situations. Suggesting a will or transfer from joint tenancy to tenancy in
common in a divorce matter has accounted for generally favorable client
response and not insignificant income for the firm. Our efforts to suggest wills when the client comes in on a consumer or contractual complaint are not so successful. Likewise, a suggestion to review a will or
tenancy arrangements are not generally fruitful two years after the divorce is final and the crisis is less immediate. The immediate relevance
to a pending matter seems to be the causal variable that ignites preventive action.
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So, what lessons can anyone draw from this limited experience?
First, we cannot underestimate the amount of general education that is
necessary to prepare the public to prevent legal problems. The resistance appears less due to antagonism and more to ignorance. Obviously,
present and future providers must be trained to offer and to competently deliver preventive legal services. Such training, of course, requires conceptual orientation as well as technical implementation of the
craft. However, as just mentioned, even if providers are adequately
trained, the very clients who have come in to the law office for nonpreventive purposes and have come to trust the provider have great
resistance to spending time and money on legal prevention when it is
not seen as immediately and directly meeting their curative needs.
Therefore, the problem may be larger than any one or group of wellmeaning and trained preventive lawyers can solve. The emphasis of the
National Center of Preventive Law to offer conceptual research and development in this field will be invaluable. Generic advertising on specific applications of preventive law funded by government and business
may be a start to build the receptivity of the public to prevention. Concrete demonstrations of how prevention actually saves money to individuals may start to wear down consumer resistance - particularly when
providers recognize that it is a satisfying and profitable devotion of professional time.
B.

Preventive Planningin the Resolution of Disputes

An area ripe for immediate applications by both transaction lawyers
and litigators is the planning for the process of solving future disputes.
Lawyers are obsessed with the substantive rights - we start by reading
appellate decisions and we continue in practice by specializing in a substantive area. Clearly, the method of resolution of disputes affects rights
and people's lives. Rarely does a settlement of a lawsuit or negotiation
of a transactional document lack problems of future enforcement. The
parties often concentrate on the fact that $10,000 is owed in one year
and the amount of the penalty for nonpayment. Much less emphasis
seems to be placed on how the collection (including penalties) can be
enforced. For example, arbitration clauses are much more common
now but are often not refined as to how to implement arbitration, how to
select the decision maker, which issues are subject to arbitration, what
rules apply for discovery, or how awards can be enforced. As a means of
collection, do not forget the opportunity to get security for the obligation. It is true that one can never plug up all the holes of future disputes. However, if arbitration clauses are often neglected in careful
drafting, imagine the problems that lawyers might have with drafting
clauses for mediation, mini-trials, summary jury trials, or even procedures for good faith bargaining and notices before litigation. Litigators
are often too focused on solving the immediate storm and planners may
lack sensitivity to the intricacies of dispute resolution. This is an area in
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which attention as well as training may lead to improved service to the
public.
Thus, the planning of dispute procedures may be an area which is
ripe for study and consideration by the Center and both transaction and
litigation lawyers across substantive lines.
Robert Shafton: My name is Bob Shafton and I have been a partner in a
Los Angeles office of a large national law firm, Stroock, Stroock and
Lavan. In addition, I'm an optimist. I believe in self-realizing prophecies despite the fact I, like Woody, have met and was adopted by and
became a fan of Louis M. Brown thirty years ago. Only once in my career have I earned a fee for what I would call a classic example of preventive law.
We have already overused our time so I will be very brief, and say
first the reason I am an optimist is I really believe that preventive law is a
series of specific subjects. Woody alluded to this: it is a process, not a
happening that goes both to what we are doing today and to the general
concept about which we are talking and with which we are wrestling so
hard. There are several examples about how to educate clients and the
bar. First, I would try in every way I could to expand the circulation of
the Preventive Law Reporter. I think the work of the publication does a
damn good job of sensitizing clients. I have given away probably forty
subscriptions to clients that I have checked years later who continued to
subscribe, teasing me about the fact that they are not calling me any
more because they just read that publication. To which I respond,
"that's terrific, that's wonderful! I think you should refer to it, excerpt
from it, xerox from it, even though that's probably illegal, do it anyway,
and I think that Mr. Brown and others would love it if you did." See that
accountants, attorneys, clients and everybody get it and everything else
like it.
Preventive medicine is not harmful to the health of physicians. Attorneys should not worry about the negative financial impact of preventive law. We should go for it. It is not unethical, we will get to that later,
and it is good for our practice. It certainly is good for our clients. Estate planning and tax planning as Connie pointed out certainly are key
bellwethers of the use of preventive law. Think about how much money
will be earned by hotels, restaurants, publishers, tax lawyers, accountants and others whether or not the present tax law goes all the way
through Congress. Think about what is going to happen in the next six
months.
This conference is certainly a milestone. Ed and Louis and others
here should feel very, very good. And I think that speaks extremely well
for the future. How do we get this to the top of the agenda of the business roundtable? How will we get the press? I will end with the thought
that the buttons to push are the CEO's and internal counsel, because
outside counsel will not always see preventive law as being in their selfinterest. It has got to come from the top down as most things do. Notice that it is the Dean of the law school that is doing it here today. I
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think it is okay not to define what preventive law is. Define means finish
off. We do not have to finish it off. We can start and I hope this is a
beginning, and I think it is a damn good one.
Edward Smith: My name is Ed Smith and I am Executive Director of the
Rhode Island Bar Association. An Executive Director of a bar association has many responsibilities, but absolutely no authority. Any bit of
information I have to say about preventive law is included in my article.
I cannot cover the material in the article in three minutes. My thirty
years of meetings planning tell me we have to keep time schedules. You
are all ready for the coffee break, not to listen to me. I think this is a
tremendous conference in that it has brought out many things that we
can do as associations. Administrators have to have guidance from
those people who know what needs to be done. Administrators know
how to do it, but the members must come up with the objective. Administrators can put out nice bar journals that can say, "This is the 350th
anniversary of the State of Rhode Island." However, somebody who has
the expertise has to write and research the history of those 350 years for
the publication. Unless we, as administrators, can excite our lawyers to
do things that we cannot do as administrators, then we are not going to
get the job done as associations. So when you go out and talk to people
within your association, to those who have the bright ideas on what to
do, try to get them to take the initiative in starting an association program or policy.
Too often we, as administrators, hear the question, "Why don't
'they' do this?" As an administrator, I do not want to get into arguments by saying, "Why don't you do it?" That does not make me popular, but sometimes it does get an article or a program going. My
message then is this: Association executives are expert at getting things
done, but are normally resented and in trouble if they assume the policy
setting role. I hope this conference will bring forth concepts in preventive law that can be made part of bar associations programs throughout
the nation.
IV.

PREVENTIVE LAW IN GOVERNMENT PRACTICE

Mike Milleman: My name is Mike Milleman and I teach law at the University of Maryland School of Law. I am going to talk today about the
public practice of preventive law, by, in effect, sharing with you the autopsy of a public law audit. It was an audit that was quite removed from
the commercial world; an audit that I helped conduct when I worked in
the Maryland Attorney General's Office. I was hired as Chief General
Counsel with a specific charge to develop a preventive law program. We
learned a lot in the course of developing that program.
In reflecting on this public law audit, I believe there is a justification
for the practice of preventive law in government - indeed a preventive
law mandate - that is quite different than its practice in the private sector. On the other hand, I think there are a lot of similarities, including
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the existence of significant common benefits and tensions that have
been mentioned by a number of people today, and about which I will
also speak.
When I first came into the Maryland Attorney General's Office in
1979, I took a tour of the various general counsels' offices to try to identify the most perplexing legal problems that state government faced our "legal pathology" if you will. Those of us on the tour asked a seemingly simple question to our lawyers: "Where are we in trouble?" We
received a responsive question: "Do you really want to know?" We
glibly answered "yes." I think that was the right answer or I would not
be here. But the issues raised by that dialogue are a lot more complicated than the brevity of that dialogue indicates.
One problem we learned a lot about, both from advocates outside
the Office and our own assistant attorneys general, was a tragic human,
and profound legal, problem. Over a long period of years in Maryland,
a number of people had been wrongly confined in mental institutions;
they were mentally retarded, not mentally ill. If assistant attorneys general look hard, they also will find this misplaced population in virtually
every state.
These lost souls were committed to mental institutions long before
the due process revolution; before one facing commitment had a right
to a hearing. One was committed as early as 1928! Many had been committed two and three decades ago. Some were sixteen and seventeen
year old children who had been committed more recently. All were
inappropriately placed, without treatment. They were not receiving rehabilitative services appropriate to their condition. In short, there were
compelling arguments that their initial and continuing commitments
were illegal and unconstitutional.
In response to this described problem, and with the consent and
support of the administrators of the mental health system, we performed
the equivalent of a legal audit. We looked at records, examined files,
and conducted interviews. We found over 300 mentally retarded persons within this misplaced population, warehoused in the back wards of
the State's mental institutions. Many of the records contained entries
that told the troubled history of the asylum and read like excerpts from
Charles Dickens' novels.
The symbol of this misplaced population was the "quiet man."
That is how institutional staff referred to him. He was, indeed, a quiet
man. He was committed to a state mental institution in 1957 when he
was a sixteen year old retarded boy. Then there were no alternative
special education placements, as there are today.
When he was committed, he had some basic social skills: the capacity to talk, the capacity for self-care, and other competencies that survive
moderate retardation. However, over the years, he had deteriorated.
He had been treated with the "therapy of the time," including electroshock therapy and insulin therapy, and he had regressed because of
the lack of appropriate care.
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When I met him and attempted to talk to him as part of the audit, he
did not respond. He had not talked for several years. He sat quietly,
hands clasped behind knees, rocking back and forth. His life was a
tragic reality, and he was a powerful symbol of our potential civil liability. He was, as one of my colleagues on the Attorney General's staff
said, "a self-contained potential civil rights explosion."
Our justifications for beginning to deal with this extraordinary
problem, thus, were two-fold. One set of justifications was pragmatic,
mirroring those offered today to justify the practice of preventive law in
the private sector. The potential for the award damages in civil rights
cases was very substantial. The public exposure for the client administrators and the State would have been devastating. (As I later learned as
a government lawyer, it is a rule that public exposure of sensitive governmental problems must occur during the legislative session when the
oversight committee is considering the budget of the problem-ridden
agency.) Disclosure would have seriously restricted policy options that,
otherwise, would have been available to the executive branch of government. A reviewing court or oversight committee inevitably would have
been tempted to make decisions to resolve this pervasive problem that,
in normal circumstances, would be best left to the executive branch. Finally, it is not difficult to imagine the time, expense, and executive energy it would have taken to litigate the several decades old civil rights
problems of this misplaced 300 person population.
So there are lots of good pragmatic reasons to deal with the arguably illegal and unconstitutional confinement of 300 mentally retarded
persons in mental institutions; the same reasons that justify corporate
audits, for example, to measure, and help assure compliance with environmental laws. But there is another, at least equally important reason,
to practice preventive law if you are an assistant attorney general. We
have heard interesting and accurate suggestions today about the terms
of the original social compact, the moral source of government. We
have been told that the compact was born in the necessity of government to seek peace by allocating essential resources, protecting vulnerable citizens from those who over-reach, and generally insuring the
public good.
These governmental responsibilities are embodied in law. In this
sense, the raison d'etre of government is law implementation, and the essential work of governmental lawyers is civil and criminal law enforcement. The practice of preventive law in the public sector is an
indispensable means of civil law enforcement. Thus, this practice has a
basis more compelling than pragmatism. It discharges the fundamental
responsibility of government.
However, you can imagine some of the tensions that a preventive
law audit produces for governmental clients. The first tension, which
surfaced when we met with our clients about this special audit, concerned who we were. Let me read to you an excerpt from the Model
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Rules of Professional Conduct that describes a basic ambiguity in the
governmental attorney-client relationship:
Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific
agency, it is generally the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau,
either the department of which the bureau is a part or the government as a whole may be the client for purposes of this Rule.
How does one translate this relationship to the administrator of a
troubled state agency? Perhaps as follows:
Administrator Jones, I am your lawyer or at least you are part
of my client responsibility. But you are just one part of it. I
also represent the governor, and he is part of it, but he is not
the whole of it either. I represent the legislature, and they are
part of my client responsibility. To make it simple Administrator Jones, when the three parts of this fragmented governmental personality coalesce into a single entity, that entity is my
client.
It helps to be Catholic to understand this almost divine relationship.
So the first tension in the practice of public preventive law may be
confusion. The governing rule of the adversary system, invoked in the
context of litigation, is breathtakingly simple; indeed, grossly oversimplified I believe. It is "my client right or wrong." As counsel, I cannot
violate ethical mandates or the law, but I can, and must, vigorously defend my client in almost all other respects.
When one compares this apparently simple rule with the complexity
of a preventive law audit focused on problems that may lead to substantial legal liability, the potential role confusion is very significant both for
client and lawyer. I expect that I am going to hear appropriate criticism
about the failure of law professors to introduce law students to this
complexity.
Aggravating that potential role confusion, assistant attorneys general often physically are placed in the agencies they represent, are sometimes paid by those agencies, and feel the most understandable human
instinct to befriend their clients. When asked by a sometimes frustrated
client whether you are an advocate or auditor, an advisor or defender, a
supporter or critic, it is sometimes difficult to answer "all of the above."
This potential role confusion can present the biggest risk to the practice
of preventive law, the erosion of client confidence to the point that a
client no longer wishes to take advantage of the invaluable preventive
law resource that he has available to him.
These problems can be summarized in the context of our particular
audit in a response that we might have received from the administrators
of the mental health system. I emphasize that this response is hypothetical rather than actual; in fact, the administrators in my example were
supportive and anxious to resolve the problem we jointly had identified.
Administrator Jones: Are you saying that we have to find more
appropriate placements for 300 institutionalized persons? If
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so, do you know what percentage of our budget will be encumbered by this exercise? We would prefer, very frankly, to spend
our money on young people who have mental health problems.
The people you have identified are older, and many will die in
five, ten, or fifteen years in the hospital. Why must we provide
costly appropriate treatment for them? And, if we do, don't we
run the risk of emphasizing, rather than minimizing, this extraordinary problem that you have unearthed? After all, we
cannot sneak 300 people out of mental institutions under cover
of dark. The advocacy community has some of the characteristics of sharks; when it smells liability, it masses.
Assistant attorneys general must be powerful advocates for the rule
of law to respond convincingly to these legitimate concerns.
There are other antidotes to this understandable client angst. One
is careful role clarification. An assistant attorney general has to be very
honest initially with her client about the limits of the public practice of
preventive law. It is rooted in the law - in my cases constitutional and
statutory law - not policy. It is based on advice, not coercion. While it
is the lawyer's obligation to honestly assess potential legal liability, it is
the administrator's prerogative to respond to that advice with a range of
lawful policy options that maintain flexibility and efficiency.
Another antidote is confidentiality. Sometimes it will be in the interest of government to "get out in front" of a problem by publicly noting its proactive response to it. Other times it will not. In these latter
instances, assistant attorneys general must bathe every step of the preventive law process in the attorney-client privilege, the work product
privilege (where applicable), and, yes, executive or governmental privilege. The predicate for client cooperation is confidentiality.
This need for confidentiality often poses serious problems for assistant attorneys general. The work of government often is, and should be,
available for public inspection and review. However, because preventive
law is such an essential component of public law practice and, through
its civil law enforcement, it supports the creation and expansion of existing privilege law. For example, recognition of the much maligned executive or governmental privilege is warranted when assistant attorneys
general are able to demonstrate that it is necessary to protect communications that are essential to voluntary law compliance.
Aggressive advocacy can also prevent the erosion of client confidence that sometimes accompanies the practice of preventive law.
When the practice of preventive law created a good faith defense to litigation, an assistant attorney general must aggressively and convincingly
assert that defense. In short, there comes a time to "show the flag."
This may involve a bit of posturing, as well as a lot of good lawyering,
but it makes the practice of preventive law cost effective and a lot more
fun for the client, especially when you are successful.
Indeed, in the middle of the preventive law exercise that I have
been discussing, advocates for the mentally retarded filed a class action
lawsuit against the administrators of the mental health system, arguing
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that the 300 mentally retarded patients were illegally and unconstitutionally confined. We filed an answer to this lawsuit, not a motion to
dismiss. We attached to our answer documents that indicated the
dimensions of the preventive law exercise: the state's identification of
the problem, its proposed solution, and the significant progress that it
had made in the implementation of its own remedial plan.
The judge, acting on his own motion, dismissed the complaint in a
forceful opinion in which he praised the governmental response to the
problem. That was the most effective message to our clients that the
practice of preventive law can be pragmatic, as well as the right thing to
do.
In closing, let me return to the quiet man. As you recall, he had
been wrongly institutionalized for over two decades. He was placed in
an appropriate community-based program, as were many of the 300
mentally retarded residents of the mental institutions. (These placements, by the way, generally have been extraordinarily successful.)
In a short period of time the quiet man began to talk, and was exhibiting positive behaviors that he had not shown for years. When I
heard this encouraging news, I approached the Attorney General and
said, "I have happy news for you. The quiet man is talking." The Attorney General said, "That's just wonderful. I hope he never stops talking
again. But for your sake, mine, and the sake of preventive law, I hope he
never learns the words civil rights litigation."
It helps to be a little bit lucky in the practice of public preventive
law.
In sum, I suggest that, for assistant attorneys general, the practice
of preventive law is not simply a pragmatic option. It is a mandate that
inheres in the rule of law itself, and it is an indispensable means of discharging the public duty to enforce the law.
Major John Meixell: I am Major John Meixell, with the Office of The
Judge Advocate General of the United States Army. I serve as the Deputy Chief of the Army Legal Assistance Office. While Clarine has addressed the state entity as the client, I am going to be addressing the
individual employee as the client and how we aim the Preventive Law
Program toward that individual.
By way of introduction, let me state that the Army has historically
had a very strong interest in Preventive Law and feels a very close tie to
the organization that is sponsoring this seminar. In November of 1964
the First Emil Brown Preventive Law Award was made to the United
States Army's Preventive Law Program. While I can not take any credit
for this, the plaque is still very proudly displayed at our offices in the
Pentagon.
In the 1985 Department Of Defense Authorization Act, we received
formal recognition of the Armed Services Legal Assistance Program.
This provides a number of legal services to all members of the armed
forces and to family members of those military individuals. The Army
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has implemented a number of regulations that expand upon this. The
first is the Army Regulation 27-3 and I will have copies available. This
regulation outlines in more detail who is eligible for legal assistance and
the types of legal assistance that may be provided. The types of service
include domestic relations, wills and estates, adoptions and name
changes, non-support and indebtedness, taxes, landlord-tenant relations, consumer affairs, civil suits, Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act
and other services as the commander may deem appropriate. I mentioned the Legal Assistants Officers; we have about 248 Legal Assistance
Officers world-wide. These are attorneys who provide the retail legal
assistance to the soldiers and their family members and can cover the
whole gamut that I described earlier. We have a separate regulation,
Army Regulation 600-14, entitled The Army Preventive Law Program. This
regulation formally recognizes a Preventive Law Program for the Army.
This program is a command responsibility and thus the commander is
required to implement a local Preventive Law Program responsive to
local problems. While the lawyers are the main players in this program,
by making the commander responsible, we have insured a significant degree of command interest, influence, and support which goes a long way
in effectively implementing the program.
This past year, as a part of our tax program, the Chief of Staff of the
Army sent a letter of direction to all subordinate commanders directing
them to implement a strong and effective tax assistance program. This
emphasis has raised the level of consciousness of all commanders and
resulted in more effective support of the program. This support is manifested in more personnel and resources. Army Regulation 27-3 also
speaks of the Preventive Law Program. It directs that the Army's Legal
Assistance Officers will "prepare and participate in the active preventive
law functions of publicity, education, and training to insure that service
members and their families are informed at a minimum about the following legal information: (a) counseling services available through the
Army's Legal Assistance Program; (b) the importance of seeking legal
advice before taking action that may lead to adverse civil involvements
; (c) the rights and privileges granted by law to assist the service
member; [and] (d) the rights and privileges of service members and
their families as consumers." To further the Legal Assistance program,
the legal assistance officers are encouraged to cover additional subject
matter, and to provide preventive law services which will make aggressive and continuous efforts to ensure that active duty members of the
armed forces and their families are adequately prepared in the event of
deployment.
In addition we have formed an Armed Forces Individual Income
Tax Council which contains representatives of the various armed services to examine all income tax proposals that may impact upon military
members, and make suggestions on changes in these proposals. They
are also asked to educate the members of the armed forces as to their tax
responsibilities and to assist them through the Tax Preparation Pro-
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gram. The four Chiefs of the various armed services Legal Assistance
Divisions get together on a monthly or bimonthly basis in order to exchange ideas, common problems and suggested solutions. Recently, as
a result of one of these meetings, we established contact with the Legal
Services Corporation and began working with them and sharing legal
and educational services. We are exploring the possibility of providing
more comprehensive service to those clients that both organizations
might serve. And finally, we work very closely with the American Bar
Association's Legal Assistance to Military Personnel (LAMP) Committee, that is composed of members of the ABA and representatives of the
armed forces to examine means to provide better civil legal services to
the members of the armed forces.
The military can be a somewhat closed community. As a result, the
legal assistance officers often have a better grasp of our clients and a
rare opportunity to identify their needs and to address those needs.
Our officers provide a comprehensive legal assistance to the clients and
in the process they identify those areas of reoccurring problems which
need to be addressed through the Preventive Law Program. Much is
accomplished at the local installation level. For example, in South Carolina our attorneys identified problems with some retail merchants who
typically aim at the lower ranking enlisted personnel. As a result of the
consumer complaints the legal assistance officers raised, one of the companies was recently investigated by the South Carolina Department of
Consumer Affairs and found to be charging an illegal rate of interest.
The South Carolina Board ordered the company to cease the practice
and to refund excess interest payments to the consumers. This is one of
the more aggressive uses of the Preventive Law Program.
Also we have a chain of command control over our clients that allows us to force them to see a lawyer. As an aside, one can lead a horse
or a soldier to a lawyer but you cannot make him follow the advice. That
was recently pointed out in a tragic air crash at Gander where 248
soldiers were killed. A review of their personal affairs after the crash
indicated that many of them did not have wills or otherwise provide for
the disposition of their property. This despite a very intensive effort on
the part of the chain of command to see that all were offered the opportunity to have a will prepared and to take other opportunities to arrange
their personal affairs. In interviewing survivors of that battalion they
readily acknowledged that they had been put through classes on these
subjects, but as one soldier said, "My family knows where I wanted it to
go so why bother with a will?" This is one problem that I am not sure
we are ever going to resolve.
I have outlined some of the areas that are authorized under the
Legal Assistance Regulation and now want to address three areas of particular importance in our Preventive Law Program. The most obvious
one is in the area of consumer awareness. We try to educate the client
concerning what to look for before signing a commercial contract, and
also aim at information on merchandise schemes that prey on our
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soldiers as in the South Carolina example. A recent problem that has
surfaced within the United States is that a large number of our soldiers
are entering into long term lease arrangements on automobiles as opposed to buying them. This may be fine for the average consumer, but
not for the soldier that enters into a four year lease and after one year
receives orders to go to Germany, and finds that he is unable to ship the
automobile. He is then stuck with that long term lease and effectively
denied use of the car. We highlighted that problem and are taking steps
to educate the consumer concerning the problems with these contracts
and to work with him in resolving the existing problem contracts.
The tax assistance program consists of establishing Unit Tax Assistors at each unit and volunteer tax preparers through the Army Community services Organization. These individuals are trained on the
preparation of income tax returns. In the tax program, finally, we have
Legal Assistants Officers at each installation. The tax program is
designed to educate the client about their tax obligations and, to warn of
the danger of individuals who prepare tax returns and then offer the
soldier a highly discounted immediate payment. We have a structure in
which the lower level unit tax advisors and volunteer tax preparers will
prepare the bulk of the tax returns for the individual and then pyramiding up to the Legal Assistants Officer to resolve any questions that are
beyond the capabilities of these volunteers. Finally in the areas of personal affairs we stress very strongly the preparation of wills, powers of
attorney and, as indicated earlier, pre-mobilization planning.
I think a large portion of the methods we use throughout the Legal
Assistance and Preventive Law Programs are educational in nature.
First of course is educating the attorneys as to the need for preventive
law training. We do that by keeping them fully informed of current developments. This can be done through electronic messages which go
out on a fairly regular basis to provide updates and current information.
We have a monthly publication called The Army Lawyer which is published by The Judge Advocate General's School in Charlottesville, Virginia. This publication includes a section dealing with current topics of
interest in the legal assistance area. The Air Force has what they call
Short Burst, published on a monthly basis and distributed to their Legal
Assistance Officers. This publication concentrates on one particular
area of legal assistance interest and provides a concentrated amount of
information. A recent Short Burst dealt with consumer affairs, and consisted of a six page letter dealing with various aspects of this topic and
then backed it up with a large amount of resource material.
We have a semi-annual one week training course at The Judge Advocate General's School for Legal Assistance Officers. The most recent
one included Representative Pat Schroeder discussing recent legislative
developments affecting the military, and a half day pitch by the Federal
Trade Commission as to some of the resources they had available to
assist us in the consumer affairs area. And finally we engage in inspection visits of the various field offices. Yesterday I was at Fitzsimmons
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Army Hospital in Denver and at Fort Carson in Colorado Springs, talking to them about their programs, and to the attorneys about their
hands on training and finding out the areas in which we could share
knowledge.
At the local level this involves classes to the soldiers, newspaper
articles in the post newspaper, radio and TV spots on the on-post stations. Overseas we have our own television network and instead of commercial announcements they have public service announcements. Many
of these are in the preventive law area. There is an annual legal checkup form. It is a multi-page document that is probably useless as far as an
actual checkup, but it is an excellent tool in the estate planning area. I
usually give it to clients after they have completed a will, saying "fill this
out and keep it with your will; it will help your personal representative in
handling your estate." We are currently studying a simplified annual
legal checkup that will be mandatory throughout the Army. This will
highlight those areas where the soldier needs to consult with an attorney, i.e. changed circumstances requiring an updated will. Also, those
units that are engaged in a pre-mobilization mission will have a semiannual legal check-up to determine the status of wills, powers of attorney, tax returns and consumer affairs. We are testing an alternative dispute resolution program at Fort Hood, Texas, which could serve as a
small claims court for local disputes. If that is successful, it can be expanded to include rental contracts with a clause requiring arbitration of
any disputes under the contract and the consumer affairs arena.
Edward Dauer: One quick comment and then a quick question. Your
point about the South Carolina case, where you identified one particular
emergency, suggests a shift from private health to public health, to use
that analogy, which is located in sources of individual legal problems in
some environmental factor rather than in the individual affairs of the
client. Individual lawyers seeing individual clients don't have the sense
of overview which they can accumulate into the identification of those
etiologies.
Medicine is often practiced in large groups. Law is also practiced,
sometimes in large firms so that there is something interesting to be said
about the potential for doing an analysis of public "legal health"
through a group practice plan. The question I have is "Have you done
the client cost effectiveness evaluations for delivery of these services?"
Because that seems to have been an issue on the minds of a lot of people
as we have gone through the day.
John Meixell: We do not anticipate doing a cost effectiveness study. It
would be very difficult since so much of our practice has been centralized. Perhaps the answer to cost effectiveness is not one of the important factors in our practice. We have the increasing demand of the legal
services to be provided to the soldiers, while not having a corresponding
increase in resources available. As we have identified, an effective preventive law program will allow us to more effectively utilize the re-
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sources to provide an increased service to the soldier with a non
increasing basis.
In response to your original comment too, as a result of the Gander
accident we have seen, I think, a very effective use of this public aspect.
One of the early ideas was that we could settle all claims against the
insurance company on behalf of the surviving family members. We soon
realized this was perhaps an area much more complex than our individual attorneys could deal with. We then went out and contacted about
ten of the better known law firms nationally, in the area of aviation accident law, and obtained commitments from them for very favorable potential new contracts. Most of them are now operating at the 12.5% to
15% range. We made that available to the legal assistance attorneys that
have been assigned to assist each of the families.
Louis Brown: I just want to make one short comment, the military services is the largest group legal service program in this country by an
enormous number, and my observation is that has been overlooked in
the studies that have been made of group legal service programs.
Clarine Nardi Riddle: In 1984, the Connecticut Attorney General, Joseph
I. Lieberman, commissioned a task force on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to review the policies and procedures of our Attorney General's Office and its impact on the judicial system in light of ADR. The
Attorney General's Office is one of the largest law firms in the state and
is responsible for some 8,000 of the 50,000 civil suits in the state's
courts. Therefore, the procedures in our office regarding dispute resolution could have a very significant impact in the state legal arena. Attorney General Lieberman became interested, as Dean Dauer
mentioned before, in litigation avoidance after a trip to Japan where he
witnessed a justice system that operates with far fewer lawyers than the
United States and where the filing of a lawsuit is viewed as an act of very
last resort in that all attempts to resolve the dispute have failed.
I was asked to head the Attorney General's ADR Task Force and
worked with four other senior attorneys from our office. The Task
Force was charged with reviewing three goals; 1) avoiding legal disputes
altogether, 2) providing alternatives to litigation as a means of resolving
legal disputes, and 3) reducing costs of litigation when resorting to
court is unavoidable.
To meet our charge, the Task Force agreed upon two approaches:
educating ourselves on alternate forms of dispute resolution and reviewing the current caseloads of our various legal departments to determine
where ADR techniques would be beneficial. Our education included
meeting with Dean Edward Dauer, then of the Yale Law School, and
many others in the field, including judges and people in the corporate
and business communities. We also reviewed initiatives already present
in Connecticut in the public and private sector. In the Attorney General's Office itself, we have an extensive number of examples of cases
which we had settled through pre-trial negotiations.
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The Task Force was also quite sensitive to the role of a public law
office and the public policy and constitutional issues it was responsible
to represent. I would refer you to an article in which Judge Harry Edwards raises some of the particular concerns of a public lawyer. 7 Most
of the materials concerning ADR involve peculiarly private sector considerations and rely heavily on assumptions about bottom line business
judgments and financial considerations as the basis for using ADR. This
article, published after we issued our Task Force report, helps define for
the public lawyer the policy considerations prior to utilization of nonjudicial dispute resolution. At the conclusion of our review, we developed a list of "recommendations for action" to achieve the three goals
established by the Attorney General.
A.

Avoiding Legal Disputes

In the category of avoiding legal disputes altogether, the Task Force
recommended a more deliberate process of counseling our client agencies. We firmly believe that this is the best way to avoid litigation. Public clients need to be apprised quickly of changes in the law. Changes in
federal and state statutes and recent court decisions, which affect an
agency, can be numerous and overwhelming. In addition, some new requirements for state agency practice and procedure are so complicated
that client agencies do not understand the full impact. This lack of
knowledge raises the possibility that litigation may be initiated against
the client for failure to follow newly established constitutional, statutory,
or regulatory requirements.
Time dedicated to preventive legal counseling is difficult to marshal. The office is involved with approximately 10,000 lawsuits or contested hearings annually, and defense of those matters is a very timely
process. As a result, the counseling process sometimes takes a backseat
to other "hot" priorities.
The Task Force specifically recommended that the office undertake
a series of seminars on areas of the law which greatly impact all state
agencies, such as our freedom of information laws, our personnel and
labor laws, and our administrative procedures act. Some of the seminars
would also focus solely on ADR techniques and application. In addition,
the Task Force recommended that the Attorney General establish a regular newsletter to supplement the seminars, in order to inform the agencies of any changes in the area covered by the seminars or any other
helpful subject matter areas. The intent of the newsletter would be to
contain an overview in plain, non-legalistic language, of new laws and
cases impacting state agency practice, but then also refer the reader to
an Assistant Attorney General representing that agency for further
information.
7. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
(1986).
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1. Legal Audit

Our second recommendation for avoiding litigation through education of client agencies is the implementation of legal audits. The audit
would consist of regular meetings with personnel of each client agency
to determine whether the agency is complying with the statutory, regulatory, common law and constitutional mandates of the particular agency.
It would not be the same as the legal audit used in business, but would
review agency procedures and regulations for non-compliance with state
and federal requirements.
2.

Administrative Law Judges

In our discussion with the heads of our various legal departments,
there were often comments regarding the quality of decision making at
the state agency hearings. Some of the decisions which our office must
defend in court do not have adequate records by these decision makers.
In light of this problem, the Task Force recommended that a separate
Administrative Law Judge Unit be established by the legislature or executive. The new unit would consist of a pool of Administrative Law
Judges who could be called upon to conduct hearings for state agencies
as needed. This unit would better coordinate the needs of the state.
These judges could then be trained and have more expertise in ADR,
administrative procedures, due process and relevant law. Short of having the Administrative Law Judge pool established, we would develop
extensive training programs for state agencies and their hearing officer
personnel. On April 16, 1986, we conducted such a seminar entitled
"Plain Talk About Contested Cases" and 150 state government officials
and employees from the highest level - agency heads, commission
members and hearing officers - attended this seminar. It was a full day
program and received a most favorable evaluation from the participants.
3.

Advising Against Litigation

Also, under this goal, we reaffirmed the office's position that we
should avoid lawsuits by assertively counseling some client agencies.
There are cases in which the client agency head would like our defense
but from a legal standpoint the cases are very weak. Therefore, the Assistant Attorneys General representing the client agency must always exercise independent judgment in evaluating cases and must not
automatically agree with the client's decision to bring or defend a meritless case.
B. Alternatives to Litigation
Our second goal was to find alternatives to litigation. To achieve
this end, the Task Force suggested that Attorneys General be trained in
ADR techniques. By training the attorneys to think in terms of ADR,
more cases may be resolved earlier, resulting in maximizing the attorney
time spent on public law issues, where judicial resolution or court an-
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nexed resolution is mandated and needed. We have now added a permanent negotiation component to our training program for first year
new hires in the office.
1.

Screening Cases

The litigation management committee (LMC) of the office, which is
composed of two other senior attorneys and myself, review all significant
cases in the office and all appellate and settlement decisions. The LMC
serves as the litigation strategy review committee and takes ADR techniques into consideration when reviewing the office's caseload. The
LMC is prepared to recommend arbitration, mediation, summary juries,
mini-trials and mini-hearings. The committee can also retain an ADR
specialist if warranted and can categorize cases as being presumptively
appropriate for ADR.
2.

Advocating Use of ADR Techniques by Contract Attorneys

Sometimes a large public state law office has to hire outside counsel. In those situations, we execute a contract with the contract attorney.
We have now included in all of our private attorney contracts a provision that states: "Contract attorneys will use ADR techniques or encourage the use of ADR techniques." We supervise all of these
contracts so we can invoke this provision of the contract when we believe the contract attorney should be using such techniques. This is also
useful to reduce the cost of litigation under those contracts.
3.

Statutory Mandates of ADR

Another way that we can use alternatives to litigation is by expanding statutory provisions to include ADR. We are in the process of
reviewing all state statutes to ascertain where a statutory mandate of
ADR techniques would be helpful. A statutory arbitration procedure is
in place for construction claims. Another particularly attractive area is
child support where states are now being encouraged to set up administrative or quasi-judicial procedures to perform these functions. Experience has shown that these procedures are successful in eliminating all
but a small percentage of cases from the court docket and have increased collection of child support. The Task Force also recommended
that the state legislature look at current experimental projects involving
state mediation offices and multi-door courthouses to see whether these
concepts could be adopted in Connecticut.
C.

Reducing Court Costs

With respect to the third goal of reducing delay in the courts and
court costs, the Attorney General issued a directive which established a
set of guidelines for Assistant Attorneys General to follow in order to
reduce these delays in courts which add to costs. He urged quick evaluation of cases, judicious filing of motions and concise discovery requests.
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The Task Force also recommended that the department heads assess the
performance of all Attorneys General along ADR lines in any incentive
and performance evaluation system. Additionally, the Task Force recommended active cooperation with the judiciary, the Connecticut bar
and the business community in its ADR efforts.
Since the issuing of our report, the Attorney General has publicly
advocated ADR techniques as the best solution to many legal conflicts.
Many action steps other than the ones mentioned before have been
taken. ADR publications, including the Preventive Law Reporter, have
been added to our library acquisitions. We have supported a bill in the
legislature to create a group of independent hearing officers to provide
a trained group of people responsible for the conduct of hearings. And
during the week of May 4, 1986, the General Assembly adopted a legislative proposal to place child support matters in a quasi-judicial process,
referred to as family support magistrates. This will take approximately
4000 of our cases from the Superior Court docket. Our office is also
preparing summaries of state statutes and Attorney General advisory
opinions for inclusion in our regular newsletter that goes to state
agencies.
It is too early to gauge the impact of the steps that we are able to
take toward preventing litigation. Nonetheless, I firmly believe that the
formal initiative and ongoing awareness and action plans we have established represent a good model for further study and implementation. In
times as litigious as ours, each taxpayer has every right to expect that its
public law enforcement agencies will do everything in their power to
address the goals of ADR that I have mentioned today and to provide
equal justice for all. Thank you.
V.

PREVENTIVE LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION

Sheldon Krantz: As the program indicates, I am the Dean of the University of San Diego School of Law. Along with all of you here, I have long
admired Louis Brown and Edward Dauer for the work they have been
doing in the field of preventive law.
A few days ago, a group of law school deans met with members of
the Committee of Bar Examiners in California. I was a member of this
group. At this meeting, the deans raised a number of concerns about
the administration of the California Bar Examination - mostly those
relating to the pressures to add more and more required subject areas
and the extremely high pass-line.
As you know, the percentage of those passing the California Bar
Examination is consistently the lowest in the country. Thus, the Committee of Bar Examiners takes its responsibility as gate-keeper to the
legal profession very seriously. Typically far fewer than fifty percent of
those that take the California bar exam pass it. Committee members
apparently feel that extremely high standards are warranted because
there are already over 100,000 lawyers in California and 12,000 to
14,000 aspiring lawyers who take the bar exam every year. Of equal
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significance, according to members of the Committee, a large number of
those taking the bar exam each year go into solo practice. Committee
members, believe, therefore, that new admittees must clearly demonstrate the ability to practice law since so many will not be nurtured along
by law firms, governmental agencies or corporations.
Given these concerns, the members of the Committee shared with
the deans the view that the examination process is not yet even rigorous
enough. One Committee member, for example, raised the following
question: "How can applicants for admission be approved for law practice without having been tested on taxation or family law," topics that
are not now required on the California bar exam.
The primary format of the California Bar Exam, like that of most
other states, combines the multi-state and an essay examination emphasizing state law issues. California also has a performance exam which
supposedly tests lawyering skills such as those relating to reviewing factual information, synthesizing issues, and drafting documents. But even
the performance portion of the examination currently appears to largely
test doctrinal knowledge. It is to this exam format that the Committee
member was seeking more required subject areas. He did not get any
support from the deans. It seemed to them ludicrous to test on even
more doctrine. According to one of the deans, "being able to remember
a few more legal principles in a few more subject areas says little about
one's ability to practice law competently."
I report this event because in many ways the response of the deans,
including me, could rightly be turned against us. For the deans were
rejecting an approach to testing for competency to practice law which
they have already embraced as the core of legal education: pervasive
reliance on doctrinal courses for preparing students for the profession.
Reviewing curriculum at nearly all law schools will confirm this.
Law schools mostly teach law and legal reasoning. They devote little
time to what is involved in the practice of law, what it means to be a
professional person and how attorneys relate to their clients. Law students prepare for practice primarily by studying appellate cases in their
courses. Granted, there have been some changes in the past twenty-five
years, many of which were prodded by support for clinical programs by
the Ford Foundation during the early 1960's. But even with the expansion of legal clinics; new skills training in areas such as interviewing,
counseling and negotiation; some new emphasis on basic writing and
legal research; and experimentation with computer-aided and simulation education, the core curriculum at most law schools remains wedded
to the study of doctrine and analytical forms of reasoning.
I am not opposed to our stressing these matters. After all, gaining
knowledge about the law in different subject areas is important information for lawyers to have. So is learning how "to think like a lawyer." In
my view, though, the undue emphasis in law schools on these areas inadequately prepares students for their chosen profession. The narrowness
of legal education may in part also explain many of the problems within
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the profession today and what I perceive to be widespread unhappiness
among both students and attorneys. Why I reach these conclusions is
the topic for my brief presentation today.
As part of my research for a book on the future of the legal profession, I have had interviewers talk to prelaw and law students and attorneys. The purpose of the interviews has been to learn why students
want to go to law school, what they think of their experiences once they
get there, and what attorneys think of the profession once they enter it.
An early impression culled from the interviews is that prelaw students
often enter law school with considerable enthusiasm for the notion of
helping people solve their problems, that the enthusiasm tends to wane
during law school, that students often become disaffected with their
legal education by their second year, and that altruistic goals quickly are
replaced by more self serving ones. Two few interviews have been done
so far to permit quantifiable conclusions, but the findings thus far
should not surprise most of us involved in legal education. What happens during law school that accounts for loss of enthusiasm, disaffection, and replacement of altruistic goals with more selfish ones?
I would argue, first of all, that the extensive emphasis in law school
on law and legal reasoning is partly responsible. Law students begin
school with their own special personal aspirations, convictions and values. During the exchanges that occur in first year socratic dialogues, the
personal feelings and values of the students are often deemphasized or
belittled and the complex relationships between lawyers and their clients virtually ignored. Little time is devoted at the outset to providing
students with an overview of what lawyers do, what types of skills they
need, and what impact lawyering has on one's own values. In short, doctrine courses unintentionally depersonalize the nature of lawyers' work
by focusing immediately upon law instead of on the nature of the lawyering process.
First year students receive little context. It is not surprising, therefore, that the intellectual game playing with professors wears thin after
awhile, that students get cynical about the law (like their professors
seem to be), and that they quickly begin to lose sight of their reasons for
going to law school in the first place.
In fairness to legal educators, however, declining student interest in
and enthusiasm about law school has a broader genesis. The accelerating cost of education, for example, requires more students to work
longer hours at earlier stages of their education. Thus, law school is no
longer a full time effort for many. The fears of not getting a job and of
not passing the bar also preoccupy students and erode student
attention.
But there are other matters within our control that also negatively
impact legal education. One is the way most of us teach. Not too long
ago, one of our faculty members arranged for an expert in learning theory to sit in on a number of classes at our law school. After observing a
number of classes and talking to students, he prepared a brief report

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

and presented it to our faculty. The social scientist began his report by
saying that the law professors he observed were brilliant, articulate and
clever. He said he was truly impressed with what were equivalent to fine
theatrical performances. After making those comments, though, he added that he was not sure students were learning very much. According
to him, there may be real limits on learning when there is heavy reliance
on large classes, Socratic teaching or lecture in 50 minute segments, and
so few opportunities for students to receive feedback and positive reinforcement. In other words, the primary ways in which law schools teach
their students is counter to current thinking in the field of learning theory. That should concern all of us.
A third matter that troubles me is the severe isolation between practitioners and academics. Law professors often know little about the
practice of law or have not kept up to date on it. They seldom weave
matters relating to practice into their courses and do very little research
on practice issues either. Although law schools would be harmed by an
overemphasis of any particular area, the need for more focus on the
practice of law, particularly in areas of prevention, seems to me to be
inconvertible. There is a common assumption among law professors
that learning about practice is not of intellectual merit equivalent to
learning about law. The absurdity of that notion is readily apparent.
After all, what does or does not go on between an attorney and his or
her client in an office setting is worthy of intellectual development. Creatively assessing a client's problem or need and identifying alternative
ways of responding to it is a challenging undertaking. It requires far
more than knowledge of law and legal reasoning. Spending more time
on counselling, advisory, drafting and negotiating functions, therefore,
appropriately deserve enhanced attention in law school. So do the complex human interaction problems that inevitably occur when working
with clients. The problem thus is not subject matter but lack of knowledge by professors and the absence of useful course and library materials. Also, we have all been weaned on the Langdellian casebook method
and we tend to denigrate alternatives to it.
When legal educators do develop courses on the lawyering process,
they more often than not focus on litigation. Certainly, students should
learn how to file lawsuits and fight vigorously for their client's rights in
court. But the perception that develops in law school that being a lawyer primarily means being a litigator (and that the courtroom is where
lawyers and their clients succeed or fail) badly distorts what most lawyers do or should do, as we all know.
In mentioning this, I am struck by an analogy to another field that I
know something about - the field of law enforcement. For years, I
spent time observing police in the field and in police training academies.
The image typically developed in the training academy is that a police
officer fights crime. Little attention is given during training to the role
police officers play in order maintenance, in crime prevention, or in simply helping people in crisis. When police officers leave training acade-
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mies, they find that they actually spent little time catching criminals.
They also learn that they are not prepared to handle most of the tasks
that await them.
In a number of interviews I have had recently with attorneys, I
heard responses similar to those I use to hear from police officers: "I
was not prepared to address most of what I do." I also found, by the
way, that many lawyers do not seem to be getting much gratification
from practice. This may come from the inherent limitations in lawyers'
roles, the shifting of law from profession to business, the distortion in
law schools of what law practice is all about, or the current lack of direction within the profession itself. These comments disturb me. It is appropriate, therefore, to explore what law schools might do to help
address some of them.
Law schools rarely have clearly stated educational goals. To the extent that they do, it may be timely to re-exam them. If goals do not
exist, it may be worthwhile for law faculties to formulate them. Existing
curriculum and methods of instruction should then be analyzed in light
of those goals. I would like to suggest a few goals to which law schools
might begin to give more emphasis:
1) teaching students the roles that lawyers play in society and
the nature of lawyering; (this should be done in some instances
within an historical context, through comparisons with the
roles of lawyers in other societies, and through comparisons
with the roles of other professions)
2) retaining their current commitment to rigorous analysis of
doctrine and legal reasoning;
3) critically examining professional responsibilities and attorney and client relations;
4) analyzing the range of skills that lawyers need to perform
various roles; and
5) assessing the inherent limitations of using the legal process
to prevent or resolve many problems and other options that
might be preferable.
Let me now give you a few illustrations about how law schools can
begin or already have begun to achieve some of these goals:
1) Professors should integrate more lawyering process and
professional responsibility materials into their basic courses,
even during the first year. These can include simulation exercises which place students in lawyering roles confronting typical problems. Schools such as New York University do this now
and use team teaching approaches in situations where one professor can benefit from the lawyering expertise of another.
2) Separate courses or components of courses should be developed to focus more specifically on the nature of lawyering
roles. In addition, far more time should be spent on the dilemmas of lawyering (such as the conflict between personal values
and a client's problem), the nature of the attorney-client relationship, and the types of problems that commonly lead to malpractice suits, disciplinary charges and client dissatisfaction.
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3) Greater emphasis should be given in courses to creative
lawyering exercises.
4) Greater attention should be given to supplementing large
classes with more frequent feedback opportunities, and smaller
group discussions.
Implementing these approaches will require the development of
new materials. It will also mean additional time pressures for faculty
who already feel overburdened. But it will be difficult to make significant improvements in legal education as long as curriculum remains the
same as it is now structured. Wider use of computer-aided instruction
will make necessary changes easier since it will assist in basic doctrinal
learning and feedback. Other aids may also be needed such as the utilization of teaching assistants (for small group discussions and for the
grading of simulation exercises or quizzes).
Law schools must also reassess how the last year of law school is
utilized. Instead of having the last year simply replicate the first two, it
seems more sensible to use this period to permit students to: 1) master
one area of the law or 2) practice law in a controlled environment-the
equivalent of a teaching hospital. The value of the first option is that it
would permit students to learn about at least one area of the law at more
than a superficial level. Learning one area at a far higher level of sophistication may be invaluable even if the student does not end up practicing
in that field. At least the student might just learn how complex the area
of law can be.
The notion of the teaching hospital model for a law school is certainly not new. It is also fraught with complications: cost, competition
with the profession, and malpractice coverage are only a few. But the
worth of emulating a range of practice experiences in a controlled setting merits experimentation and should go well beyond what exists in
most clinics.
Finally, it seems to me that law schools should involve students in
more research efforts relating to the practice of law and should stimulate
faculty to work in this area as well. For finding ways to improve the
profession will require the active involvement of professional schools.
Even assuming the merit of some or even all of the ideas expressed
above, there will be real constraints in pursuing them. As noted above,
all of us who now teach will find making significant changes in what we
do difficult. This is particularly true for those who teach basic courses
and who have not practiced for a number of years. Such faculty will
particulary find it difficult to integrate skills training and client related
issues into their courses. Team teaching may be part of the solution to
this problem but this in turn creates resource allocation problems.
There are other constraints as well. Most schools continue to have
isolation between clinical and non-clinical responsibilities. As skills
training programs expand, clinical faculty will likely be asked to do
more, and more and more. Their backgrounds, though, will not be suitable for much of the non-litigation emphasis need in lawyering process
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courses. If we are going to begin to restructure the nature of legal education somewhat, existing library materials will be inadequate. Law libraries still largely contain court related materials, and this is insufficient
if we are going to broaden the base of legal education.
These constraints do illustrate the difficulties in change, but they
should not dampen our enthusiasm for the challenge that lies ahead. It
is a fascinating time to be involved in legal education. I do not anticipate major reforms in the near future. I am not even sure of the correctness of many of the suggestions I have just made or that others are now
trying. It is timely, however, for law faculties to reassess what they are
doing, what they are accomplishing, and what they can and should be
doing far better than they now are. Thank you.
Alex Elson: As I listened to Sheldon Krantz list the deficiencies in legal
education, I was struck again, as I have been many times in the past, by
the strong resistance to change that characterizes many law school faculties. To be sure, we have come a long way in the past twenty-five years.
Many legal educators now recognize that clinical training, skills training
in general and what may be referred to client-focussed legal education
have a legitimate place in law schools. But there is still a hard core of
law teachers who are skeptical of these developments. Their conception
of the role of the law school is that of teaching legal reasoning, and
understanding in depth legal doctrines and their development. They
would leave to the practicing bar the task of teaching lawyers the skills
necessary to take care of client needs.
How can we get preventive law into the mainstream of legal education? The key is to make it plain that there is nothing antithetical to
combining the objective of learning legal doctrine and legal reasoning
along with the cases or materials which underscore how client problems
can be solved and disputes avoided by creative application of law.
A course in preventive law, entitled legal planning or whatever you
will, is an important step in the right direction, but will not alone achieve
the objective of turning out lawyers who will look upon keeping clients
out of trouble as their primary role and who are creative problem solvers. Such a course, particularly if it is an elective course, will fail to impress students with the fact that the preventive law approach is relevant
and important to all basic bodies of applicable law. What is needed is a
more pervasive approach.
Just a glance at the agenda for the Preventive Law Conference
makes the point. As appears from the program, preventive law models
and case studies have been developed for antitrust, warranties and products liability, securities, environmental law, employment relations, labor
law and ethical responsibilities. Similar preventive law models and case
studies are available in the basic core courses, such as contracts, torts,
trusts and wills and estate planning. I want to digress for a minute to
discuss an interesting development in connection with the teaching of
legal ethics. The course in legal ethics, now frequently titled Professional Responsibility, has been a stepchild in most law schools. The
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irony is that it has taken a sharp rise in malpractice suits and in malpractice insurance premiums to wake the legal profession to the need for
learning how to act ethically as professionals to avoid disputes with
clients.
Soaring malpractice insurance premiums have led 300 of the leading law firms in the country to organize a Bermuda based insurance
company known as Attorneys Liability Insurance Company. According
to a recent Wall Street Journal article, April 28, 1986, for the past six
months a former partner of Covington and Burling, on behalf of this
company, has been visiting the law firm members and has been conducting a Preventive Law course on what to do to avoid being sued.
Some of the items included are:
1) subjecting opinion letters and briefs to extensive peer
review; 2) avoiding matters outside the firm's expertise; 3) evaluating clients more carefully; 4) developing better communication with clients; and 5) avoiding over-extending attorney client
relationships by serving as officers and directors or by making
investments with clients which open the firm to more conflicts
of interest.
We would all agree this is an important educational venture. It
would be much better if the focus was on helping the client rather than
minimizing risks to lawyers. It would also be much better for the profession if law graduates entered the law practice as professionally responsible lawyers, educated as to how they should relate to clients in an ethical
way.
But to come back to the primary issue: how do we bring preventive
law models and case studies into the basic course? This is a challenging
enterprise. It is probably futile to think that we can persuade the present generation of teachers busily engaged in teaching the standard
courses in contracts, torts, corporation law, the Commercial Code, securities law, labor law and the like from departing from their favorite
casebooks in the field. Nor is it, in my opinion, necessary or feasible to
rewrite the casebooks. It should be possible to prepare special units in
pamphlet form to be used as supplementary materials in each of the
areas. By now, as Louis Brown can testify better than I, there is a mass
of models and case studies that can be drawn upon for this purpose.
Preparing the supplements should present no major difficulty. The hard
task is how do we get the teachers to use these materials? That is an
important challenge to our host, the National Center for Preventive
Law. One of the great things about the Center is that it is part of a law
school and a recognized part of the law school world. The presence
today of so many distinguished law professors attests to this fact. In the
past, changes in law school curriculum such as teaching litigation skills,
providing clinical training through legal aid clinics, client centered
counseling and alternative dispute resolutions, have come about despite
the passive resistance of law school faculties, largely through the pressure of the practicing bar and judges and some more forward looking
law teachers. Now we can look to this Center to provide leadership to the
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law schools of the country to make room within the curriculum for preventive law.
Robert Hardaway: Well, first I think I must say that in following some of
the excellent and enlightening presentations I feel a little bit like Zsa Zsa
Gabor's seventh husband. I think I know what to do, I am just not sure
how to make it interesting. What I would like to do though is pass out a
few pieces concerning legal education. One is a comparative study of
legal and medical education and some of the lessons I think we can learn
from medical education in terms of integrating procedures and methods
of skills training. And then from that, perhaps we can go even further
and learn some lessons about how we can integrate methods of teaching
preventive law in the law school curriculum, keeping in mind that the
primary restrictions are cost and resources. We have already gone
through this with regard to clinical education. We saw a huge rise in the
teaching of clinical education in the 1960s, and then as interest was lost
somewhat, and as the budgets became tighter, we found that what
passes for clinical education in the law schools today is nothing more
than a disguised farm-out system where we send students out to various
law firms or institutes where they are not under the direct supervision of
a faculty member. So keeping in mind these restrictions, the Center this
summer will be suggesting a comprehensive plan for integrating the
teaching of preventive law in the curriculum. In this regard I must again
thank Louis Brown for the work he has done over the years in providing
the theoretical underpinnings for a comprehensive plan of teaching preventive law. But this summer we hope to get to the nuts and bolts, the
logistics of how we would incorporate the teaching of preventive law
into the curriculum.
I would like to briefly outline five possible areas in which preventive
law can be taught, given the present academic curriculum. First the Preventive Law course. Dean Dauer told me that just this morning he has
had several students come up to him who have heard about our institute
and are already inquiring about a course in preventive law. So I think
we are going to have some built-in interest if we are able to provide such
a course here at the law school for the next year. A preventive law
course, I think, would start out as a two credit hour course, possibly in a
seminar format, which would provide the theoretical underpinnings for
preventive law, go into and analyze the whole notion of the legal autopsy, the legal check-up; it would cut across all the other disciplines and
look at preventive law in the context of contract law, tort law and corporate law.
The second context in which preventive law could be interwoven
into the curriculum would be in the clinic. We already have a clinic here,
of course, but it is litigation-based. Under the most liberal student practice laws in the country, our students are allowed to go into court and
practice as though they were attorneys under the nominal supervision of
a licensed attorney who is a member of the bar and a member of the
faculty at the law school.
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We can learn some lessons from that clinic because we have attempted here at Denver University to integrate that clinic into the curriculum. We have tried to get away from the classic model of a clinical
program which is isolated from the main curriculum. I have distributed
a short piece giving the history of how we have tried to integrate the
clinical program into the main curriculum. I think we also can do that in
the area of preventive law by setting up, in coordination with our present clinic, a preventive law clinic-not litigation-based, but based on
personal contact with the client. So you have the same element of the
present clinic which is the personal responsibility to a live human being,
the client, but at the same time it would not be litigation based. With
regard to this, I envision a clinic in which students would give legal
check-ups and write wills or contracts for live clients under the supervision of a lawyer or faculty member.
Possibly as an adjunct to an internal clinic would be the external
clinic, which has the advantage of being relatively inexpensive. That is
why most law schools like externships because they simply farm-out students to government agencies or law firms and then they ask the law firm
to report back as to the person's progress. In order to make it look
good on their bulletin, sometimes they will appoint a lawyer at the law
firm as an adjunct professor. It has the advantage, of course, of being
cheap in that we can provide it to a large number of students and it does
not require immediate use of law school resources. We could farm out
students to law firms or government agencies with the idea that the student would do legal audits, look in to the law office management, perhaps apply some of the things he might have learned in the preventive
law course. Then he would report back to a faculty advisor at the law
school.
Fourth, I envision a preventive law course which is offered in conjunction with the course in legal counseling. We have a legal counseling
competition (Murray Blumenthal runs that) and it seems to me that preventive law should be part and parcel of a legal counseling program.
You get into the whole problem of the scope of lawyer responsibility. If
a client comes in and says "I have a speeding ticket," but in the course of
talking with the lawyer, it becomes apparent to the lawyer that the client
needs a will, what is the responsibility of the lawyer to advise a client of
his need to get legal advice or to take some kind of action with regard to
the will? I am sure we can think of better examples than that, but it
raises the whole question of the scope of lawyer responsibility. Of
course that is a gray area right now, and that is an area which I think
would be looked at more closely in the context of a preventive law
course.
Finally, and this would be the broadest in scope, we would like to
see a program whereby preventive law methods would be interwoven
into the general classes of contracts, torts and civil procedure. What
could the present teachers who are used to the Socratic method do to
focus on preventive law problems? Louis Brown has been a pioneer in
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this area and has tried various techniques and we hope to make use of
his experiences this Summer, in coming up with a comprehensive plan.
This comprehensive plan would then be given to faculty members to use
as they see fit in the teaching of their own courses. One technique, for
example, that Louis Brown has pioneered is to take a case that is in the
casebook and then pick a point in time, before the transaction had occurred, and then have a discussion of what could have been done to
prevent what occurred in this lawsuit. Another technique is the use of a
lawyer-client dialogue in which you simulate a lawyer-client discussion
that might have gone on before the transaction occurred and analyze
that discussion, and the questions that are asked between the lawyer and
the client.
These are five areas we are going to be looking at this summer in
trying to come up with a plan or a program for integrating the teaching
of Preventive Law in the law school curriculum.
Neil Littlefield: I am Neil Littlefield of the University of Denver College
of Law and I teach Commercial Law. Two comments have been made
and I would like to pick up on them and put them in a specific context.
Sheldon has been talking about the difficulties of translating what we
have been talking about into legal education terms. One comment is
that teachers run around thinking that law schools are products of the
past. I went to Law School quite some time ago, and I learned the Socratic method and I learned legal doctrine - incredible amounts of it.
Secondly, we talked about the fact that as professional law teachers, we
are unaware of what lawyers actually do. Let me relate a story of my
experience to illustrate why we have to resist these characteristics of
legal educators if we want to teach preventive law techniques in the law
school.
Fifteen years ago, I came to the University of Denver and was assigned to teach Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which I had
been teaching for some years. I told myself I ought to give the students
a drafting problem. That is what lawyers do. But I did not have them
only draft the documents. I assigned them a client, a bank, which engaged in twenty or more transactions of a certain kind weekly. The bank
did not want to hire a lawyer to supervise each and every transaction. As
part of their assignment, they had to hand in a set of instructions to the
bank as to how to proceed. That is where I began to learn about
problems of teaching preventive law.
Let me give you one simple example. In an Article 9 transaction
one has to file a financing statement, a public record of the transaction,
so as to perfect the interest against that horrendous character called the
trustee in bankruptcy. The debtor must be named. A lot of cases have
posed the problem of the so-called "tradename" problem. Litigation
teaches that if ABC Construction Company is the debtor, and that is the
name used in the financing statement, it might work. If ABC Company,
Inc. is a corporation it will work. If it is a d/b/a, a doing business as,
that is, a tradename, it will not work.
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We are all used to examining litigation and asking, "What did they
do wrong?" What we should do is use the legal name or real name of
the debtor. In translating litigation learning to counseling advice, more
is needed. A memo goes from the bank lawyer to the bank vice president or commercial loan department and specifies "use the real name of
the debtor on the financing statement." Imagine the subsequent interview between the debtor, ABC Construction Co., and the bank vice president. The bank vice president says: "My lawyer says I need your real
name. What's your real name?" What happens? Parties use ABC Construction Co. What happens is that you have the same litigation on the
tradename that you did before. The preventive law advice was
inadequate.
I have had dialogues in my class with my students in which I tell the
students that I am the vice president, and ask for advice. They tell me to
"use the real name, use the legal name." But this is not enough. It is
necessary to "laymenize" the counseling advice.
A lot of people say: "That's common sense and you don't teach
that in a law school course. Get into the intricacies of the hypothetical
lien creditor power of the bankruptcy trustee. Don't bother with
details." But if you do not translate the legal tradename problem into
effective advice by stating: "Mr Vice-President, you need a method to
determine the individual, partnership, or corporate name of the debtor.
Watch out for tradenames and do not use them on the financing statement," you will still have problems. The only way to remove the threat
of litigation is to change the ways in which bank personnel operate.
What tells me that effective counseling advice is not being given is that
the trade name cases do not diminish over time. Clients continue to
think that ABC Construction Co. is a legal name because they have a
bank account in that name; it's a name registered with the city clerk
under the Doing Business Under a Fictitious Name Act.
One final example. The counseling advice that lawyers are used to
giving is inadequate. Standard legal texts, for example, have almost no
counseling advice other than the standard, "Follow Peskind's rule."
That is, file wherever a litigator might argue you should have filed. Section 9-307(2) provides that a consumer goods security interest is good
unless you want perfection as against a consumer buyer from a consumer buyer. Peskind's rule would require you to file in all consumer
goods transactions. I ask my students to consider advising their clients
to evaluate the risk. If your client sells 1,000 television sets and you file
in every case, you add $3.00 to every transaction, at a minimum. Out of
those transactions arguably one percent of such transactions will result
in a need for the 9-307(2) protection. In short, your client spends
$3,000 to save $50. That is not good counseling advice.
Lawyers, law professors and law schools have a lot to learn. I found
that out some sixteen years after assigning these drafting problems. I
learned by trial and error. We need to share with our colleagues, identify the commonalities, and become more effective in preventive law
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techniques. The goal is, through check lists, compliance procedures,
legal audits, or, in my field, through drafting exercises and better legal
skills in instructing lay clients, to avoid litigation. Thank you.
Frank R. Strong: I am Frank R. Strong, in active retirement after fortyfive years of teaching law and contributing to reform in legal education.
To include instruction in preventive law as a part of formal legal
training makes so much sense in itself that there is no merit in a contrary
view. The problem concerns how to work such instruction into the overall law curriculum. At one time there was some support for adding a
fourth year, or extending summer sessions into third semesters, but financial and other considerations led to early demise of any such solution. Computer assisted instruction during the traditional three dual
semester years and post-admission supplementation have loomed as
possibilities, but inherent limitations in these make it clear that they are
not adequate to solve the problem of an added time dimension. In order to introduce an adequate array of instruction in private law within
the established three year span clearly something has to give way. I have
these three suggestions to make.
First, get rid of overlap. There is no question that overlap is to be
found in many law courses. I was on the Curriculum Committee of one
law school when an effort was launched to ferret out the extent of this
form of double timing. Members of the faculty were asked to submit
quite detailed outlines of the coverage of their courses. Only one-third
cooperated; the others failed to respond to the request. The latter were
protecting their assumed "right" to teach what they wanted to teach.
One excuse offered for overlap is that it's a good pedagogy to afford
second coverage for "important" material. This is rubbish; there is not
time for this luxury in a crowded curriculum. Indulgence of overlap is
significant and must go.
Second, eliminate from the courses the exhaustion of every detail of
a subject matter. Teach the structure of a subject, leaving the detail to
be filled in by the student. In other words, self-instruction. This is feasible if legal education is understood as an institute to instruct students in
learning how to learn. Current reform in medical education offers a
model. I have battled with colleagues near and far over the number of
semester or quarter hours necessary for adequate teaching of Constitutional Law. This can be done in four hours of one semester if instruction is directed to basic structure rather than case by case coverage. But
what has happened? The trend is rather to expand the course to five or
even six semester hours in order to cover "all the decisions." A similar
trend can be seen with respect to other subjects. For instance, some
schools provide a second year of additional hours of Torts. This overkill
is known as Advanced Torts. Fighting this nonsense unsuccessfully at
North Carolina, I suggested renaming the first-year course of six semester hours as Retarded Torts. What a name, Advanced Torts! All this
foolishness in the face of studies demonstrating that the human mind
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cannot retain mass detail but only fundamental concepts and principles.
This leads me to my third suggestion, a radical proposal that should
have been put into curricular effect a hundred years ago.
Third, rid the legal curriculum which is organized by subject-matter. No more courses in Contracts, Torts, Property, Corporations, Conflicts, Constitutional Law, ad infinitum. Rather, follow Mortimer Adler
and Robert Hutchins in the search for the great ideas. If Mortimer Adler could come up with 102 great ideas in the total field of knowledge,
surely those of us in legal education should be able to identify the basic
principles that underlie the legal system as we know it. Vicariousness is
one idea; ultra vires another. To complete the catalogue, someone
would have to go through law school a second time. You go to law
school the first time, you do not learn very much. By going to law
school a second time you might be able to comprehend the underlying
principles of law, and that is what ought to be the heart of legal
education!
Noting that the last topic on today's agenda concerns research in
preventive law, I have, with this third suggestion, probably been guilty
of "Frankfurterage". Felix Frankfurter never taught at Harvard Law
School the course in Constitutional Law. T. R. Powell, one of the
greats, the likes of which we will never see again, taught the course in
Constitutional Law. However, Frankfurter was wont in his teaching of
other public law courses to poach on Powell's domain. This led T. R. to
exclaim on at least one occasion that "I've been guilty of lots of academic offenses, but I've never engaged in Frankfurterage." Asked to
explain, he defined the offense as "spreading your own manure on another man's land".

VI.

A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FOR
PREVENTIVE LAW

Morris Cohen: Dean Dauer has suggested that I touch on the history of
criticism of the legal profession as a background to our discussions on
the concept and practice of preventive law.
Every serious history of the legal profession in this country reveals
widespread criticism of lawyers for stimulating unnecessary litigation.
While the medical profession has long been subject to criticism for
greed, avarice and incompetence, it is largely in recent decades that physicians have been attacked for promoting unnecessary services. Lawyers, on the other hand, in virtually all ages and places, have been
accused of promoting, enlarging and prolonging disputes for their own
gain. The most pervasive and recurring theme in criticism of the legal
profession in America has been directed against the promotion of unnecessary litigation to the detriment of clients' interests. Those of us
who have engaged in legal practice know that some clients need little
encouragement in provoking controversy and bringing lawsuits, but
from our earliest history the polemical literature against the bar is replete with such accusations.
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It is interesting to note that many critics specifically have proposed
the use of informal dispute resolution procedures and arbitration as a
substitute for "going to the law." This was particularly true in those
colonies where utopian ideals of a new society were the basis of settlement, and during periods of increased religious revival. By the second
quarter of the 19th century, there was significant evidence of the use of
alternative modes of dispute resolution. Arbitration was used in commercial disputes in the larger American cities by the 1840's as a way of
avoiding the expense and delay inherent in court litigation. But such
enlightened practices did not reduce the accusations of barratry and related offenses against the legal profession generally.
We are all familiar with the colorful invective of these attacks on
lawyers - one of my favorites is that of Timothy Dwight against the evil
of law practice, delivered to the Yale College graduating class in July
1776, just two weeks after the signing of the Declaration of
Independence.
That meanness, that infernal knavery, which multiplies needless litigations, which retards the operation of justice, which
from court to court, upon the most trifling pretenses,
postpones trials to glean the last emptyings of a client's pocket,
for unjust fees of everlasting attendance, which artfully twists
the meaning of law to the side they espouse, which seizes unwarrantable advantages from the ignorance, interests, and
prejudices of a jury-you should shun.
If only Dwight could have been here at our discussions today. His disbelief might have been overcome by delight at what he heard.
I was surprised to discover, in reviewing the literature against the
legal profession throughout our history, the repeated emphasis on arbitration, mediation and lay dispute settlement. An 1805 tract carried the
following engaging and lengthy title: Sampson against the Philistines: or the
reformation of lawsuits andjustice made cheap speedy, and brought home to everyman's door: agreeable to the principles of the ancient trial by jury before the same
was innovated by judges and lawyers. After a stinging attack on the lawyers
of that time, the author proposed a detailed program for reform of the
legal system based on compulsory arbitration.
Coming down to our current interest in alternative dispute resolution, an agenda for research in this field was stated by Derek Bok's
widely publicized Annual Report as President of Harvard University in
1982. Speaking of new simplified methods of dispute resolution, Bok
noted: "experiments may abound, but there is often no rigorous, comprehensive process for evaluating such ventures to decide which work
well and under what circumstances." Bok further compared the situations in medicine and law:
Though doctors are learning to assess the costs and benefits of
medical procedures and new technologies, lawyers are not
making a comparable effort to evaluate provisions for appeal,
for legal representation, for adversary hearings, or for other
legal safeguards to see whether they are worth in justice what
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they cost in money and delay. Exploration of the forces that
encourage or inhibit litigation, so that we can better predict the
rise and fall of legal activity, and perhaps reduce avoidable
actions.
As to law school curricula, Bok noted that there were: "many
courses in the intricacies of trial practice, appellate advocacy, litigation
strategy, but few devoted to the methods of mediation and negotiation."
My own limited involvement in this field was stimulated by suggestions from Edward Dauer and Louis Brown that there was virtually no
research material available in our libraries for the study of how lawyers
really practiced their profession. As a law librarian, I knew that the task
of compiling archives of the working papers of lawyers, for both teaching and research, had been sadly neglected.
Examining Louis Brown's 1950 Manual on Preventive Law, I went
through its table of contents, and quickly realized that aside from the
illustrative cases that he quotes in the book, there was very little in our
law libraries on the areas of study and research that might be undertaken in this field. There were virtually no library or archival holdings
on 20th century law practice, beyond the few published collections of
lawyer's papers, usually of 18th century political figures like Adams,
Hamilton, Jefferson and Madison. There was more 18th Century collections of lawyers' working papers than those for the 20th Century.
Whatever teaching and research has been done has utilized sparse resources painstakingly collected and prepared by teachers. That has
been much less effective and much less productive than working with the
actual materials that reflect law practice as it is conducted today.
About twenty-five years ago, I was asked on short notice to supervise the moot court program at the University of Buffalo Law School. I
didn't have time to prepare the proper materials for the program. As
librarian, I discovered that we had a fragmented set of New York Court
of Appeals records and briefs, which were about to be discarded. I distributed those appeal records to pairs of students as the basis of the
moot court competition. The use of the actual, complete record, including pre-trial documentation, trial transcripts and post-trial motions, was
far superior to the usual hypothetical case usually presented with a
sparse, artificial record. The students, working with the actual records,
were fully engaged by the material, had a lot more fun, learned more,
and the quality of their briefs and arguments revealed the advantages of
better preparation and motivation.
You are probably aware of some of the problems involved in collecting this sort of material today. There is the reluctance of librarians
due to space problems, costs of cataloguing and indexing, and problems
of limitations on access. There are problems of confidentiality and privilege, fear of client's disfavor, and the reluctance of lawyers to expose
their work product to scrutiny. There has been one ethical opinion of
the D. C. bar censuring a lawyer for turning over papers to a library
without the consent of his client.
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These problems are not insurmountable, however, and I believe
that much can be done. Many law librarians have indicated a willingness
to collect such material as part of a national effort. The program could
begin with a study of the main problems and possible solutions. The
areas of study would include:
1. A description of the types of materials which are most
needed for research and teaching, and in what ways they would
be used.
2. The legal and practical obstacles to collecting and providing access to lawyer's working papers and files, and the development of approaches to overcome these obstacles. The
obstacles obviously include professional rules and traditions,
legal restrictions, problems of library management, the difficulty of obtaining consent of clients and lawyers, etc.
3. The various storage media available for housing the material, including their costs and evaluation, the determination of
the most desirable immediate and long-term approaches, and
the selection of sites for initial collections, if traditional library
collecting and storage seems feasible.
4. The design of the best initial system for collection, storage,
and use of this material, and for the dissemination of information to potential users. This would include not only storage
media, but also indexing and inventory standards, rules for access and use, methods of communication, approaches to future
expansion and growth, and possible conversion to new storage
forms as more advance technology is developed.
5. Estimates of the costs involved in creating the system, possible funding sources, and methods of distributing or sharing
the costs involved.
It would be a large undertaking, but much interest has been expressed already, and support has been offered by a number of professional groups in law, legal history, librarianship and archival
management. We hope that valuable results will follow if sufficient energy can be stimulated. Perhaps the results of our discussions here will
focus more attention on an agenda for research in preventive law, and
on the materials needed to pursue that agenda.
Alan Widiss: Twenty-five years ago I was very stimulated in a law school
course

which

-

if

memory

serves

me

correctly

-

was

titled

"Jurisprudence." The class, taught by Louis Brown, included an extensive unit on preventive law. I was impressed by the ideas considered in
that class, as I have been by this meeting. Accordingly, I am extremely
pleased to be a participant in this conference.
In order to provide you some perspective from which to view my
comments and proposals, I would like to offer a few items of background
information. I am a law professor at the University of Iowa, and I have
been a member of the faculty there for over twenty years. I am also the
chair-elect of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee of the
American Bar Association, Torts and Insurance Section. This commit-
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tee involves a "fusion" of my interests in the fields of insurance and
arbitration.
Before turning to the topic I have been asked to address, I would
like to make several observations which have been stimulated by the preceding presentations. First, I teach Contracts, a basic first year course.
And for at least the past decade, one of the questions I have repeatedly
asked students has been: "How can clients in similar commercial contexts prevent or avoid this type of problem?" Introducing this element
into the classroom discussions does not require new teaching materials,
and it does not take a reconceptualization of the contracts course. It
merely means that a law teacher has to identify the cases which are appropriate for such a discussion and then include this type of inquiry
among the questions that are posed to the students.
Second, I also teach Insurance Law. One of the preventive law
teaching techniques that I use in this course is to "construct bridges" to
problems and topics that students have encountered in other law school
classes. Let me offer two brief illustrations. First, family law courses
deal with trial separations. Even this presents insurance problems. For
example, if a husband and wife have had a single motor vehicle insurance policy, unless the parties are properly counseled one of them may
not have automobile insurance when they are no longer living in the
same residence. Second, students may have analyzed or considered
partnership agreements in a number of law school courses. There are
life insurance and property insurance matters that should be considered
in regard to partnerships. For example, in the event one of the partners
dies, very serious problems can be avoided by the practice of preventive
law through counseling the parties in regard to the acquisition of life
insurance coverage for each of the partners. Life insurance benefits can
be arranged so that the value of the decedent's share in the partnership
can be passed to the decedent's heirs without having to liquidate the
business. The point of these examples is to provide illustrations of the
observation that it is possible to introduce and teach preventive law in
our traditional law school courses.
Third, when I think back to my years as a law student a quartercentury ago, as well as my first years in teaching, and then look at what's
going on in law schools today, I am struck by a tremendous number of
differences. There was no client counseling competition then. There
were no preventive law discussions in substantive law courses. Moreover, as several of the preceding presentations have indicated, law
professors are now rethinking some of the basic questions about the
pedagogy of legal education in ways that are likely to produce additional
significant changes.
The topic that I've been asked to address today is, "What should be
the Agenda for Preventive Law Research?" It seems to me that as we
examine the possible agenda for research, we should bear in mind two
primary objectives. First, I believe that we need a more complete and
comprehensive understanding of the costs and benefits of practicing
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preventive law. Second, I think we should consider possible research
agenda with a view towards developing both (1) an expertise about what
is necessary to practice preventive law and (2) the materials that will be
needed to teach students how to practice preventive law.
Many aspects of the practice of preventive law depend on the "diagnostic" skills of the lawyer - that is, frequently the practice of preventive law requires the ability to "diagnose" the problems that may
develop for a client. The attorney must be able to discern the conditions that may lead to significant problems. I believe that so long as we
primarily - and perhaps exclusively - continue to teach law through
the examination of legal disputes retrospectively by analyzing appellate
court opinions, we are doing very little to teach students to develop the
skills that lawyers need to practice preventive law.
Several of the preceding presentations have included references to
the practice of medicine. I wish to make one more analogy to the medical profession in relation to suggesting an aspect of the possible agenda
for research in regard to teaching preventive law. In hospitals throughout the United States, surgical procedures are subject to a post-operative review. The questions that are asked include: "Was the operation
necessary?" and "Was the diagnosis correct?" Doctors, and especially
surgeons, have to repeatedly confront these questions when their diagriosis and treatment are considered by a review committee. Lawyers, on
the other hand, are rarely compelled to address the analogous questions
that, for example, exist when a controversy results in litigation. There is
little, if any, peer review of a lawyer's analysis of a problem and the appropriateness of the legal procedures employed by the attorney. Similarly, we seldom, if ever, analyze or review the work of practitioners to
consider whether a lawyer who counseled a client could have foreseen
possible problems and provided advice which would have led to measures that would have avoided a dispute.
I believe that the basic format and approach used for most law
school classes contributes very little to developing a student's diagnostic
skills. The judicial decisions and problems that comprise the teaching
materials for the vast majority of law courses come "labeled": they are
set forth in the context of a specific course, and within the course format
there's a table of contents. Frequently, the question which a case or a
problem is intended to raise or address is specifically identified by a
heading or a note which precedes or follows the material in the book.
Consequently, in general we allocate little effort to teaching
"diagnosis."
When I started to think about the teaching of "diagnostic skills,"
one difference between the medical and legal professions was particularly notable. Although we have many legal specialties developing and indeed they are now being licensed or certified in some states there is one type of specialists that I have never heard discussed with
respect to the practice of law and the legal profession. There is no specialty among lawyers that is comparable to the pathologist in the medical
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profession. Among the tasks performed by pathologists is the determination whether a treating physician's diagnosis was correct on the basis
of an examination of tissue removed by an operation. Although the
analogy to the practice of law in regard to litigation may not be perfect,
there is a notable similarity in regard to what could be done by a "legal
pathologist."
I believe that one of the principal reasons why we award relatively
little attention to teaching and learning the techniques of diagnosis is
that we do not have the type of materials that Morris Cohen was talking
about in the preceding presentation. Therefore, my first recommendation in regard to the research agenda is to develop a body of materials
from which we can teach diagnosis in regard both to the analysis of possible approaches to "treatment" of existing problems, and how to recognize "symptoms" so as to avoid such problems before they arise. I
believe that the compilation of such materials will constitute an important resource which will enable us both to teach about, and to implement the practice of, preventive law. The development of materials
which are essential for teaching diagnostic skills may facilitate another
type of learning experience that I believe is also very important in regard to preparing students to practice preventive law.
Typically, when we talk about the case method, we mean the appellate court opinion. As I read a court decision, often I am curious about
aspects of the dispute that are not reflected in the opinion. When this
occurs, I ask our librarians to borrow the briefs and trial court record.
Unfortunately, these materials frequently do not provide the answer that is, information that seems to me to be significant does not appear in
the "official record" of the case.
Sometimes I have written to attorneys and asked them for materials
from their files, and often we have found ways to overcome the confidentiality problems. Frequently, the files have been most informative.
In the courses of making such requests, I have also discovered that this
material generally "disappears" very quickly. Once a case is fully and
completely resolved, law firms do not have a great deal of interest in
preserving material in their files. Typically it is destroyed by the attorney or returned to the client who usually has little reasons to preserve
the file. Sometime files are placed in "long term" storage with an instruction to destroy it after a specified date. Thus, unless libraries collect such materials, they will not exist in the twenty-first century. We
will forever lose the opportunity to gain the more complete understanding of disputes that is provided by an examination of the materials included in lawyers' files. However, this is not the primary point I want to
make in regard to teaching the principles and practice of preventive law.
The legal autopsy has been referred to several times at this conference. I have sent students out to perform "autopsies" by assigning
them the following task: "Talk to the attorneys for both parties about a
dispute that was not settled and consequently ended up in litigation, and
then prepare a paper which explains why the negotiations failed." This
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project is particularly appropriate for students because attorneys in
practice rarely - if ever - have an opportunity to impartially examine
both sides of a litigation. Once in practice, a lawyer almost always views
disputes as an advocate for one or more parties involved in the case.
Lawyers rarely are afforded an opportunity to examine both sides of a
dispute.
It is extremely important to the practice of preventive law for lawyers to have had the experience of examining disputes from both sides.
While it may be impossible to secure cooperation from enough attorneys to provide every law student with such opportunities first-hand, this
experience could be attained by having students study the complete files
of attorneys for both sides of selected disputes together with videotaped
interviews with the lawyers and the parties to the dispute. Therefore, I
propose as one facet of the research agenda the identification, collection, and organization of materials that will make it possible for students
to analyze problems from the viewpoints of all parties to the dispute,
rather than viewing cases only through the "distillation" presented in an
appellate court opinion or even by the record of the case together with
the appellate briefs. I believe that this type of educational experience
can contribute significantly to educating law students about the avoidance and settlement of controversies, which - at least in my view should be one of the important aspects of practicing preventive law.
A third aspect of the research agenda that I would like to propose
involves developing materials that will facilitate a thorough cost/benefit
analysis of preventive law practices. As several of the panelists in the
course of today's discussion have pointed out, preventive law ultimately
will flourish or wither because it is or it is not cost effective. I believe it
can be shown to be very cost effective. Perhaps it is my work in the
insurance area which leads me to believe that this conclusion will be
justified by research.
We typically think of insurance as a transaction in which a premium
is paid so that in the event a loss occurs, there is resource to call upon to
provide indemnification. That characterization is true for many types of
insurance which are sold in this country. It is, however, not descriptive
of every type of insurance. For example, in the area of boiler insurance,
historically ninety percent of the premium dollar was allocated to developing better designs for boilers and to the inspection of boilers. In
other words, the insurance dollar was primarily used to avoid losses,
rather than to indemnify insureds after a loss. The same approach applied to dental insurance.
Dental insurance programs are most cost effective when the system
is designed so that each individual is encouraged to have preventive
dental care - that is, when a significant portion of the insurance dollars
are allocated to prevention. This usually means that the insurance plan
must provide for a program of semi-annual dental care that includes a
checkup and a cleaning for everyone who is covered. When we were
looking at the proposals for a dental insurance program at the Univer-
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sity of Iowa and one of my colleagues from the business school heard
this, he said "It's not insurance." He added: "You don't have an insurance plan when you are cycling dollars for prevention and you know that
if you take in $100, $85 is going to have to go back out to pay for regular
dental checkups and semi-annual teeth cleaning." Yet for dental insurance, without such a flow of dollars to encourage preventive dental care,
small problems go undetected and develop into conditions that result in
major expenses. Thus, experience has shown that everyone's interests
are served by "funnelling" dollars to encourage or even require preventive dental care by each insured. Experience with other insurance coverages has also demonstrated the cost effectiveness of such preventive
actions.
There are many types of human activities where experience has
shown that preventive actions are cost effective. Some of the practicing
attorneys at this conference have suggested that preventive actions are
cost effective, and that preventive law practices are cost effective. However, for the most part, we are still at the level of "assertion" rather than
proof. I believe the research agenda for preventive law should include
an analysis of legal problems with a view of demonstrating the economic
value of preventive "legal care." And I hope that one of the missions of
this Center will be to provide support for conceiving and executing research which will show that preventive law practices can be cost effective
for clients.
Edward Dauer: Not long ago, two professors of something-or-other at a
major research university were overheard arguing about an idea which
one of them had and which the other was roundly criticizing. The proponent of the idea pointed out that actual field experience had clearly
confirmed the soundness of his views, to which the critic replied, with
some exasperation, "Well it may work in practice, but it'll never work in
theory!"
Preventive law - to be precise we should call it preventive lawyering
is something like that just now. It works in practice, but it has not yet
been sufficiently described in theory. That is an important point, and
not a point of interest just to us wooly-haired academics. It has rather a
large practical bearing on the usefulness and accessibility of the information now becoming available to practitioners of the field. The point
can be illustrated - as we law professors are prone to do - with a hypothetical case. A company in the machine-tool industry, let us suppose,
has developed a program for the prevention of products liability losses.
Among the program's elements are a design review process, accident
awareness considerations wrought into customer relations and marketing, a novel system of hazard warnings, and an accident-analysis feedback loop. The process seems to be successful; descriptions of it are
written and made available to other companies. "Sharing the experience," to misuse the popular California phrase, in this way is important.
Without it the same wheels would be reinvented over and over again by
other companies in the industry, a "dis-economy" that benefits no one.
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But now consider the manufacturer of a different kind of product critical-care medical devices, for example - products like anesthesia
regulators, heart-lung machines, dialysis units. How might that company actually utilize the description of the machine-tool maker's system,
to reduce its own portfolio of products liability expense? Replicating its
elements exactly into this different context probably will not work very
well. Accidental injuries are, after all, products not only of the characteristics of the offending machine, but also of the environment in which
it is used. Injuries from machine tools happen to the people who operate the product; injuries from medical devices happen (if you will pardon the pun) to those whom the products operate upon. (Thus, for
example, the legal effectiveness of a particular hazard warning system
may vary considerably from the one context to the other.) The potentials for controlling those misuses of the product which otherwise might
turn design "defects" into lawsuits are also very different. Do these differences matter? Are there other differences which might? Hint: They
do, and there are. If a preventive law strategy is therefore to be adapted,
as it must be, from one setting to another, it is necessary, when thinking
about what to take as is and what to change, to have an understanding of
why and how the original design worked in the original context: to have,
in other words, a theory of at least that aspect of preventive law.
Good and useful theories are assembled from collections of individual observations: here are twenty or thirty products liability prevention
systems actually field-tested by a variety of companies. The ones in this
pile worked. The others, over in this pile, did not. What are the common denominators of success, the generalprinciples out of which new particular applications can be crafted? Collecting and sharing the
experiences is a critical beginning. Turning the collection into useful
theories is the equally practical and equally necessary next step.
Products liability prevention is not an isolated example. The point
is just as valid for legal audits, regulatory compliance exercises, dispute
incentive reviews and each of the many other techniques which comprise
this growing field. The practice of preventive law needs a set of theories
of preventive law.
Analogies are occasionally helpful. Some of us in thinking about
preventive law have found analogies to preventive medicine to be useful,
not because we lawyers need to emulate our physician friends, but because our operating predicates are similar to theirs and therefore comparisons to a more familiar and more well-developed field might
illuminate opportunities we could otherwise miss. (Preventive law is less
well-developed than preventive medicine is.) Hence we speak of such
notions as legal autopsies (litigation audits), periodic checkups (corporate legal audits) and the early diagnosis of nonsymptomatic "disease."
The preventive law/preventive medicine analogy should therefore also
be useful in our thinking about a research agenda for preventive law.
The practice and theory of preventive medicine are built on the
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principles of three disciplines: epidemiology, prophylaxis and public
health.
Epidemiology is the study of the origins and causes of disease. It
logically precedes prophylaxis - the processes of preventing disease for a fundamental reason which is, in law, sometimes overlooked. Without knowing where disputes actually come from, we cannot design a system which will effectively prevent them. Consider, for example, a
corporation which seeks to reduce the expense and disruption of EEO
complaints brought by or on behalf of its employees. It is a relatively
straightforward matter to design, and (what is often a little harder) to
implement an EEO compliance system which will not only guard against
inadvertent acts of discrimination, but which will also create the records
necessary to support a successful defense when litigation does arise.
No trick to that. But that is only half of what good preventive lawyering is about. Once a problem is voiced as a claim of legal right, much
of the trouble it generates is irreducible, even if its prosecution is entirely meritless. Thus, the other half is preventing the dispute from arising in the first place. To accomplish that we need, first, an
epidemiological theory: where do EEO disputes come from? Interestingly enough, they do not always begin with acts of even arguable discrimination. The data we have suggests that they often come from the
same place - physicians would say they have the same "vectors" - as
certain strains of OSHA troubles do, and as other employment standards complaints do. Namely, from people who feel themselves aggrieved by something someone else in the corporation has done to them
or about them, and who perceive no effective means of redress other
than to package what is not in fact a discrimination complaint into the
legally cognizable clothing of EEO.
One remedy for malaria is quinine. Often a better strategy is to
drain the swamps where mosquitos breed. This is a lesson which the
banking industry learned in an expensive way during the late 1960's and
early 1970's, when the bringing of Truth-in-Lending suits seemed to be
as popular a consumer pastime as stickball. Some banks responded with
a combination of litigation postures and redrafting - sometimes many
times over - their Regulation Z disclosure forms. That was a perfectly
logical legal response but it did not do as much practical good as the
lawyers would have liked. Other banks analyzed their litigation portfolios as if they were the symptoms, or consequences, of causal factors a
layer down, as well as being problems in themselves, and in the process
learned about a linkage between the recruitment of TIL claims and the
ways in which delinquent retail accounts were handled at the level of the
branch. The solution was not then to take a dive on every workout, but
rather to recognize that there were business judgments to be made
about whether the quinine would cost more or less than draining the
swamp would. The outcomes were in many cases much better for having been informed by analysis of the causes.
We are now discovering something very similar about medical mal-

1988]

PREVENTIVE LA W

practice. It has been convincingly established that the origin of a fair
portion of all malpractice claims is not the injury (or disappointing medical outcome) itself, but rather the remoteness (or absence) of a professional relationship which satisfies the patient's emotional needs and
personal expectations. That finding is proving to be a very useful piece
of a general theory.
The results of these separate "epidemiological" insights comprise,
when taken together, useful theories about the origins of legal troubles.
Some of them may be hard to believe at first glance; but then, until Van
Leeuwenhoek invented the microscope no one believed that disease
came from microbes rather than from an angry God. The building of
causal theories out of empirical observations has proven to be, in law as
in medicine, a useful alternative to celestial supplication.
Epidemiology, as preventive medicine employs it, is partly analytical
and partly statistical; until we understand all of the elements of a causal
chain, correlations have to do. Everyone reading this article, I suspect,
has some familiarity with the "statistical risk factors" in the etiology of
coronary artery disease, and with the relationship between statistical
studies and the promulgation of preventive advice.
Physicians have large bodies of data from which theories about causal
correlations can be gleaned, because, unlike lawyers, they do their work
in institutions which deliberately collect such information from individual practitioners in normal course. Few if any individual physicians have
sufficiently deep and broad experience to build valid general theories
from their client base alone. The sharing of nonconfidential data with
others in the profession has therefore been a strong theme in the culture
of medical practice for as long as prevention has been. We lawyers need
to develop some such institutions, and perhaps a dose of that aspect of
the professional culture as part of our own R & D agenda. No shared
observations to study means no useful theories to grow on.
There is a significant body of methodological literature in preventive medicine. It covers not only the biological and chemical sciences,
but the behavioral and the social sciences as well. Medicine takes the
need for broadly-gauged causal studies very seriously, and believes that
the origins of disease - like the origins of legal claims - often reside in
patterns of human behavior as well as in the Latinesque crannies of the
profession's "harder" science. All physicians are to some degree social
scientists as well as scientific practitioners.
Law has not yet developed its own epidemiological methodology.
But lawyers can similarly be social scientists, easily well enough to contribute to the building of our own theories about the causes of litigation
and legal conflict. In fact, we already do it, all the time, without necessarily thinking about it systematically. Every well-planned transaction is
based upon predictions not just of what courts will do, but of what people will do, and of how their future perceptions may be translated into
legal forms of action. That crystal ball gazing is nothing if it is not the
derivation of particularized predictions, drawn from a more general the-
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ory about human behavior. The R & D agenda of preventive law, however, must be broader in its ambition than what any one of us can
achieve alone.
Where then, do we go from here? First, we need to gather lots of
data, about experiments that worked and experiments that failed. Second, we need to develop sound methods for analyzing it all. And third,
we must take seriously the commitment to search for mosquitoes as well
as for quinine, for useful theories of the organizational determinants of
legal dispute.
Prophylaxis, preventive medicine's second major element, is the
process by which trouble is prevented, by which the transmission of disease is interrupted or rendered ineffective. It is, as I have been arguing,
inefficient unless it is based upon an adequate understanding of the
"vectors" of the troubles to be avoided, because only with that knowledge can sound practical judgments be made about the cost-effectiveness of alternative prophylactic strategies. As one medical text points
out, it is vastly cheaper for the patient to sleep on the second floor,
where mosquitos seldom fly, than for the physician to keep the patient's
blood in a state of constant alkalosis, even though the latter is by far the
professionally sexier thing to do.
In discussing the prevention of personal injuries - a matter of
some interest to both professions - one physician has suggested the
following menu of generalized options. Some of them have intriguing
legal analogues:
Prevent the cause from coming about. ("Human factors" engineering in product design.)
Prevent the causefrom acting. (Post-sale monitoring of field use.)
Constrain the causal act in time and place. (Notice requirements.)
Impose barriers to the injury. (Include mandatory ADR clauses in
sales contracts.)
Raise injury thresholds. (Warranty limitations and indemnity
agreements.)
Optimize emergency care. (Any ideas?)
Maximize rehabilitation. (Well, every analogy has its limits.)
The point is not that this list is particularly good, or bad or even
relevant. It is, rather, to suggest that for any given disease there will
likely be a range of different preventives to choose from. Some will
work better than others. Some, given at the wrong time in the wrong
dosage, may prevent the disease but kill the patient. How are we to
choose? In a word, counseling.
I must mention a related point. When I came across this in my
reading of a preventive medicine text, I was struck by the power of its
simplicity. It has to do with how professionals categorize things. From
the point of view of treatment, squamous cell carcinoma is best classified
as a cancer. From the point of view ofprevention, it is best classified as a
disease caused by smoking. If the preventive analysis hews to the classifications of the curative, it may not get very far.
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My friend and collaborator, Louis Brown, once told me about a client who wanted a special class of common stock for his closely-held corporation, one that would afford its holder full participation in some
aspects of the enterprise but not in others. I would guess that would
have been easy enough for Louis to create, if he had classified the problem as one of corporations or securities law. What the client was asking
for, however, was not the problem. It was the solution to a problem that
lay deeper. The client had an adult son who was the cause of certain
difficulties, which the client thought would be ameliorated by bringing
him into the business (but not allowing him to exercise any control over
the business' fundamental affairs). Once that was identified as the problem - and the securities device as only one possible solution - a world
of other possibilities opened up, most of which had nothing to do with
corporations law or common stock.
The successful outcome in that case came not from some rule of
substantive law, but from the technique of client counseling. Counseling is something good lawyers learn experimentally and do instinctively.
Poor lawyers do not do it at all, and the rest of us do it at best unsystematically. Yet preventive lawyers demands a focus not on the legal
forms of facts that have already happened, but on the aspirations and
factual constraints of the client. Instinctive methods of counseling may
not be enough as our preventive pharmacopeia develops. There is
nothing "soft" about effective counseling. It is an area of professional
skill as open to development through applied research as any other.
Who needs a doctor with forty different pills but no client-centered theory with which to choose among them?
The third and final run at the preventive medicine analogy concerns
"public health." That is a very broad area, which means essentially the
procedures by which the benefits of epidemiological and prophylactic
studies can be brought to the client population in acceptable ways ...

to a

population which as often as not does not think it needs it.
One of the problems of preventive anything is that it addresses matters that are not obvious, risks of diseases with no current pains, incipient legal problems (or foregone opportunities) that have not yet given
rise to a perceived loss or to the assertion of a claim by someone else.
How do we get nonsymptomatic clients to take advantage of preventive
legal services? Medicine does it by brute force. From 1946 until 1953,
for example, patients admitted to hospitals for anything at all were subjected to TB screening through chest X-rays. Few doctors then or now
will treat a problem solely as you have defined it without doing at least
some screening for other nonsymptomatic things. And many HMOs
have created strong financial incentives for periodic preventive care.
For another thing, litigation - for the plaintiff anyway - creates a
fund from which the lawyers' fees can be paid. (Litigation defense has
something of the same psychological "advantage," in that the client can
compare the concrete fee with the concrete judgment he might otherwise suffer.) But preventive lawyering creates no such obvious fund, and

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

to prove that it is a wiser investment than waiting for the disease to erupt
is often to prove a negative, something even lawyers have trouble doing.
Part of the problem is that we do in fact reinvent wheels, and the
diseconomies of doing so affect the costs of our ministrations. Even in
legal audits, the preventive law device most well advanced, we have only
begun to create replicable procedures, audit techniques that do not have
to be built from scratch for each company and each topical area. While a
machine-tool company cannot just apply as is the audit instruments of
an anesthesia company, neither must the machine tool folks design their
own procedures as if none had ever existed elsewhere. Again, the key
point is the idea of the useful theory; a collection of general principles,
of how and why preventive strategies work, which can be adapted to new
contexts, efficiently enough for the economic value of the service to be
maximized and to become obvious. This is an avenue of important R &
D: fashioning our discoveries into less expensive and sweeter
medicines. If we can let this law-to-medicine analogy take one final,
probably self-destructive leap, it would be to suggest that our clients still
take what we do pretty much as an unnecessary injection in the gluteus.
For their sake we need to change that.
None of this comparing and analogizing should be taken as a naive
lionization of another learned profession, nor as a suggestion that preventive law must take its form from its medical namesake. Preventive
law will develop its own intrinsic techniques and methodologies in time.
At the moment, however, it is a body of useful practice much in need of
supporting theory. For ideas about how the necessary research and development work might be conceived, it seems fair to search for likely
analogues.
Whether the analogy is apt is ultimately not important. What it
demonstrates, however, is. Preventive law is an effective mode of lawyering. Its development beyond its present state will require, in addition
to continued experimentation, efforts at theoretical understanding; R &
D ventures which will enhance our professional abilities to plumb the
real sources of avoidable legal conflict; to fashion optimal strategies for
its containment, and to do so in a way that our clients can accept.
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TheJudicialpower of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.
-Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
INTRODUCTION

The varied ways in which the Supreme Court has reached beyond
the literal language of the eleventh amendment in an effort to articulate
its true meaning are familiar to all who study, teach or practice in the
field.' The eleventh amendment speaks of barring suits prosecuted
against a state by "citizens of another State,"' 2 but the Court has not
1. A sampling of recent commentary on the topic might include C. JACOBS, THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972);J. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF
THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987); M. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 139-68 (1980);
Engdahl, Immunity and Accountabilityfor Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. I
(1972); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U.

PA. L. REV. 515 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Part One]; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV.

1203 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Part Two]; Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Constructionof an Affirmative GrantofJurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Lichtenstein, Retroactive Relief in the Federal Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip Through the Twilight Zone, 32
CASE W. RES. 364 (1982); Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1413 (1975); Shapiro, lWrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case,
98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682
(1976).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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hesitated to apply it to suits brought by citizens of the state being sued. 3
The eleventh amendment speaks in classic subject matter jurisdiction
terms by limiting the "judicial power of the United States," 4 but the
Court has suggested that states may waive the jurisdictional bar and that
Congress may override it by legislative action. 5 The eleventh amendment speaks of barring suits "in law or equity," but it has been applied
to suits in admiralty as well, 6 and has been ignored in some suits in equity based on the legal fiction that suits to enjoin state officials from
enforcing allegedly unconstitutional state laws are not suits against the
state. 7 As one commentator noted: "One might expect that a look at
the language of the eleventh amendment would help resolve most sovereign immunity issues. The problem is that the eleventh amendment is
'8
universally taken not to mean what it says."
Perhaps the foremost cause of the Supreme Court's difficulties with
the eleventh amendment is the first impression it typically generates
that, however unambiguous it might appear, it makes no sense. What
ever could have possessed the drafters of the eleventh amendment to
bar suits against a state only by citizens of other states? This question
leads inescapably to the answer that the drafters could not have intended such a bizarre result. However, interpreting the eleventh
amendment to bar all suits against states in federal court creates other
difficulties. Consider, for example, the obstacles to enforcing the fourteenth amendment if states cannot be sued in federal court. Inevitably,
exceptions to such an interpretation of the eleventh amendment would
have to be recognized to make its application more tolerable. The result
was preordained. As one judge recently observed: "Any step through
the looking glass of the eleventh amendment leads to a wonderland of
judicially created and perpetuated fiction and paradox." 9
Several commentators in recent years have advocated alternative interpretations of the eleventh amendment in an effort to avoid this pre3. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare [hereinafter Employees], 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. It could not have been merely coincidental that its drafters chose to begin the eleventh amendment with the same language that introduces article
III. That language has been uniformly interpreted to refer to subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 8, at 26 (4th ed. 1983).
5. See, e.g., Employees, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). There the Court noted that the eleventh

amendment stands as a barrier to federal court suits "against a nonconsenting state." Id.
at 284. It also suggested the pertinent inquiry was "whether Congress has brought the
States to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity from suit in a federal court." Id. at
283. Though the Court ultimately concluded that Congress had not done so, the obvious

implication of its question was that Congress could do so if it wished. Id.
6. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n. 17 (1982); Ex
parte New York, No. 1,256 U.S. 490, 497-500 (1921). Contra United States v. Bright, 24 F.
Cas. 1232, 1236 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 14,647).
7. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
8. Field, Part One, supra note 1. at 516 (emphasis in original).
9.

Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 1980).
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dicament.10 Their premise is that the drafters of the eleventh
amendment meant what they said. These commentators conclude that
the eleventh amendment does not prohibit suits by citizens against their
own states. I I This conclusion makes sense. Nonetheless, in Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 12 the Court's most significant recent eleventh
amendment decision, a bare majority of the Court rejected this view of
the eleventh amendment.13
The purpose of this article, however, is only secondarily to urge the
adoption of a more literal interpretation of the eleventh amendment as a
means of solving the eleventh amendment's conceptual dilemmas. Its
primary purpose is to suggest that the body of eleventh amendment case
law prior to Atascadero, although seemingly in hopeless disarray, can be
synthesized into an analytical framework that is both sensible and workable. Atascadero misinterprets, neglects or rejects the framework erected
by these cases, which explains the title of this article.
Part I will describe four key eleventh amendment cases decided in
the last twenty-five years and the problems that have been presented for
those attempting to derive from these cases a comprehensible framework for eleventh amendment analysis. Part II will explain how these
cases can be reconciled with each other in a workable construct consistent with the proposed literal interpretation of the eleventh amendment.
Part III will examine and criticize the Court's holding in Atascadero.
I.

KEY ELEVENTH AMENDMENT CASES

The eleventh amendment has generated considerable litigation in
the past fifteen years, including six major Supreme Court decisions and
at least eight minor ones. 14 Its earlier history was more circumspect.
Although the eleventh amendment was mentioned in several Supreme
Court decisions in the early 1800's,15 the Court's most significant rul-

ings were not made until after the ratification of the Civil War amend10. Redish, supra note 1; Field, Part One, supra note 1; Field, Part Two, supra note 1;
Fletcher, supra note 1; Gibbons, supra note 1.
11. Redish, supra note 1, at 152; Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 544; Fletcher, supra
note 1, at 1060.

12. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
13. In Atascadero the majority reaffirmed what it considered to be the holding of Hans
v. Louisiana "that the Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his own
State in federal court, even though the express terms of the Amendment do not so provide." Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 (1985).
14. The six major cases are Welch v. State Department of Highways & Public Transportation, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985);
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); and Enployees, 411 U.S. 279
(1973). The minor cases include Papasan v. Allain, 106 S.Ct. 2932 (1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); Florida
Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981)
(per curiam); Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
15. Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821).
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ments 16 and the general grant by Congress in 1875 of federal question
jurisdiction. 17 The earliest key Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the eleventh amendment were Hans v. Louisiana 18 in 1890, and Ex parte
Young' 9 in 1908. Hans held that neither a citizen nor a noncitizen can
sue a state in federal court. 20 In Ex parte Young, a decision that would
21
have major ramifications for future fourteenth amendment litigation,
the Court held that a suit against a state official to enjoin enforcement of
an unconstitutional state law was not a suit against the state for eleventh
22
amendment purposes.
The major catalyst to the modern influx of eleventh amendment litigation was Parden v. Terminal Railway Co., decided in 1964.23 Parden, and
three key cases that followed it, Employees of the Department of Public Health
& Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare (Employees),24 Edelman v.
Jordan,25 and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,2 6 form a quartet which provides the
framework of modern eleventh amendment analysis.
A.

Parden v. Terminal Railway Co.

Parden2 7 was a lawsuit brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) 28 by an Alabama railroad employee against his employer.
The state of Alabama owned the railroad and raised the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment. Because
16. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, & XV.
17. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
18. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
20. 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
21. The Court has more recently noted that Ex parte Young is a watershed case which
has permitted "the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather
than merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). A number of landmark cases striking down state statutes
on constitutional grounds could not have been heard by the federal courts were it not for
Ex parte Young. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (meditation or voluntary
prayer in the public schools); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962) (state legislative reapportionment); Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racially segregated public schools).
22. In Ex Parte Young, the Court held that a state official acting in conflict with the
Constitution "is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct." 209 U.S. at 160.
From that premise the Court adopted the fiction that a suit to enjoin a state official from
enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state law is not a suit against a state for eleventh
amendment purposes, although the consequences of the injunction are certainly felt by the
state, and although, for fourteenth amendment purposes, the actions of the state official
would still be considered "state action." Id. at166-68. However, the Court has refused to
extend this reasoning to suits seeking lump sum money damages or restitution, even those
couched in terms of injunctive relief, when the source of relief would be the state treasury.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974).
23. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
24. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
25. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
26. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
27. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
28. Federal Employer's Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, as amended bv Act of Aug. 11,
1939, ch. 685, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)).
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the plaintiff sought a damage award to be paid out of the state treasury
rather than injunctive relief against state officials, 2 9 Ex Parte Young was
not applicable. Justice Brennan, who would later become a key figure in
a short, ambigumodern eleventh amendment jurisprudence,3 0 wrote
31
ous opinion for a bare majority of five justices.
1. Justice Brennan's Majority Opinion
Justice Brennan noted that although the literal language of the eleventh amendment did not prohibit suits by citizens against their own
states, Hans v. Louisiana had nevertheless held that unconsenting states
were immune from suit in federal court. He distinguished Hans by noting that Congress had authorized suits under the FELA against any railroads operating in interstate commerce, whether publicly or privately
owned. Congress, he asserted, was empowered to subject Alabama to
suits because each state surrendered a portion of its sovereignty to Congress by ratifying the commerce clause. 32 Acknowledging that a state
still could not be sued in federal court without its consent, he noted that
the issue of consent was itself a question of federal law. 3 3 Despite state
law to the contrary, 3 4 Justice Brennan held that Alabama had consented
to suit in federal court by entering into the interstate railroad business
with full knowledge that such conduct would bring it within the provithat Alabama could not claim immusions of the FELA. He concluded
35
nity from suit in federal court.
The ambiguity in Justice Brennan's majority opinion concerns the
interrelationship between his "surrender" and "consent" theories. On
one hand, if the states had surrendered their sovereignty to Congress by
ratifying the commerce clause in 1789, as Justice Brennan suggested,
then why did it matter whether Alabama had subsequently consented to
this suit? Was it not enough that Congress had used the commerce
.power given to it by the states to enact the FELA? On the other hand, if
it is true that, as Justice Brennan said, "tilt remains the law that a State
may not be sued by an individual without its consent,"'3 6 then in what
sense did the states surrender their sovereignty to Congress in 1789?
29. 377 U.S. at 184 (1964).
30. See Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 2010.
31. 377 U.S. at 198. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Goldberg and Clark
joined in Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court. Justices White, Douglas, Harlan and
Stewart dissented.
32. Id. at 191.
33. Id. at 196. Justice Brennan observed that Congress could condition state participation in interstate commerce on states waiving their immunity from suits in federal court
related to those activities. Such congressional authority would be rendered meaningless if
a state, "on the basis of its own law or intention, could conclusively deny the waiver and
shake off the condition." Id. As Alabama's activity involved interstate commerce, the
question of its consent to suit was necessarily a question of federal law.
34. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14 states that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a
defendant in any court of law or equity."
35. 377 U.S. at 192.
36. Id.
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Justice White's Dissent

Justice White wrote a short dissent which three other Justices
joined. Justice White started with the proposition that states enjoy constitutional immunity from suits in federal court. 37 He then focused on
Congress' enactment of the FELA as it related to Alabama's alleged consent to this suit. He argued that, while Congress certainly had the power
to condition a state's entry into the interstate transportation business on
its consent to suits arising out of that business, the Court should demand a clear manifestation of that congressional intent before recognizing such a result. Justice White pointed to a line of cases holding that a
waiver of sovereign immunity could only be based on "the most express
language,"'38 and noted that the FELA contained no such language. He
concluded that Alabama could not be subjected to this suit in the federal
courts.

B.

39

Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v.
Department of Health & Welfare

Employees 40 was a lawsuit brought by a class of mental hospital employees against its employer, the state of Missouri, for overtime wages
owed to them under the 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). 4 1 Here the Court found the suit barred by the eleventh
amendment. The majority opinion was written by Justice Douglas, one
of the dissenters in Parden. Justice Marshall, who joined the Court after
Parden was decided, concurred in the result. 4 2 Justice Brennan, author
43
of the Parden opinion, dissented alone.
1. Justice Douglas' Majority Opinion
Justice Douglas began by explaining that, although the eleventh
37. Id. at 198 (White, J.,dissenting).
38. Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S.459, 468-70 (1945); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171
(1909)). It should be noted that the cases relied on by Justice White were not cases where
the alleged "waiver" of state immunity was found in congressional legislation. Ford .Volor
Co. involved an ambiguous state statute which the Court construed as limiting consent to
suits in state courts. Murray involved state legislation which dissolved the state liquor control board and created a special commission to dispose of the assets held by the board. Id.
at 160-61. Plaintiffs, who sued the commission in federal court, asserted that the state had
relinquished control over these assets so that a suit against the commission was not a suit
against the state within the meaning of the eleventh amendment. Id. at 170. The Court
disagreed, holding that such an interpretation of the state statute would only be adopted if
supported "by the most express language, or by such overwhelming implication from the
text as would leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Id. at 171.
39. 377 U.S. at 200 (White, J., dissenting).
40. Employees, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
41. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended by Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (1966) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 201-19 (1982)).
42. 411 U.S. at 287 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall was joined by Justice
Stewart, a dissenter in Parden.
43. None of the four members of the Court who joined injustice Brennan's majority
opinion in Parden was on the Court when Employees was decided.
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amendment did not literally apply to citizen suits, Hans v. Louisiana had
held that unconsenting states were constitutionally immune from both
citizen and noncitizen suits in the federal courts. 4 4 Justice Douglas acknowledged that the issue was whether this case was controlled by the
holding of Parden. He noted that in Parden, suit had been allowed
against Alabama based on waiver or consent. 4 5 He found Parden distinguishable from Employees by the nature of the
state activities and the stat46
utory authority involved in the two cases.
Justice Douglas examined the state activities involved in each case.
In Parden, Alabama had entered into the proprietary field of running an
interstate railroad. 4 7 By contrast, in Employees, Missouri had done nothing more than engage in the traditionally governmental and nonproprie48
tary function of running state mental hospitals.
With respect to the statutory authority for the respective suits, Justice Douglas acknowledged that in Employees, as in Parden, Congress had
acted pursuant to its commerce clause power. However, because of the
nature of Missouri's governmental activities, the harshness of the double
damage penalty Congress imposed on FLSA violators, and the availability of other enforcement mechanisms besides private suits, he concluded
that it would be inappropriate to assume that Congress intended to
bring "the states to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity from suit
in a federal court," 4 9 merely because Congress had included certain
state operations within the FLSA definition of "employer." ' 50 He was
unwilling to permit this suit to proceed without an explicit statement by
Congress that the FLSA's grant ofjurisdiction to the federal courts in5
cluded the power to entertain private enforcement suits against states. '
Justice Douglas' opinion in Employees, like Justice Brennan's opinion
44. 411 U.S. at 280.
45. Id. at 284. Both Justice Douglas in Employees and Justice Brennan in Parden appeared to use the terms "consent" and "waiver" interchangeably. While "consent" is
sometimes viewed as involving a more conscious choice on the part of the decision maker
than is present in the case of "waiver," it does not appear that either Justice Douglas or
Justice Brennan intended to draw such a distinction. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
276 (5th ed. 1979) ("Consent is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind
weighing as in a balance the good or evil on each side."); id. at 1416 (Waiver "may be
shown by acts and conduct and sometimes by nonaction.").
46. 411 U.S. at 282-84.
47. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 185 (1964).
48. 411 U.S. at 284.
49. Id. at 283.
50. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended
by Fair Labor Standards Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,80 Stat. 830 (1966). The original
FLSA excluded federal, state and local governmental bodies from the definition of "employers." The 1966 amendments added an exceptions clause to § 3(d) which read: "except with respect to employees of a State, or a political subdivision thereof, employed (1)
in a hospital, institution, or school referred to in subsection (r) of this section." Subsection (r) further defined hospitals, institutions and schools.
51. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 284-85. Section 16(b) of the FLSA authorized suit in
federal district court against an "employer" to recover overtime compensation, liquidated
damages and attorney's fees. When Congress expanded the definition of employer in
§ 3(d) in 1966 to include certain state operations, it left the grant ofjurisdiction in § 16(b)
unchanged.
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in Parden, was not without its difficulties. As was readily apparent, Congress had been much clearer in the FLSA than it had been in the FELA
about its intent to "[bring] the states to heel."'5 2 The FELA was silent
about suits against states in federal court, and no one suggested that
Congress had even thought about the matter. 53 It was really only coincidental that the state of Alabama operated an interstate railroad, and
Congress, twenty years earlier, had decided to authorize suits under the
FELA against interstate railroads. By contrast, Congress explicitly addressed the question of applicability to state entities in its 1966 amendments to the FLSA, by modifying the definition of "employer" to
include specified state institutions, such as state hospitals. 54 It is therefore difficult to understand how Justice Douglas thought Congress had
not made its intent clear enough in the FLSA, when Parden had found
the FELA to be sufficiently clear without any evidence of congressional
intent. Indeed, Justices Marshall and Brennan in concurring and dissenting opinions found Justice Douglas' argument that Congress had
55
not been clear enough in the FLSA nothing short of incredible.
A second problem with Justice Douglas' opinion concerned the conclusion implicit in his analysis of congressional intent that Congress, had
it been clear enough, could have subjected states to suits under the
FLSA even without state consent. 5 6 Given his assumption that Hans
52. Employees, 411 U.S. at 283.
53. The legislative history of the FELA discloses no congressional consideration of
the potential liability of states engaged in interstate railroad operations. Rather, the debate focused on whether the legislation would unconstitutionally intrude on states' exercise of police power over intrastate commerce. See, e.g., 42 CONG. REC. 4438 (1908).
54. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, Title II, § 102(b),
80 Stat. 831 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)).
55. Justice Marshall said: "In the face of such clear language, I find it impossible to
believe that Congress did not intend to extend theffull benefit of the provisions of the FLSA
to these state employees." Employees, 411 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J. concurring). Justice
Brennan found "no support whatever in either the text of the amendments or their legislative history for the arguments made by the Court for its contrary conclusion." Id. at 303
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
It would be possible to attribute untoward motives to Justice Douglas. He was one of
the dissenters in Parden, arguing that Congress had not made sufficiently clear in the FELA
its intent to permit suits against states in federal court. One possibility, therefore, is that
he was silently overruling Parden in Employees. His dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974), however, suggests otherwise.
In Edelman Justice Douglas accepted the Parden rationale that Alabama had constructively consented to suit by entering the interstate railroad business twenty years after enactment of the FELA. He found constructive consent present in Edelman as well, based on
Illinois' decision to enter into a federal-state welfare plan heavily regulated by Congress.
While Justice Douglas' Edelman dissent did not refer to his majority opinion in Employees, it
is fair to assume that he was more concerned about the degree of congressional authorization in Employees than he was in Edelman because there was no basis for finding state consent in Employees. In order to permit suit in Employees, Justice Douglas would have been
required to assume that Congress intended to subject states to suits in federal court without their consent. He was not willing to make that assumption without more evidence. 411
U.S. at 284-85.
56. Congress was quick to adopt Justice Douglas' suggestion. It amended the jurisdictional provisions of the FLSA within two years after Employees, explicitly authorizing suits
against states. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(d)(l),
88 Stat. 55 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982)). Additionally, the 1974 amendments broadened the definition of employer to include any "public agency." The 1974
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read into the eleventh amendment a constitutional barrier to suits
against states in federal court, how could Congress remove that barrier
by statute? Justice Marshall's concurring opinion addressed both of
these problems with Justice Douglas' opinion, but left other problems
unresolved.
2.

Justice Marshall's Concurring Opinion

Justice Marshall asserted that there were two distinct questions
raised by Employees: first, whether Congress, by extending the FLSA to
certain state employees, had abrogated the states' affirmative defense of
common law sovereign immunity; and second, whether this exercise
of
57
federal judicial power was barred by the eleventh amendment.
On the first question, Justice Marshall concluded that Congress had
intentionally and effectively abrogated the defense of common law sovereign immunity by using its commerce power to enact the FLSA which,
by its terms, authorized suits against states. 58 He therefore disagreed
with the Court's more cautious reading of congressional intent.
Justice Marshall based his concurrence in the judgment of the Court
on his answer to the second question. Emphasizing notions of federalism and state sovereignty, Justice Marshall concluded that the eleventh
amendment barred suits against states in federal court by citizens as well
as noncitizens. 59 The suit against Alabama in Parden had been allowed
to proceed, injustice Marshall's eyes, because Alabama had waived eleventh amendment immunity by entering into the interstate railroad business with full knowledge that it would thereby subject itself to federal
regulations like the FELA. He asserted that no waiver had occurred in
Employees, because Missouri had been running state mental hospitals
long before Congress amended the FLSA to bring them under its coverage. 60 Because he believed the eleventh amendment raised a constitutionally imposed jurisdictional barrier to suit in federal court, he
concluded that, regardless of congressional intent to the contrary, the
plaintiffs in Employees could not bring suit in federal court. 6 1
Although Justice Marshall's concurring opinion resolved the obvious problems with the Court's opinion, it exposed other difficulties that
could not be so easily resolved. For example, if the eleventh amendamendments were held unconstitutional in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), although on tenth rather than eleventh amendment grounds. National League of
Cities was itself overruled nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
57. Id. at 287-88 (Marshall, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 288-89 (Marshall, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 294 (Marshall, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 296 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 289 (Marshall,J., concurring). Citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) and
General Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), Justice Marshall concluded that the the state
courts would be constitutionally obligated under the supremacy clause to enforce FLSA
claims, common law sovereign immunity to the contrary notwithstanding. 411 U.S. at 298
(Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, by contrast, noted that state courts might be
available for FLSA suits, but declined to decide whether they were obligated to hear them.
Id. at 287.
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ment imposes a constitutionally dictated jurisdictional barrier to suits
against states in federal court which Congress cannot overcome by legislation, how can states confer jurisdiction on the federal courts by mere
consent? What of the black letter rule learned by every first year law
student that consent of the parties does not confer subject matter jurisdiction? 62 Justice Marshall's only response to that question was that the
ability of a state to waive the jurisdictional bar of the eleventh amendment by consent "is an anomaly that is well established as a part of our
constitutional jurisprudence." ' 63 While correct as far as it goes, this
statement is hardly a satisfactory basis for constitutional decision
making. 64
3.

Justice Brennan's Dissent

Justice Brennan criticized both Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall
for what he felt was a misunderstanding of his Parden opinion. In explaining what he meant in Parden, Justice Brennan also provided answers
to key problems raised by the opinions ofJustices Douglas and Marshall.
Justice Brennan took the position that Parden had held the eleventh
amendment inapplicable to citizen suits. As a result, Missouri's immunity defense would have to rest on the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, he reiterated his view that the states had
surrendered a portion of their sovereignty to Congress by ratifying the
commerce clause. Congress, he felt, had authorized suit against Missouri by enacting the FLSA pursuant to its commerce power. This left
65
no immunity on which Missouri could rely in defense of this lawsuit.

By taking the position that the eleventh amendment does not apply
to citizen suits, Justice Brennan accomplished two things. First, he resolved the problem presented by Justice Douglas' opinion of how Congress could by statute override a constitutionally imposed immunity.
Second, he avoided the anomaly of permitting subject matter jurisdiction to be conferred on the federal courts by consent of the states.
The biggest problem with Justice Brennan's dissent is his insistence
that Parden held the eleventh amendment inapplicable to citizen suits.
Without the benefit of Justice Brennan's Employees dissent, few persons
reading the majority opinion in Parden would have guessed as much. In
62. See

J.

M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 13 (1985); C.
7, at 23 (4th ed. 1983).
63. 411 U.S. at 294-95 n.10 (Marshall, J., concurring).
64. Another conceptual problem not resolved by the approaches taken by Justices
Douglas and Marshall concerns the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over the state
courts. The eleventh amendment does not distinguish between appellate and original jurisdiction. Thus it literally applies not only to suits against states brought originally in the
federal district courts but also to suits against states brought in the state courts and appealed to the Supreme Court. However, the power of the Supreme Court to hear such
appeals has never been seriously questioned, in spite of the eleventh amendment. See, e.g.,
General Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908) (exercise of appellate jurisdiction to determine
whether state courts were obligated by supremacy clause to hear suits that might be barred
in federal court by the eleventh amendment).
65. 411 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
FRIEDENTHAL,
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Parden, he stated: "Although the Eleventh Amendment is not in terms
applicable here, since petitioners are citizens of Alabama, this Court has
recognized that an unconsenting State is immune from federal-court suits
by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another State."'6 6 In retrospect Justice Brennan probably meant that, although the eleventh amendment did not apply to citizen suits, states could nevertheless raise the
defense of common law sovereign immunity even without state consent or
congressional authorization. But no other Justice participating in the
Employees decision was willing to read Parden that way.
C.

Edelman v. Jordan

Edelman v. Jordan6 7 was a class action on behalf of Illinois disability
benefit applicants against the state officials administering federal-state
programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD). 68 Plaintiffs
alleged that the processing of their benefit applications by the defendant
officials exceeded the maximum time periods authorized by federal law.
They sought a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to comply
with federal standards. They also requested a permanent injunction requiring defendants to provide restitution to plaintiffs for benefits with69
held by the state as a result of past noncompliance with federal law.
The Court granted the first request but denied the second. Justice
Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion. This time Justices Douglas, Marshall and Brennan each dissented, albeit in three separate opinions. Justice Blackmun joined injustice Marshall's dissent to round out another
five-four split.

70

1. Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
Insofar as the plaintiffs sought prospective injunctive relief against
Illinois state officials to compel their compliance with federal law, Justice
Rehnquist saw no difficulty with permitting the suit under Exparte Young.
However, Justice Rehnquist rejected plaintiff's argument that Ex Parte
Young permitted an award of back benefits. 7 1 He concluded that the
award of back benefits, although couched in terms of equitable restitution, nevertheless constituted a monetary award against the state of Illi72
nois barred by the eleventh amendment.
66. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964) (citing Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. I (1890)) (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist used virtually identical language
in Edelman, stating that "[wihile the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a
State by itsown citizens, this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is
immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of
another State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
67. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
68. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.No. 92-603, Title III, 86 Stat. 1465
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1982)).
69. 415 U.S. at 656.
70. Id. at 678 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.at 688
(Marshall,J., dissenting).
71. Id.at 664.
72. Id. at 666.
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Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that Parden permitted an
award of back benefits because Illinois had waived its immunity from
suit in federal court by accepting matching federal funds under the provisions of the Social Security Act. 73 He noted that "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of
constitutional rights." 74 He concluded that a state can only be found to
have waived its eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal court
75
when the waiver is stated in "the most express language."1
Justice Rehnquist found further support for his conclusion in the
failure of the Social Security Act to provide for enforcement suits
against states in federal court. The only sanction Congress provided in
the Social Security Act for the violation by participating states of its fund
76
distribution requirements was termination of future federal funding.
He noted, by contrast, that both Parden and Employees involved federal
legislation "which by its terms authorized suit ...

against a general class

of defendants which literally included States or state instrumentalities."' 77 The state was literally included in a class of defendants against
whom suit was authorized in Parden by operating interstate railroads,
and in Employees, by operating mental hospitals.
Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that the Civil Rights Act of
1871 (section 1983)78 authorized this suit to bring Illinois into compliance with the Social Security Act. He noted that section 1983 did nothing more than authorize an action against state officials, such as
plaintiffs' claim for prospective injunctive relief which the Court found
was permitted by Ex parte Young. In Justice Rehnquist's view, that hardly
constituted congressional authorization to sue the state itself, let alone a
79
general class of defendants that literally included states.
73. Id. at 671. The court of appeals had stated this as an alternative basis for its
decision.
74. Id. at 673.
75. "[W]e will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable
construction.' " Id. (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970) (omitted by revision, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 302, 86 Stat
1465 (1982)).
77. 415 U.S. at 672.
78. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982), states in part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
79. Justice Rehnquist was probably following the Court's reasoning in the seminal
decision of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe held that the word "person" in
§ 1983 encompasses natural persons but not municipalities. Id. at 187. By the same logic,
§ 1983 could be viewed as authorizing suits against state officials but not against the state
itself.
After Edelman was decided, this aspect of Monroe was overruled in Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), a
continuation of the Edelman litigation under a different name, the Court concluded in dictum that the lonell reading of § 1983 to encompass suits against municipalities would not
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One problem immediately raised by Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Edelman concerns his apparent reinterpretation of the Parden decision.
In Employees, Justice Douglas had stated that the Parden decision was
based on the doctrine of waiver.8 0 However, Justice Rehnquist seemed
to suggest that Parden was really based on the doctrine of congressional
authorization. Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist said that congressional
authorization was present in both Parden and Employees, once again raising the question of why that authorization was sufficient in Parden and
not in Employees.
A related problem raised by Justice Rehnquist's opinion concerns
his statement that constructive consent could not be the basis of an eleventh amendment waiver. The Parden Court based its decision, at least in
part, on the issue of constructive consent. 8 1 Justice Douglas' opinion in
Employees referred to Parden as a consent case. While this seeming inconsistency with Parden might explain why Justice Rehnquist sought to characterize Parden as a congressional authorization case, that
recharacterization served only to emphasize the incongruence between
Parden and Employees.
2.

Justice Douglas' Dissent

In his majority opinion in Employees, Justice Douglas had distinguished Parden from Employees on the basis of consent. He now asserted
that Edelman was distinguishable from Employees on the same basis. He
found consent in Illinois' acceptance of matching federal funds to support its AABD program, coupled with knowledge of Supreme Court precedent authorizing monetary awards against states not complying with
federal guidelines for administration of AABD programs.8 2 He was satisfied that section 1983 provided the appropriate vehicle for such
awards.
Justice Douglas was not concerned about the lack of explicit congressional authorization, as he had been in Employees, because in
Edelman, unlike Employees, he felt that the state had consented to suit. 8 3

This also explains why Justice Douglas required Congress to use more
explicit language in Employees than had previously been required in
Parden. Parden, like Edelman, involved state consent, and therefore explicit congressional authorization was not necessary.
change the outcome of Edelman. The Quern dictum was reaffirmed without further discus-

sion in Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 70 (1985).
80. Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 282 (1973).
81. Parden could not have been based on express consent. Alabama hotly contested
whether plaintiff could subject it to suit in federal court, and nothing in Alabama law suggested that Alabama had consented to this suit. Thus the only kind of consent that could
have been found in Parden was constructive consent. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377
U.S. 184 (1964).
82. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 686-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (DouglasJ., dissenting).
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Justice Marshall's Dissent

Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun, agreed that Illinois
had waived its immunity from suit by accepting federal funds in support
of its AABD program. Justice Marshall argued that, by accepting federal
matching funds, Illinois had agreed to abide by the requirements imposed by the Social Security Act and accompanying regulations regarding their administration. Like Justice Douglas, he was untroubled by the
lack of authority in the Social Security Act for suits against states to enforce compliance with federal requirements, because he found that authority in section 1983. While conceding Justice Rehnquist's point that
section 1983 did not literally authorize suits against states, Justice Marshall noted that the Edelman class action was not literally a suit against a
state. It was a suit against state officials, and in that sense, had been
literally authorized by Congress. In the face of what he viewed as congressional authorization of a suit to which Illinois had constructively
consented by its acceptance of federal matching funds, Justice Marshall
found no eleventh amendment bar. He further noted that his views
were consistent with his position in Employees because there had been no
basis in Employees for inferring that Missouri had consented to the terms
84
of the FLSA.
4.

Justice Brennan's Dissent

Justice Brennan again asserted that the eleventh amendment does
not apply to citizen suits. He contended that the only immunity from
citizen suits which states could claim was the "ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity," which the states had surrendered by the grant of enumerated powers to Congress in the Constitution. In his view, since the
states gave up their immunity when the Constitution was ratified in
1789, there was no reason to inquire whether Congress intended to authorize suits against states for retroactive AABD benefits, or whether Illinois had consented to such suits by its acceptance of federal funds in
8 5
support of its AABD program.
D.

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer

Fitzpatrick 86 was a Title VII sex discrimination suit by a class of current and retired male employees of the state of Connecticut against supervisory state officials. The class sought retroactive retirement
benefits. 8 7 As it had in the FLSA, Congress specifically excluded state
employers from coverage when it initially enacted Title VII, but subsequently amended the definitional provisions to bring states within the
purview of the statutory scheme.8 8 This time, acting pursuant to its
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 694-95 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Id. at 449-50.

88. As originally enacted, the term "employer" was defined to exclude "the United
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian
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fourteenth amendment enforcement power, Congress included jurisdictional language ever so slightly more explicit than the language which
89
was found to be insufficient in Employees.
Fitzpatrick was a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist. 90 It was the first and only modern eleventh amendment case to be
decided without dissent. 9 1 The only hint of disagreement on the Court
appeared in brief concurring opinions written by Justices Brennan and
92
Stevens.
As in Edelman, to the extent plaintiffs sought prospective injunctive
relief against the individual state officials they had named as defendants,
the suit was permitted by Ex parte Young. This time, however, Justice
Rehnquist found that an award of back benefits from the Connecticut
state treasury was also permissible in spite of the eleventh
93
amendment.
1. Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
In his discussion of the eleventh amendment implications of a retroactive monetary award against the state, Justice Rehnquist observed
that, unlike Edelman, "in this Title VII case, the 'threshold fact of contribe, or a State or political subdivision thereof .. " Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982)).
89. The claim in Employees was brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
Section 3(d) of the FLSA originally defined "employer" to exclude states and political
subdivisions. This definition was amended in 1966 to except from the exclusion "employees of a state, or a political subdivision thereof, employed ... in a hospital, institution, or
school." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982). However, § 16(b) of the act, which granted jurisdiction to the federal courts to enforce the provisions of the FLSA, was not amended to
include any specific reference to this expanded definition of "employer." 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1982). The court held that it would not infer congressional intent to abrogate
immunity from suit in the absence of an amendment to § 16(b).
The claim in Fitzpatrick was brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As with the
FLSA, the Civil Rights Act originally excluded states, but was later amended to include
governments, their agencies and political subdivisions. Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. IV 1970). The crucial difference was that the
enforcement provisions of the Civil Rights Act were also amended to make clear that the
right of private enforcement was being extended to individuals aggrieved by public employers. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a) to (g) (Supp. IV 1970). Subsection (f)(1) states in
part:
In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental agency, or
political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission shall . . . refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action
against such respondent in the appropriate United States district court. The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought
by the Commission or the Attorney General in a case involving a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision.
90. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
91. Other eleventh amendment cases decided by a split vote include Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (five-four); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226 (1985) (six-three); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(five-four); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982) (six-three); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978) (six-three); Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (five-four); Employees, 411 U.S.
279 (1973) (six joining in Court's opinion, two concurring in the judgment only, and one
dissent); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (five-four).
92. 427 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 458-60 (Stevens,J., concurring).
93. Id. at 457.
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gressional authorization' .. to sue the State as employer is clearly present."'9 4 He added that "[t]his is, of course, the prerequisite found
present in Parden and wanting in Employees." 9 5 Justice Rehnquist noted
that Parden involved authorization based on Congress's commerce
power, while Fitzpatrick was based on Congress's fourteenth amendment
96
enforcement power. However, he found such a distinction unavailing.
After all, the fourteenth amendment was aimed specifically at states and
their treatment of private citizens, and section five of the fourteenth
amendment gave Congress express authority to enforce the provisions
of the fourteenth amendment "by appropriate legislation." ' 9 7 Justice

Rehnquist concluded that the eleventh amendment, and the principles
of state sovereignty embodied therein, were "necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 98 Congress had acted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, and was therefore capable of authorizing this suit.
The primary difficulty with Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Fitzpatrick
concerns its starting point. First of all, Justice Rehnquist had unequivocally stated in Edelman that "[b]oth Parden and Employees involved a congressional enactment which by its terms authorized suit . . . against a

general class of defendants which literally included States." 99 Yet here
he contended that congressional authorization was "found present in
Parden and wanting in Employees."' 00
Second, Justice Rehnquist's Fitzpatrick opinion renewed the confusion created in Employees about the degree of specificity required by Congress in order to overcome the eleventh amendment. On whatever scale
of sufficiency the Court used to measure congressional authorization,

why was authorization insufficient in Employees but sufficient in Fitzpatrick
and Parden? Regarding the legislation at issue, Congress had been fairly
specific about regulating state activities in Employees, slightly more specific in Fitzpatrick, and utterly silent in Parden.
2.

The Concurring Opinions

Neither Justice Brennan's nor Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
addressed these difficulties. Justice Brennan merely reiterated his view
that the eleventh amendment did not apply to suits brought by citizens
against their own state.' 0 Justice Stevens acknowledged the plausibility
10 2
ofJustice Brennan's position and agreed with his result.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 452 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974)).
Id.
Id. at 452-53.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 652, 672 (1974).

100. 427 U.S. at 452.
101. Id. at 457 (Brennan,J., concurring).
102. Id. at 458 (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens commented that "[e]ven if the
Eleventh Amendment does cover a citizen's suit against his own State, it does not bar an
action against state officers enforcing an invalid statute." Id. at 458-59 (Stevens,J., concurring) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)

and Employees, 411 U.S.
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The Problems Summarized

The problems created by the Supreme Court's view of the eleventh
amendment in Parden through Fitzpatrick can be divided into two categories. The first relates to the Court's conception of the eleventh amendment as a constitutional barrier to both citizen and noncitizen suits
against states in federal court. The second relates to the analytical bases
for the distinctions drawn in its eleventh amendment decisions.
The Court's conception of the eleventh amendment poses three
principal dilemmas for the Court. First, it requires the Court to ignore
the literal language of the eleventh amendment. Second, it creates serious problems for the Court in explaining how the eleventh amendment's jurisdictional barrier may be waived by the decision of individual
states to consent to suits against them in federal court. Third, it leaves
unanswered the question of how Congress can abrogate the eleventh
amendment merely by enacting a statute authorizing suits against states.
The analytical difficulties with the Court's precedent concern the
degree of state consent or congressional authorization needed to avoid
eleventh amendment problems, and the relationship between state consent and congressional authorization. Are both consent and authorization necessary, or will one suffice? If the authorization in Parden was
sufficient, why was the authorization in Employees insufficient, and what
made the authorization in Fitzpatrick sufficient? If constructive consent
supported the suit in Parden, why did Justice Rehnquist say in Edelman
that eleventh amendment immunity could not be waived by constructive
consent?
II.

THE CASES RECONCILED WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH A MORE
LITERAL VIEW OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The Court's conception of the eleventh amendment is rooted firmly
in its decision in Hans v. Louisiana that the drafters of the eleventh
amendment could not have intended to bar federal suits against states
by noncitizens while simultaneously permitting citizen suits. However, a
narrower and more literal reading of the eleventh has been suggested by
two commentators, Professors Field and Fletcher.10 3 The interpretation
of the eleventh amendment that follows is based largely on their ideas.
A.

Did the Drafters of the Eleventh Amendment Mean What They Said?
In order to understand why the eleventh amendment was drafted as

279, 298 (1973) (Brennan,J., dissenting) for the proposition that the eleventh amendment
does not apply to citizen suits). Justice Stevens based his conclusion on the Ex Parte Young
fiction that suits to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state statutes are
not suits against the state for eleventh amendment purposes. He acknowledged that
Edelman forbids the application of Ex Parte Young to cases where funds are sought directly
from the state treasury. He asserted, however, that Edelman did not apply where the award
would be paid directly out of trust assets which would only later be replenished from state
treasury funds. Id. at 459-60.
103.

Field, Part One, supra note 1; Field, Part Two, supra note 1; Fletcher, supra note 1.
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it was, it is necessary to examine the problem the eleventh amendment
was designed to address, which is universally agreed to be the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisolm v. Georgia.10 4 Understanding the full significance of the problem Chisolm posed requires analysis of the various
grants of judicial power found in article III, section 2, of the
Constitution.
1. The Constitution's Grant of Power to the Third Branch
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution lists a number of different
bases for the exercise of federal judicial power, but they can all be categorized under one of two headings: party-based or subject-based jurisdiction. 10 5 For purposes of eleventh amendment analysis two clauses
are of paramount importance: the "arising under" clause, and the
"state-noncitizen" clause. The arising under clause, the principal subject-based jurisdictional grant, extends the judicial power of the United
States to cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority. "106 The state-noncitizen clause, one of several party-based jurisdictional grants, extends federal judicial power to controversies "between a
07
State and Citizens of another State."i
The potential ramifications of the state-noncitizen clause were not
debated during the Constitutional Convention. However, there was
considerable debate during state ratifying conventions over the question
of whether the state-noncitizen clause would partially abrogate state sovereign immunity by permitting states to be sued in federal court by citizens of other states. 10 8 While it is not possible to draw from these
debates firm conclusions about the intent of the framers, there is support for the view that neither the state-noncitizen clause nor any other
clause in article III, section 2, was intended to have such an effect. 1 9
2.

The Court's First Mistake: The Problem Presented by Chisolm
v. Georgia

Whatever the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court in Chisolm v. Georgia decided that the state-noncitizen
clause did abrogate state sovereign immunity.I 1 0 This sent the nation,
in the words of one commentator, into "profound shock," and was the
104. 2 u.s. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See Field, Part One, supra note 1,at 515; Fletcher, supra
note 1, at 1034; Jacobs, supra note 1, at 64-67; Redish, supra note 1,at 140.
105. Party-based jurisdiction refers to those clauses in article III, section two, which
base jurisdiction on the status of the parties. Examples include the diversity of citizenship
clause and the clause granting jurisdiction in suits involving ambassadors, public ministers
and consuls. By contrast, subject-based jurisdiction refers to those clauses which base
jurisdiction on the subject matter of the litigation. This includes the clause granting jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases.
106. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
107. Id.
108. Fletcher, supra note 1,at 1046-53; Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 527-31.
109. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1049, 1054; Field, Part One, supra note I, at 527-29.
110. 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 419 (1793).
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catalyst for the proposal and ratification of the eleventh amendment. III
Chisolm was a common law action for breach of contract. 1 2 Since it
did not meet any of the requirements for subject-based jurisdiction, it
would normally have been brought in state court. And, of course, in
state court, Chisolm would have faced the common law defense of sovereign immunity. But since Chisolm was not a citizen of the state he
sued, he brought his suit in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, asserting that his claim could be heard there by reason of the
state-noncitizen clause.' 1 3 The "mistake" made in Chisolm was in the
Court's conclusion, based on ambiguous evidence in the ratification debates, that this conferral of federal subject matter jurisdiction partially
abrogated the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 14
3.

The Cure: The Eleventh Amendment

The response to Chisolm v. Georgia was immediate. One day after
Chisolm was announced the following amendment to the Constitution
was proposed:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in
any of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit of
any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic
or corporate, whether
5
within or without the United States."l
One day later, a different amendment was proposed:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any
suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or
1
subjects of any foreign state. 16
111. C. WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1932).
Professor Warren reports that there was considerable fear that Chisolm would encourage
raids on meager state treasuries through suits against states in federal court brought "by
holders of State issues of paper and other credits, or by Loyalist refugees to recover property confiscated or sequestered by the States." The Georgia House of Representatives
immediately enacted a statute making any attempt to execute process in the Chisolm case a
capital felony, punishable by "death, without benefit of clergy, by being hanged." Id. at
100.
The "profound shock" theory of the eleventh amendment does not stand undisputed.
Judge Gibbons has suggested the eleventh amendment was more a reaction to "foreign
policy concerns and political compromises of the Federalist era" than outrage at the
Court's attempt to undermine sovereign immunity. Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1894.
112. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419.
113. Id. at 420-21.
114. Justice Iredell, dissenting in Chisolm, asserted that the state-noncitizen clause did
not abrogate common law sovereign immunity. He argued that jurisdiction under article
III could be exercised only to the extent legislatively authorized, and that, by permitting
the issuance of writs "agreeable to the principles and usages of law," Congress had not
intended to alter the common law principle that the sovereign could not be sued without
consent. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 433-34 (Iredell, J.,dissenting) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81).
115. Fletcher, supra note 1,at 1058-59 (quoting Pa. J. & Weekly Advertiser, Feb. 27,
1793, at 1, col. 2).
116. Fletcher, supra note 1,at 1059 (quoting 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793)).
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This proposal, with three words added to it, and one word changed
from plural to singular, became the eventual text of the eleventh
amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit[s] in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
17
state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.'
Whatever else might be said about the intent of the drafters of the
eleventh amendment, it should be clear by comparing the first proposed
amendment to the one eventually adopted that the decision to focus the
eleventh amendment on noncitizen suits was not inadvertent. However,
when the Supreme Court decided Hans v. Louisiana118 approximately
one century later, it seemed to take a different view of the matter.
4.

The Court's Second Mistake: What Was Wrong with
Hans v. Louisiana

Hans, like Chisolm, was a suit for breach of contract brought against a
state in federal court. The major difference was that Hans was a citizen
of the state he sued. Consequently he could not rely on the state-noncitizen clause as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.' l 9 Instead, Hans
asserted a claim against Louisiana under the contract clause of the
United States Constitution,' 20 relying on the arising under clause of article III as the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. 12 '
The Hans Court asked whether the drafters of the eleventh amendment meant to forbid suits against a state by citizens of other states
while permitting such suits by its own citizens. 122 The Court concluded
that the drafters could not have intended such an odd result,' 2 3 and the
eleventh amendment has been in trouble ever since. Whether the Court
in Hans meant to constitutionalize state immunity from citizen suits or
simply to recognize a common law analogue to the eleventh amendment
117.

Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1059 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 25 (1794)).

Emphasis

indicates words added to the previous version, while brackets indicate that the letter "s"
was deleted from the previous version.
118. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
119. Id. at 9-10.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 states: "No State shall ... pass any ... law impairing
the obligation of contracts .... "
121. The arising under jurisdiction of the lower federal courts was implemented by
Congress in the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
122. 134 U.S. at 15.
123. The Court in Hans said:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal
courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was
indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh
Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should
prevent a State from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would have been
adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its
face.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

bar against noncitizen suits, 1 2 4 the Court in subsequent cases has interpreted Hans as recognizing in the eleventh amendment a constitutional
12 5
immunity of states from citizen and noncitizen suits in federal court.
A major portion of subsequent eleventh amendment jurisprudence has
been devoted to identifying and justifying exceptions to this immunity,
so that limitations on state power imposed by the Constitution or Congress could be enforced by private parties through litigation in the fed12 6
eral courts.
The Court might have laid a better foundation for future eleventh
amendment analysis had its focus in Hans been on why the drafters of
the eleventh amendment were unconcerned about citizen suits against
states, rather than on whether they intended to permit citizen suits. Answering this question is a crucial first step to unraveling the eleventh
amendment.
B.

The True Meaning of the Eleventh Amendment

Starting with the premise that the principal concern of the drafters
of the eleventh amendment was to correct the Supreme Court's misconstruction of article III in Chisolm,' 2 7 and viewing that premise against a
124. Justice Brennan has for some time contended that the conclusion of Hans v. Louisiana was based on nothing more than the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 320-21 (1973). Professors Field and Fletcher both agree.
Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1039; Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 539 n.86. Until Atascadero,
the rest of the Court disagreed with Justice Brennan's interpretation. For example, in
Employees, Justice Marshall engaged in a vigorous footnote battle with Justice Brennan,
contending that Hans found in the spirit of the eleventh amendment a constitutional barrier to suits against states in federal court whether brought by citizens or noncitizens of the
state sued. 411 U.S. at 292 n.7 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 292-93 n.8 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In Atascadero, Justices Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun for the first time
agreed with Justice Brennan's reading of Hans. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n.17
(1982); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 280
(1973).
126. This article chronicles the Supreme Court's struggle with the eleventh amendment since Hans. One can imagine how much more difficult has been the task of the lower
federal courts of interpreting and applying the Supreme Court's post-Hans decisions.
Compare United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986) (private suit against
state under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
barred despite inclusion of states among "persons" liable under the Act) and Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986) (copyright infringement suit against state institution barred) with Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.
1986) (order directing expenditure of state funds to finance living arrangements for
mental health patient unconstitutionally confined in state institution not barred) and
Grotta v. Rhode Island, 781 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1986) (as consequence of state court interpretation of state statute as waiving eleventh amendment immunity, state is a "person"
subject to suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and David D. v. Dartmouth School
Comm., 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985) (suit against state entities under Education of the
Handicapped Act not barred) andJohnson v. University of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va.
1985) (copyright infringement suit against state institution not barred).
For a list of current federal statutes authorizing in some fashion citizen suits against
state entities, and therefore raising potential future eleventh amendment problems, see
McClintock, Downey, Karau & Kirkpatrick, The Atascadero Rule: New Hurdlefor Plaintiffs Suing States in Federal Court, 21 GoNz. L. REv. 47, 86-101 (1986).
127. In support of the point that it was primarily a matter of misconstruction the draft-

1988]

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

backdrop of the other grants of judicial power found in article III, it is
readily apparent why the drafters focused solely on noncitizen suits.
The only clause in article III that had been misconstrued was the statenoncitizen clause. Furthermore, the only suits that threatened state sovereignty in federal court were noncitizen suits. Citizen suits posed no
similar danger. 1 28 If Chisolm had been a citizen of Georgia, then, regardless of sovereign immunity, his contract claim against Georgia
would not have been within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The drafters of the eleventh amendment addressed their only
immediate concern by providing that suits like Chisolm's could not be
29
heard by federal courts.1
This reading of the drafters' intent, while further justifying the conclusion that the otherwise odd wording of the eleventh amendment was
not inadvertent, raises two key questions. First, can a citizen sue her own
state in federal court when jurisdiction is based on the federal question
clause of article III? Second, if the answer to the first question is yes,
can a noncitizen also sue the state in federal court on a federal question
claim, thus avoiding reliance on the now maligned state-noncitizen
clause for jurisdiction?
The difficulties posed by these questions may be what prompted the
Supreme Court to approach Hans as it did. When Hans sued his home
state of Louisiana in federal court, basing jurisdiction on a federal question, the Supreme Court had to answer the first question. Furthermore,
the Court had to at least consider the implications an affirmative answer
would have for the second question. If a citizen could sue her state on a
federal question in federal court then perhaps a noncitizen could also
bring such a suit, even in the face of the eleventh amendment. Hans
avoided the implications posed by the second question by answering the
first question in the negative, concluding that, regardless of the basis for
subject matter jurisdiction, neither a citizen nor a noncitizen could sue a
30
state in federal court.1
There is, however, another way of approaching these questions that
both addresses the implications of the second question and permits a
ers were worried about, Professor Fletcher notes that the earliest draft of what ultimately
became the eleventh amendment provided that "[tihe Judicial power of the United States
shall not extend to any suits in law or equity .... Only later was the phrase "'be construed
to" added, so that eleventh amendment opened with the command that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend .
Fletcher, supra note i, at

1059-62 (emphasis added).
128. Citizen suits could not be brought under party-based jurisdiction. Therefore, the
only likely basis for jurisdiction in a citizen suit would have been federal question jurisdiction. Congress, however, did not authorize the exercise of federal question jurisdiction by
federal trial courts until 1875, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, save for a brief
period in 1801. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4,2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8,
2 Stat. 132.
129. As Professor Fletcher notes, "[u]nder this interpretation, the adopters of the
amendment were following the traditions of common law lawyers in solving only the problem in front of them by requiring a limiting construction of the state-diversity clause."
Fletcher, supra note i,at 1063.

130. 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890).
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more literal interpretation of the eleventh amendment. This approach
rests on a premise first articulated several years ago by Professor Field
that the intent behind article III was to remain neutral on the question
of continued viability of the doctrine of common law sovereign immunity. 13 When the Constitution was written, debate on the sovereign
13 2
immunity question was limited to the state-noncitizen clause.
Although the views expressed about whether the clause abrogated sovereign immunity were mixed, no one suggested that the clause created a
new constitutional immunity. 13 3 Furthermore, if the state-noncitizen
clause was intended to be neutral on the question of sovereign immunity, as the reaction to Chisolm v. Georgia would suggest, then certainly
the same would have to be said for the rest of article III.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this premise is that the eleventh amendment was simply designed to restore the original intent of
article III by forbidding a construction of the state-noncitizen clause
hostile to common law sovereign immunity.1 34 In other words, the eleventh amendment does not impose a jurisdictional bar to noncitizen suits
in federal court. Rather, it forbids an interpretation of the article III
state-noncitizen clause that would permit such suits. The difference,
although subtle, can be seen most vividly by inserting six words into the
text of the eleventh amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, on the basis that it is commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
35
State.'
131.
132.
133.

Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 538.
Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 527-36; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1046-52.
Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 527-29; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1049, 1054.

134. Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 538-39; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1063.
135. The italicized words are those of the author, not Professor Field's. But the conclusions Professor Field reaches are consistent with the added language. She asserts that
[t]he provision that the 'U]udicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to' certain classes of cases may mean simply that the language
should not be deemed affirmatively to allow the prosecution of those cases, as it had
been deemed to do in Chisolm. The eleventh amendment then would simply overturn Chisolm's abrogation of sovereign immunity.
Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 543 (emphasis in original); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1060-

61.
Professor Field's conclusions have not received unanimous acceptance. Professor
Fletcher points to the writings of several scholars critical of these conclusions, although he
accepts her central thesis. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1036 n.9. The most serious criticism
of Professor Field's views comes from Professor Redish, who contends that neither historical evidence nor the language of the eleventh amendment supports her conclusions. Redish, supra note 1, at 148-49.
Regarding Professor Redish's view of the historical evidence, it should be noted that
there is no direct historical evidence supporting anyone's view of the drafters' intent in
proposing the eleventh amendment. As Professor Field notes, the amendment "passed
without debate, and contemporary indications of the intended scope of the amendment
are not available." Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 541. However, the alternative amendments proposed in response to Chisolm, as well as historical information concerning other
reactions to the Chisolm decision, permit some inferences to be made about the drafters'
intent. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1058-59. That information, coupled with considerable
historical data concerning the intended scope of the state-noncitizen clause, provide ample
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Under this view of the eleventh amendment, the answers to the
questions faced by the Court in Hans are quite simple. Whether a state
may be sued by its citizens in federal court on a federal question claim
will depend on the nature of the claim and whether a common law sovereign immunity defense is available. This is so because article III permits the assertion of federal question jurisdiction but does not eradicate
the defense of common law sovereign immunity. 13 6 If a citizen can sue
his state in federal court on a particular federal question claim because
for whatever reason a sovereign immunity defense is not available, then
a noncitizen should also be accorded that right because the eleventh
amendment does not impose a jurisdictional bar to noncitizen suits. It
merely forbids an interpretation of the state-noncitizen clause that
would permit such suits. Thus, any federal suit against a state must be
brought under some jurisdictional heading other than the state-noncitizen clause. 13 7 Such a suit will also be subject to any common law soversupport for the proposed reading of the eleventh amendment. See Fletcher, supra note 1, at
1045-63.
As for Professor Redish's view of the language of the amendment, it is ironic that
Professor Field, who is critical of the Court for ignoring the language of the eleventh
amendment, is in turn criticized for failing to follow her own advice in interpreting the
eleventh amendment. Professor Redish is correct in his assertion that Professor Field's
justification for her reading of the eleventh amendment strains the language of the amendment. But the conclusion advocated by Professor Field can be reached with less strain by
reading the eleventh amendment in the fashion suggested in the text.
The point of Professor Field's analysis is that, because the language of the eleventh
amendment does not bar citizen suits, it should not be read to do so absent firm historical
evidence supporting such an interpretation. On this point Professor Redish agrees wholeheartedly. Redish, supra note 1, at 152. Once this point is established, the question then
becomes why the drafters circumscribed the eleventh amendment in such a fashion. Professor Field's answer to that question is certainly more faithful to the language of the
eleventh amendment than the response of the Court. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. ScanIon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
136. Thus, Professors Field and Fletcher maintain that the result in Hans would not
change under their analysis. Common law sovereign immunity would be available as an
affirmative defense to Louisiana, even if the eleventh amendment is not viewed as barring
Hans' claim. In fact, they both agree with Justice Brennan's assertion that this is exactly
what Hans held. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 320-21 (Brennan,J., dissenting); Field, Part One,
supra note 1, at 539 n.86; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1039.
Today the same result could be reached by finding that there was no federal question
jurisdiction in Hans. The Court assumed there was, but under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule first enunciated in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908), eighteen years after Hans, that assumption could easily be overcome. Plaintiff's
claim in Hans was essentially for breach of contract. The defense to the merits would have
been that the breach was justified by state statute. Plaintiff's counterargument was that the
statute was unconstitutional because it violated the contract clause. On a virtually identical
fact pattern, Mottley held federal question jurisdiction lacking because the federal issues
were relevant only to the validity of defendant's defense and not a part of plaintiff's wellpleaded complaint. 211 U.S. at 153.
137. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1060. Professor Field appears to take an even narrower
view of the eleventh amendment. She does not read the eleventh amendment as forbidding reliance on the state-noncitizen clause as a basis for jurisdiction. Rather, she reads it
as simply overturning Chisolm s interpretation of the state-noncitizen clause, thus forbidding a construction of the clause that abrogates sovereign immunity. Field, Part One, supra
note 1, at 543.
The difference can be seen most clearly by imagining the Chisolm suit brought today as
"Chisolm H," but this time against a state which has explicitly waived immunity from suit in
federal court. Professor Fletcher reads the eleventh amendment as "modify[ing] article III
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eign immunity defenses available to the state.
This interpretation of the eleventh amendment makes more sense
than reading into the eleventh amendment what is plainly not there - a
prohibition against suits by citizens as well as noncitizens. It also makes
more sense than interpreting the eleventh amendment as permitting
federal question claims brought by citizens against their own state while
38
barring the same claims by noncitizens.1
Under this view of the eleventh amendment, the question of amenability of states to suit in federal court requires a two step process of
analysis. The first step involves an inquiry into the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. When a state is named as a defendant, the question
is whether there is some basis for subject matter jurisdiction other than
the state-noncitizen clause of article III.
Assuming some proper basis for subject matter jurisdiction is
found, the second step requires an examination of whether the state has
available to it the defense of common law sovereign immunity. 139 This
directly by repealing one of its affirmative grants." Fletcher, supra note 1,at 1060. Thus,
he would presumably find Chisolm II barred for lack of an article III grant ofjurisdiction.
Under Professor Field's approach, however, the state-noncitizen clause is still a viable basis for jurisdiction, subject to the defense of common law sovereign immunity. Since that
defense is waived in Chisolm II, the suit would be allowed in federal court.
The interpretation of the eleventh amendment proposed in this article comes closer
on this point to Professor Fletcher's views. It is also conforms more easily to the language
of the eleventh amendment. This difference in approach seems minor, however, in comparison to the primary point of agreement that citizens and noncitizens can sue states in
federal court in cases where jurisdiction is otherwise proper, subject to the defense of
common law sovereign immunity.
138. Justice Brennan once took such a position. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687
(1974) (Brennan,J., dissenting). But in Employees, he referred to the question as open for
debate. Employees, 411 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Professor Redish also has asserted that the eleventh amendment permits citizen suits
on federal question claims while barring similarly based noncitizen suits. Redish, supra
note 1,at 152. He has argued, in criticism of the views of Professor Field, that while "[i]t
might be preferable to have no constitutional bar to a suit against a state, even by out-ofstate citizens(,] .. .the only appropriate means to achieve this goal is by constitutional
amendment, not by a simple rejection of constitutional language." Id.
On a practical level, however, the position taken by Professor Redish will not lead to
results very different from those advocated by Professor Field. First, most modern suits
against states are citizen suits. For example, all of the major cases, and most of the minor
ones, listed in note 14, supra, were citizen suits. Professor Redish readily agrees that the
eleventh amendment does not bar these suits, though he may disagree with Professor
Field on the availability of a common law sovereign immunity defense. Compare Redish,
supra note 1, at 162 with Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 1227. Second, even Professor
Redish concedes that noncitizen suits, in his view barred by the eleventh amendment, can
be authorized by Congress pursuant to its fourteenth amendment enforcement power.
Redish, supra note 1,at 152. Thus, the only suits Professor Redish finds barred by the
eleventh amendment are noncitizen suits authorized by Congress under some provision
other than the fourteenth amendment.
139. Field, Part Two, supra note 1,at 1261-62. Professor Fletcher asserts that his principal disagreement with Professor Field concerns whether sovereign immunity remains as
nothing more than a common law defense. He argues that there may be other constitutional sources of sovereign immunity, such as the tenth amendment. Fletcher, supra note
1,at Il 11-12 & n.303. This dissagreement seems largely semantic. Professor Field does
not view the tenth amendment as a source of sovereign immunity, but she does point to it
as a limitation on Congress's power to abrogate the common law sovereign immunity of
unconsenting states. Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 1218-21. In any event, the Court's
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inquiry in turn prompts two others: first, whether the state consented to
being sued; and second, whether Congress authorized the suit by 4a0 valid
congressional enactment, thus abrogating the state's immunity.'
C.

Conceptual Difficulties: Impact of the Court's Failure to Adopt a More
Literal View of the Eleventh Amendment

The Supreme Court's decisions from Parden through Fitzpatrick have
been largely consistent with this proposed interpretation of the eleventh
amendment. In each case there was subject matter jurisdiction in the
federal courts based on the arising under clause,' 4 1 save for whatever
jurisdictional implications the Court found in a state's claim of eleventh
amendment immunity. In each case the availability of an immunity defense to the federal claim rested in some fashion on the questions of
state consent or congressional authorization. The Court has been asking all the right questions. Only the reasons for asking them have been
wrong.
Thus, the question of whether to adopt the proposed interpretation
of the eleventh amendment could be viewed as a simple matter of semantics, since its adoption need not disturb the outcome of the Court's
decisions. 14 2 But it is important that the Court ask the right questions
for the right reasons because the Court's purpose in asking a question
cannot help but influence its answer.
At a minimum, a decision by the Court to adopt the proposed interpretation of the eleventh amendment would eliminate the three earlier
described conceptual dilemmas caused by the Court's current position:
first, how the eleventh amendment can be read to bar citizen suits when
it says nothing about them; second, how states can confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the federal courts by consent; and finally, how Congress
can statutorily authorize suits barred by the eleventh amendment.
More significantly, however, in terms of its effect on the outcome of
eleventh amendment cases, the elimination of these conceptual dilemmas would reduce analytical confusion about how these cases should be
43
decided.1
subsequent overruling of National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), makes the tenth amendment unavailable as a source
of, or limitation on, congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity.
140. Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 543-45; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1130.
141. In each case, plaintiff's cause of action was created by federal legislation-the
FELA in Parden, the FLSA in Employees, § 1983 in Edelman, and Title VII in Fitzpatrickthereby bringing each case within the arising under jurisdiction of the federal courts.
142. Professor Field suggests that the results in the Court's modern eleventh amendment cases would not have to change in order to accommodate her theories. Field, Part
One, supra note 1, at 545; Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 1279-80; see also Fletcher, supra
note 1, at 1131.
143. A comparison of Employees and Fitzpatrick reveals some of the confusion flowing
from the Court's unwillingness to confront the conceptual dilemmas inherent in its vision
of the eleventh amendment. In Employees, the Court required what seemed to be an inordinate degree of congressional explicitness to sustain a finding of legislative abrogation of
the eleventh amendment. By contrast, the Court was noticeably less concerned about congressional explicitness in Fitzpatrick. Both opinions were devoid of analysis of the differ-
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D. Analytical Difficulties: Explaining Parden through Fitzpatrick
As has been suggested earlier, the Court's analytical difficulties with
the eleventh amendment occur in two related ways: first, in failing to
explain the relationship between consent and congressional authorization; and second, in failing to delineate the kinds of consent and authorization required to overcome the eleventh amendment.
1. The Subtleties of Consent and Congressional Authorization
To take the latter point first, the cases seem to contradict themselves on the question of consent. Parden accepts constructive consent
as a basis for overcoming the eleventh amendment while Edelman appears to reject it. However, the Court's holding in Edelman was more
limited. Edelman held that consent must normally be stated expressly. 14 4
But the Edelman Court did not overrule Parden, which was based at least
partially on constructive consent. How then was Parden abnormal? The
answer rests on the relationship between consent and congressional authorization, as will be discussed in the next section.
The cases also seem contradictory on the question of congressional
authorization. The Court in Employees said Congress was not explicit
enough about authorizing suits against states in federal court, even
though authorization was more explicit in Employees than in Parden.
Then the Edelman Court found authorization in both Parden and Employees, but again without explaining why it was nevertheless insufficient in
Employees. Finally, the Fitzpatrick Court said there was authorization in
Parden but not in Employees.
However, the cases can be viewed as consistent on the issue of conence. One explanation, however, might relate to the Court's unspoken conceptual
difficulty with the notion that Congress could legislatively abrogate what the Court conceived of as a constitutional immunity.
In Fitzpatrick Congress acted pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist noted that the fourteenth amendment was
aimed at limiting state power. It also gave Congress specific authority to pass legislation
enforcing its provisions. Because this specific fourteenth amendment power postdated the
eleventh amendment, he concluded that Congress could use this power to subject the
states to law suits otherwise barred by the eleventh amendment. 427 U.S. at 456.
By contrast, in Employees Congress acted pursuant to its commerce power. That the
Court had some concern with Congress's power to abrogate the eleventh amendment
through the use of its commerce power is evidenced by the fact that the Court held such an
effort unconstitutional three years later in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976). However, the Employees Court did not hold, or even suggest, that Congress could
not abrogate the eleventh amendment with its commerce power. If anything, the Court
implied the contrary by refused to assume Congress intended such a result absent extraordinarily explicit language. 411 U.S. at 287. When Congress provided the requisite language by amending the FLSA the Court was again able to avoid coming to grips with the
conceptual difficulties underlying its interpretation of the eleventh amendment by declaring Congress's actions unconstitutional on tenth amendment grounds. NVational League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
Because the Court chose to resolve Employees and Fitzpatrick without confronting the
difficulties with its concept of the eleventh amendment, the result was confusion about the
analytical basis for distinguishing the two cases.
144. The Court stated that "[clonstructive consent is not a doctrine commonily associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." Edelman
v. Jordan, 411 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (emphasis added).
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gressional authorization as well. When Edelman says there was authorization in Employees and Fitzpatrick says there was not, the Court is
referring to two different kinds of authorization. Edelman was referring
to implicit authorization, which the Court described as authorization to
sue "a general class of defendants which literally includes States." 145 By
contrast, Fitzpatrick was referring to explicit authorization, which the
Court in Employees thought was lacking, as evidenced by its unwillingness
"to infer that Congress .

.

. desired silently to deprive the States of an

immunity they have long enjoyed under another part of the Constitution." 146 Viewed in this light, there was implicit authorization in Employees, as the Court noted in Edelman. 14 7 Nevertheless, there was no explicit
14 8
authorization in Employees, as the Court later noted in Fitzpatrick.
The cases still seem contradictory insofar as Parden permits suits
based on implicit authorization, while Employees requires explicit authorization. But even this contradiction can be explained by examining the
relationship between consent and congressional authorization.
2.

The Link Between Consent and Congressional Authorization

Consent and congressional authorization, in the cases from Parden
through Fitzpatrick, exist on two levels: independent and dependent.
Express consent by a state will defeat state immunity independent of the
question of congressional authorization. 14 9 By the same token, explicit
congressional authorization will defeat state immunity, regardless of the
question of state consent.1 50 So long as either one is sufficiently clear,
state immunity will be overcome. In this sense, the questions of consent
and congressional authorization are independent of each other.
When neither consent nor congressional authorization is expressed
with sufficient clarity to decide the issue independently, the availability
of state immunity mus.t be determined by considering the questions of
consent and congressional authorization together. In this sense, they
become dependent variables.
This dependency occurs when a state constructively consents to being
sued in federal court, as Alabama did in Parden by entering into the interstate railroad business. Whenever constructive consent is alleged,
145. 415 U.S. at 672.
146. Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973).
147. Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress had authorized suits "against a general
class of defendants," in this case employers, which literally included states. 415 U.S. at
674.
148. 427 U.S. at 452. Congress, in the statutory scheme involved in Employees, had not
explicitly stated that private enforcement suits could be brought against states in federal

court. These suits were nevertheless implicitly authorized when Congress provided for
private enforcement suits against "employers" in federal court and amended the definition
of employers to include certain state entities.
149. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673; Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171

(1909). Of course, in order to sue a state some law must create a cause of action on
plaintiff's behalf. However, that law need not be created by Congress.
150. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456; Employees, 411 U.S. at 283. For this reason, it is sometimes referred to as "congressional abrogation."

See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,

473 U.S. 234, 253 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the surrounding circumstances must be examined to determine both
whether there is consent, and to what consent was given. In other
words, unlike express consent, which by definition identifies the terms of
the consent within itself, constructive consent must be viewed in the
context of external circumstances. Relevant circumstances in Parden included what Congress said would happen to those choosing to enter the
interstate railroad business. When a state engages in activities having
the effect of bringing it within a general class of defendants which Congress has chosen to regulate, and against whom Congress has authorized suits in federal court, then the state can be said to have
15 1
constructively consented to a suit implicitly authorized by Congress.
3.

The Theory Applied to the Cases

The Parden Court found that Alabama's entrance into the railroad
business, coupled with Congress's prior authorization of suits against
railroad employers, justified a finding of constructive consent. 1 52 Because constructive consent was present, the Court was not concerned
about whether Congress had explicitly stated its intent to abrogate state
immunity.' 5 3 By the same token, express consent was not necessary in
light of Alabama's actions taken in the face of Congress's enactment of
the FELA. But neither Congress's enactment of the FELA nor Alabama's entry into the railroad business, by itself, would have been suffi54
cient to overcome Alabama's sovereign immunity defense. 1
Viewing Parden this way, both Employees and Edelman become easily
distinguishable from Parden, although each for different reasons. In
Employees, there was no basis for constructive consent, because Missouri
merely continued to perform its traditional governmental functions in
the face of new congressional regulation of that activity. Furthermore,
the Court refused to assume that Congress intended to abrogate state
immunity unilaterally, absent explicit statutory language to that
55

effect. 1

151. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964).
152. The Parden Court did not make it clear that congressional authorization and consent were linked together in the manner suggested. Parden was an ambiguous hodgepodge, as even its author later conceded. Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 301 (1973) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
In light of later decisions, however, it is apparent that what justified the result in
Parden was the coupling of Alabama's actions in acquiring a railroad with prior congressional authorization of suits against railroad employers. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 672 (1974); Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 282 (1973) (majority opinion); id. at 288
(Marshall, J., concurring).
153. This distinction became clearer in Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Employees,
and became the focus of Justice Douglas' dissent in Edelman.
154. Had Congress not enacted the FELA, there would have been no basis for constructive consent. To what, after all, would Alabama have been consenting? By the same
token, congressional authorization of suits against railroads would have had no impact on
the eleventh amendment, absent Alabama's entry into the railroad business.
155. Unfortunately, Justice Douglas' opinion in Employees obscured the relationship between consent and congressional authorization. He could simply have held that in the
absence of express or constructive consent the Court would require Congress to manifest
clearly its intent to impose FLSA suits on unwilling states. Instead, he appeared to distin-
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In Edelman, by comparison, constructive consent could have been
based on Illinois' acceptance of matching federal money. However,
Congress had not authorized suits against states under the Social Security Act. The only enforcement mechanism Congress provided in the Social Security Act against noncomplying states was termination of
funding.' 5 6 This justified the Court's conclusion that Illinois had not
been put on notice that, in exchange for receiving federal money, it
15 7
would be deemed to have consented to suit in federal court.
Finally, in Fitzpatrick, although there was no basis for finding any
form of consent by Connecticut, the Court held that Title VII had been
sufficiently explicit about authorizing suits against states to demonstrate
congressional authorization independent of state consent. ' 58
There is a pattern to these four cases that perhaps can be seen more
159
clearly in the following chart:
STATE CONSENT
express
constructive

CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORIZATION
explicit
Fitzpatrick
implicit
Parden
Employees
none
Edelman

Parden
Edelman
none
Employees
Fitzpatrick
Parden represents what might be viewed as the minimum standard
for waiver of state immunity: constructive consent by a state to a suit
implicitly authorized by Congress. Since there was no consent of any
guish Parden from Employees on the basis of lack of congressional authorization. This holding made no sense because Congress had been more explicit in Employees than it had in
Parden. Justice Douglas eventually provided some clarification of his position in his
Edelman dissent. See Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (Douglas,J., dissenting).
156. 415 U.S. at 674.
157. The question was a close one. As Justices Douglas and Marshall pointed out in
their dissenting opinions, prior cases had held that the provisions of the Social Security
Act could be enforced against participating states by § 1983 actions in the federal courts.
However, it had not been settled whether retroactive monetary awards damages payable
out of state treasuries were available.
158. 427 U.S. at 456.
159. What is depicted on this chart as three distinct levels of consent and authorization
could more realistically be viewed as a sliding scale or spectrum with explicit consent or
authorization at one end and no consent or authorization at the other end. Other factors
should also be balanced on the scale. These include the burden such suits impose on
states and the source of congressional power to regulate state activity.
For example, in comparing Parden and Employees, it is obvious that the burden imposed
on states by the FLSA was considerably greater than that imposed by the FELA. This
difference was a significant factor in distinguishing Parden from Employees. 411 U.S. at 285.
Equally revealing is a comparison between Fitzpatrick and Employees. The burdens imposed
on states by Title VII were certainly no less than those imposed by the FLSA. However,
Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress's specific fourteenth amendment enforcement
powers, which explicitly authorizes congressional regulation of state activities, rather than
the more general provisions of the commerce clause. This fact, coupled with slightly more
explicit congressional authorization in Title VII, caused the Court to distinguish Fitzpatrick
from Employees. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
Nevertheless, the consent/authorization chart serves a useful purpose in clarifying the
relationship between state consent and congressional authorization in the Supreme
Court's eleventh amendment precedent.
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kind in Employees, only explicit congressional authorization could overcome state immunity. The Court was not satisfied that the existing evidence of Congress's intent to regulate state activities through the FLSA
was enough to meet this heavy burden. In Edelman, Congress could have
conditioned state acceptance of federal money on consent to suit but did
not. Absent an indication by Congress that states accepting federal
money would be subject to suit in federal court, there could be no constructive consent based on the mere receipt of federal money, and barring the suit was appropriate. Finally, in Fitzpatrick, congressional
authorization was sufficiently explicit to overcome state immunity, independent of the issue of state consent.
When viewed in this fashion, the cases from Parden through Fitzpatrick are consistent. Perhaps even more significantly, they make sense.
For example, Justice Douglas' suggestion in Employees that Congress
had not made sufficiently clear its intention to subject states to private
enforcement suits in federal court has caused endless confusion. 160 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how Congress could have rewritten the
1966 FLSA amendments to make clearer its desire to authorize state
16 1
suits in federal court.
Under the proposed analysis of these cases, the reason for the decision in Employees becomes clear. However carefully Congress amended
the FLSA to include state and local governments in the definition of
"employers" covered by the FLSA, and therefore subject to suit in federal court, the statute does not on its face declare that states can be sued
in federal court. As such, in the absence of some basis for imposing
constructive consent, the level of congressional authorization found in
Employees was insufficient to overcome state immunity.
It makes sense to require that Congress state its intentions explicitly
on the face of the statute when considering that this requirement applies
only where the obligations imposed on states by Congress are not just
substantial, but wholely involuntary. Requiring that Congress declare in
express statutory language that states can be sued in federal court,
serves two salutary purposes. It forces Congress to consider more directly the issues and problems of subjecting states to suit in federal
court without their consent and lessens the chances that some members
of Congress will vote in favor of the legislation without understanding
62
its full implications. 1

160. See, e.g., Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 1244-46 (noting apparent conflict between
Parden and Employees "in their approaches to divining congressional intent," describing the
Employees opinion as "oblique," and concluding that Employees created "uncertainty" and

"considerable ambiguity").

161. Justices Brennan and Marshall, despite their disagreement on the proper result,
lambasted the majority for concluding that the FLSA failed to demonstrate congressional
authorization. Employees, 411 U.S. at 289-90 (Marshall,J., concurring); id. at 301-08 (Bren-

nan, J., dissenting).
162.

When one section of a complex statutory scheme authorizes private enforcement

suits against "employers," and another provision defines employers to include specified
state entities, legislators unfamiliar with the legislation may not realize the significance of
voting to authorize such suits. When in addition, the legislation extends the right to sue to
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These concerns are not as pressing when states choose to participate in federally regulated activities. It follows that in such cases the
Court will be less concerned about congressional authorization. The
Court's primary concern should then be whether states were fairly put
on notice of the consequences of their participation in these activities.
This concern is satisfied when Congress makes it clear on the face of the
regulatory legislation that enforcement suits in federal court are authorized against a general class of defendants which states may join by participating in the regulated activities.
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court decided Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,' 63 and either departed from or seriously
distorted the analytical framework established by its precedent. As a result of Atascadero, the burden on a plaintiff seeking to enforce federally
created rights against states in the federal courts has been significantly
increased. If the Court misconstrued prior case law, it did so at least
partially as a result of its failure to articulate adequately in those earlier
cases an intelligible framework for resolving eleventh amendment
problems.
III.

ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL 1. SCANLON

Atascadero was a suit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.164 The plaintiff sought injunctive and retroactive monetary relief
against a California state hospital which allegedly denied him employment due to his physical handicaps.' 6 5 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act provides that "otherwise qualified handicapped individual[s]" shall
not "be subjected to discrimination under any program ...receiving
Federal financial assistance." 16 6 Section 505 of the same act states that
the remedies provided in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
include compensatory and injunctive relief in the federal courts, will be
available to anyone aggrieved by "any recipient of Federal assistance"
under section 504.167 The state hospital, a recipient of federal financial
assistance under the provisions of section 504, defended in part on elev68
enth amendment grounds. 1

The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims based on the eleventh
amendment.' 69 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds. It took the position that the plaintiff's complaint was deficient because it failed to allege that the federal funds received by
defendant had a primary objective of providing employment opportunia large class of state employees engaged in traditionally state governmental activities, and
the remedies include double damages and attorneys' fees, it seems reasonable to insist that
the authorizing language be sufficiently explicit to apprise individual legislators of the full
significance of the proposed legislation. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285-86.
163. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
164. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
165. 473 U.S. at 236.
166. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
167. Rehabilitation Act of 1978, § 505, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982).
168. 473 U.S. at 236.
169. Id.
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ties.1 70 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the
case to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in ConsolidatedRail Corporationv. Darrone,1 7 1 which had held that section 504's prohibition of handicap discrimination in employment was
not limited to programs that received federal funds for purposes of employment.1 72 The court of appeals found Darrone controlling and thus
had to face the eleventh amendment basis for the district court's dismissal. This time the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district
court, concluding that the eleventh amendment was not a bar to the suit
because California had constructively consented to the suit by accepting
federal financial assistance. The court of appeals noted that, unlike
Edelman, "the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class
of defendants which literally includes States," was present in
A tascadero. 73
The Supreme Court granted certiorari again,17 4 this time to resolve
a conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the First and Eight Circuits on
the eleventh amendment question.' 75 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding by a five to four vote that the plaintiff's monetary claims were
barred by the eleventh amendment. Justice Powell wrote the opinion
for the Court with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
dissenting.
A. Justice Powell's Majority Opinion
In holding that the plaintiff's monetary claims against California
were barred by the eleventh amendment, Justice Powell addressed three
principal arguments: first, that California had waived its immunity by
express provision in its own constitution; second, that Congress had abrogated California's sovereign immunity by enacting the Rehabilitation
Act; and third, that California constructively consented to being sued in
federal court by accepting federal financial assistance under the terms of
76
the Rehabilitation Act. 1
Justice Powell found no merit in the express waiver argument. In
Edelman, the Court had held that in order to waive its eleventh amendment immunity expressly, a state must specify that it is consenting to suit
against it infederal court; a general waiver of immunity, however express it
might be, would not suffice. 1 77 Justice Powell adopted that reasoning,
concluding that the provision in the California constitution permitting
suits "against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be
170. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated,
465 U.S. 1095 (1984).
171. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
172. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984).
173. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473
U.S. 234 (1985).
174. 469 U.S. 1032 (1984).
175. 473 U.S. at 237.
176. Id. at 240.
177. 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
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constitute an express waiver of
directed by law"' 178 was insufficient to
79
immunity from suit in federal court.1
Justice Powell next addressed plaintiff's second argument, that
Congress had abrogated state immunity by enacting the Rehabilitation
Act. He refused to consider legislative history which plaintiff offered in
support of the conclusion that Congress intended to abrogate state immunity. He justified this refusal by noting the well established requirement that Congress' intent to abrogate immunity must be "unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute" before the Court will assume that
Congress truly desired such a result.' 8 0 Justice Powell determined that
the language of section 505, authorizing relief against "any recipient of
Federal assistance," failed to demonstrate the "unequivocal statutory
language" needed to abrogate the eleventh amendment. 18
The final argument addressed by Justice Powell was that made by
the court of appeals, that California had constructively consented to suit
by voluntarily accepting federal funding under the Rehabilitation Act.
Justice Powell agreed with the observation of the court of appeals that
mere receipt of federal funds will not support a finding of constructive
consent.' 8 2 The court of appeals, however, had concluded that Atascadero involved more than the mere receipt of federal funds because California had accepted federal funding under a legislative scheme that, by
its terms, authorized suit against "any recipient of Federal assistance"
provided by that legislation.' 8 3 Justice Powell held that this additional
factor was not enough to support a finding of state consent. Referring
to plaintiff's congressional authorization argument, he reiterated that
Congress had failed to make unmistakably clear in the Rehabilitation Act
its intent to subject unconsenting states to suit in federal court. He concluded on the same basis that the Act failed to demonstrate "a clear
intent by Congress" to make state consent to suit in federal court a condition of receiving federal money. 184 As a result, he found that the case
was barred by the eleventh amendment.
178.

CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5.

179. 473 U.S. at 241.
180.

Id. at 242. Justice Powell did not cite the Employees case. Instead, he cited two

more recent decisions that trace their support directly back to Employees. Id. (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) and Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1979)). Pennhurst cited Quern, which in turn cited Employees for the
proposition that Congress must state its intent to abrogate state immunity explicitly.
Justice Powell may have been trying to insulate himself from the implication in Employees that Congress can use its commerce clause power to abrogate state immunity. The
Court, in cases subsequent to Employees, has made a concerted effort to tie Congress's
power of abrogation to the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976). That objective was furthered in Atascadero by the reference to Pennhurst
and Quern, and the Court's refusal to acknowledge the historical roots of this power in
Employees and the commerce clause.
181. 473 U.S. at 245-46.
182. Id. at 246-47.
183. 735 F.2d at 362.
184. 473 U.S. at 247.
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The Dissenting Opinions

Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined together
in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Brennan. Justice Blackmun
also wrote a separate dissent. 18 5 Justice Brennan's opinion began by
examining the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act. Pointing to
numerous references in the legislative debates suggesting that states
were among the primary targets of section 504, Justice Brennan concluded that Congress without question had intended to abrogate state
immunity and subject the states to suits in federal court under the Reha86
bilitation Act. 1
The major portion of justice Brennan's fifty-five page opinion consisted of historical analysis of sovereign immunity and the eleventh
amendment, and a critique of Hans v. Louisiana and its progeny.1 8 7 As a
way of correcting the deficiencies in the Court's eleventh amendment
doctrine, Justice Brennan advocated adoption of a more literal interpretation of the eleventh amendment, similar to the one proposed by
Professors Field and Fletcher.18 8
Justice Blackmun's opinion was much shorter. He began by agreeing with all of Justice Brennan's historical arguments and urged the
Court to reconsider Hans and its progeny, just as it had recently reconsidered its position on the tenth amendment' 8 9 by overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery 190 in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 19 He expressed continuing support for the views expressed in
185. Justice Stevens added a one paragraph explanation of why he was taking a position inconsistent with the one he took in Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v.
Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 151 (1981). In Florida iVursing Homes, Justice
Stevens concurred in a judgment he believed to be incorrect because he felt bound by the
Court's prior decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). By the time Atascadero
was decided, Justice Stevens had become persuaded that Edelman was "egregiously incorrect." He therefore decided to cast stare decisis aside and join Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun in dissent. 473 U.S. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. 473 U.S. at 248-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 258-302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. Although Justice Brennan did not state that he was advocating adoption of the
views of Professors Field or Fletcher, his opinion cited their works in several places. See,
e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 258 n. ll, 263 n.13, 270 n.20, 277 n.26, 279 n.29, 298 n.52
(Brennan, J., dissenting). When comparing Justice Brennan's Atascadero dissent to his earlier opinions, it becomes clear that his current position is based on their views. For example, Justice Brennan, as early as his Employees dissent, urged a literal interpretation of the
eleventh amendment that would not bar citizen suits in federal court. Employees, 411 U.S.
279, 309-10 (1973). At that time, however, his view assumed that noncitizen suits would
be barred by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman, 415
U.S. at 687 (BrennanJ., dissenting). Not until his dissent in Atascadero did Justice Brennan
adopt the position that the eleventh amendment does not bar any suit in federal court in
which subject matter jurisdiction is based on some provision other than the state-noncitizen clause of article III, section two. 473 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
One interesting sidelight is that Professor Fletcher served as Justice Brennan's law
clerk in 1976-77. Professor Fletcher wrote his article in 1983, and Atascadero was the next
significant eleventh amendment case decided by the Court.
189. 473 U.S. at 302-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
191. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Edelman.' 92 He concluded that
the judgment of the court of appeals should have been affirmed because
California, by voluntarily accepting federal funding under the Rehabilitation Act, had constructively consented to suit in federal court. He also
concluded that Congress had abrogated California's immunity from suit
by enacting the Rehabilitation Act in the exercise of its fourteenth
3

amendment power. 19

C.

How Atascadero Should Have Been Decided

Obviously the Supreme Court could not decide Atascadero on the
grounds it did and remain consistent with its analysis in Parden through
Fitzpatrick. The problem with Atascadero lies in the Court's failure to
grasp the distinction between the congressional authorization argument
made by the plaintiff and the constructive consent argument of the court
of appeals.
The Court was correct in rejecting plaintiff's congressional authorization argument because Congress had not made itself "unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute" on that point. It was also correct in
perceiving that a finding of constructive consent by California would depend on a finding that Congress intended to exact from states their consent to suit in federal court in exchange for Rehabilitation Act funding.
However, the Court erred in viewing these two inquiries into congressional intent as identical.
The principle reason for the "unmistakably clear" requirement in
the cases prior to Atascadero was that, without any kind of state consent,
the Court was unwilling to assume Congress intended unilaterally to
subject states to suits in federal court unless the language of the statute
documented in unmistakable terms Congress's intent to do so.' 94 Such
precautions are not necessary when there is a basis for finding that a
state has constructively consented to suit. When a state engages in activities that subject it to federal regulation, the concern shifts to whether
Congress has made it sufficiently clear to the state being regulated pre19 5
cisely which activities will be subject to what sort of control.
192. 415 U.S. at 688.
193. 473 U.S. at 304 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. Noting that subjecting states to federal suits might place enormous fiscal burdens
on the states, Justice Douglas wrote that "Congress, acting responsibly, would not be presumed to take such action silently." Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973). In his Edelman
dissent, however, he later argued that "[wihere a State has consented to join a federalstate cooperative project, it is realistic to conclude that the State has agreed to assume its
obligations under that legislation." 415 U.S. at 685 (Douglas. J., dissenting).
195. This was the primary basis for disagreement between the majority and dissenters
in Edelman. Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, noted that the Social Security Act provisions did not authorize enforcement suits and therefore provided no basis for finding "a
waiver by a participating State of its Eleventh Amendment immunity." 415 U.S. at 674.
Justices Douglas and Marshall in dissent would have found that § 1983, and the case law
applying it in the context of enforcement of the Social Security Act, had made sufficiently
clear to states that their participation in federal-state Social Security Act programs would
subject them to § 1983 suits to enforce the Act. 415 U.S. at 679-80 (Douglas. J., dissenting); id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Viewed in this light, the error in the majority's analysis in Atascadero
becomes obvious. Given California's voluntary decision to accept federal funding under the terms of the Rehabilitation Act, Atascadero should
have been analyzed as a constructive consent/implicit authorization
case. Thus, the relevant inquiry should not have been whether Congress made its intent to subject states to suit unmistakably clear on the
face of the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, the Court should have asked
whether California was fairly put on notice that recipients of federal
funding under the Rehabilitation Act could be subjected to enforcement
suits in federal court for violating the terms of the Act.
Ironically, a careful analysis of this question might have justified the
same result eventually reached by the Court. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone,1 96 which was
not handed down until after the first decision of the court of appeals in
Atascadero,19 7 it was unclear whether the nondiscrimination provisions of
the Rehabilitation Act applied to all recipients of Rehabilitation Act
funds, or only those receiving funds for the primary objective of providing employment. 1 98 Thus, an argument could have been made that California was not fairly put on notice of the consequences that would flow
from its acceptance of Rehabilitation Act funding. Nevertheless, the answer to this question was far less clear than the answer to the question
the Court did address.
CONCLUSION

Prior to Atascadero, the eleventh amendment could be overcome in
three ways: express consent of the state, explicit congressional authorization, or constructive consent to a suit implicitly authorized by Congress. Atascadero apparently has narrowed the possibilities down to two:
express consent or explicit authorization.
For future plaintiffs suing state employers under the Rehabilitation
Act, Atascadero will not matter. On October 21, 1986, Congress
amended the Act to abrogate explicitly the eleventh amendment immunity of states violating section 504.199 Nevertheless, Atascadero remains
196. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
197. The first decision by the court of appeals in Atascadero was handed down in 1982.
Darrone was not decided until 1984.
198. The result in Darrone was prefigured in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512 (1982). North Haven held that the prohibition of employment discrimination in Title
IX did not incorporate a "primary objective" requirement even though it, like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, borrowed language from Title VI, which did contain a "primary objective" limitation. Id. at 527-30; Darrone, 465 U.S. at 632 n.13. The North Haven decision,
however, was handed down only one week before the first court of appeals decision in
A tascadero.
199. Congress provided that:
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504
of the Rehabilitation of 1973, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the
Age Discrimination Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the
provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of
Federal financial assistance.
(2) In a suit against a State for violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1),
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the most recent statement by the Court of the standards for determining
when a plaintiff can enforce federally protected rights against a state in
the federal courts.
In that regard, Atascadero could be viewed as simply another example of the Supreme Court expounding on the eleventh amendment in a
manner bewildering to all concerned. On the other hand, it could be
interpreted as a conscious effort to stake out higher ground, setting up
new and more difficult hurdles for plaintiffs to clear in order to enforce
claims against states in federal court. Whatever else might be said about
Atascadero, the Court, by its refusal or failure to acknowledge its departure from precedent, has added one more layer to the wealth of confusion that has permeated the eleventh amendment for more than a
century.
Perhaps the most curious thing about Atascadero is the nearly total
neglect of Parden by both the majority and dissenting opinions. 2 00 The
majority's disinclination to discuss Parden is almost understandable. The
Court may have felt that it had run out of ways of distinguishing Parden
from its progeny. Employees could be distinguished from Parden on the
basis of consent which was found lacking in Employees. Edelman could be
distinguished for lack of congressional authorization. However, congressional authorization was much more apparent in Atascadero than it
had been in Edelman or Parden. Furthermore, it was possible to conclude
that by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, California
had consented as a condition of that funding to federal enforcement by
suits against it, just as Alabama had consented to suits under the FELA
in Parden by entering the interstate railroad business. Thus, for the maremedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a
violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in
the suit against any public or private entity other than the State.
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1845
(1986). Presumably this provision will satisfy the standard of explicitness required in Atascadero to abrogate the eleventh amendment.
Interestingly, the Senate Report accompanying the legislation states that section 1003
"clarifies the intent of Congress" and that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision [in Atascadero]
misinterpreted congressional intent." S. Rep. No. 388, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1986).
Perhaps as a result of this legislative history, a case was brought before the Court asserting
that, in light of this amendment, Atascadero should be overturned. Dunlap v. University of
Ky., 815 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3354 (U.S. November 16, 1987)
(No. 86-2029). Of course, evidence of what the 99th Congress desires does not by itself
establish what the 93rd and 95th Congress intended in enacting sections 504 and 505 of
the Rehabilitation Act. However, there was considerable support in the legislative history
of the Act of Congress's intent to permit suits against participating states. See Alascadero,
473 U.S. at 248-252 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Atascadero'sapplication of the
congressional authorization standard of prior cases was correct. The 95th Congress, unlike the 99th Congress, did not make unmistakably clear on the face of the Rehabilitation
Act its intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment. The error in Atascadero lay in importing this explicitness requirement from the context of congressional authorization to the
context of constructive consent.
200. The only reference to Parden appears as a string citation in a footnote in the majority opinion. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243 n.3. The footnote documents the assertion that
the Court has consistently held that "the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity
limits the grant ofjudicial authority in Art. III." (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) and citing fifteen other cases, including Parden).
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jority, it may have seemed that Parden either had to be overruled or
ignored.
But why did the dissenters neglect Parden? Either they misunderstood Parden, or they disagreed with what they thought it had come to
mean. There is support for the latter possibility. It was Justice Brennan
who wrote Parden, and who, ever since Employees, has been trying to convince the rest of the Court that Parden did not mean what everyone else
thought it did. 20 1 The ultimate irony of Atascadero may be that when
four members of the Court finally agreed upon a workable conception of
the eleventh amendment that could support the analytical framework
created by Parden, they chose to ignore that framework, while the rest of
the Court took its most significant step away from Parden, once again
defying the language and intent of the drafters of the eleventh
amendment.
ADDENDUM

On June 25, 1987, the Supreme Court announced its latest contribution to the eleventh amendment fray. 20 2 In Welch v. State Departmentof
Highways & Public Transportation,20 3 a plurality of four, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, invoked the eleventh amendment to bar a Jones
Act suit by a ferry dock employee against his employer, the Texas Department of Highways. 20 4 A majority was attained with Justice Scalia's
concurrence in the judgment. 20 5 Justice White, though part of the plurality, also contributed a separate concurring opinion. 20 6 Justice Brennan wrote a lengthy dissent reiterating the historical arguments he made
in his Atascadero dissent. Predictably for eleventh amendment cases, he
20 7
was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
In Welch the Court finally reached a point where it could neither
ignore Parden v. Terminal Railway, as it did in Atascadero, nor distinguish
it, as it did in Employees and Edelman. Welch presented a fact pattern identical to Parden except that the plaintiff brought his suit under the Jones
Act instead of the FELA. But even that distinction was transparent, as
the Court recognized, since the Jones Act simply "applied the remedial
provisions of the FELA to seamen." 208 Thus, the Court had either to
201.

Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 299 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman, 415 U.S.

651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457 (1976)
(Brennan, J. dissenting).

202. This addendum was written after work on the main body of this article was
completed.
203. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
204. Id. at 2944. Section 33 of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), provides a cause
of action to any seaman suffering personal injury in the course of employment.
205. 107 S.Ct. at 2957 (Scalia,J., concurring). Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment was based on his reluctance to entertain a question not addressed in the parties'
briefs about the correctness of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). He did, however,
agree with the plurality's decision to overrule Parden. 107 S. Ct. at 2958.
206. 107 S.Ct. at 2957 (White, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 2958 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
208. 107 S.Ct. at 2944.
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abide by Parden or to overrule it. It chose the latter.20 9
Two brief points should be made about Welch. First, it is clear from
Justice Powell's opinion in Welch that he intended no shift in doctrine
from that which he articulated in Atascadero. As this article suggests,
Atascadero established an analytical framework inconsistent with Parden.
Welch, in overturning Parden, simply did explicitly what Atascadero had
already done implicitly. Justice Powell's reasoning, in both cases, is
plainly that whenever a private enforcement suit based on federal legislation is brought against a state which has not expressly consented to the
suit, the eleventh amendment bars the suit unless congress makes "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" its intention to allow the
suit.

2 10

Consequently, Welch has no additional impact on the views expressed in this article about either the eleventh amendment or the
Court's analysis of the eleventh amendment, save for the significant fact
that Welch expressly overturns Parden, the progenitor of the analytical
framework on which this article is based. But of course, this article has
already criticized Atascadero for implicitly overturning Parden. The Welch
Court's decision to make the demise of Parden explicit simply adds another wrongly reasoned case to the stack.
The second point to be made about Welch concerns an argument the
Court failed to address as it discarded Parden. One question on which
the Court granted certiorari in Welch was the continued viability of the
"doctrine of implied waiver as set forth in Parden,'' 2 1 1 a question going
to the heart of whether Parden ought to be formally overruled. Remarka2 12
bly, the Court never discussed this implied waiver strand of analysis.
Save for one quote pulled from the dissent in Parden, the focus of the
Court's discussion of Parden was on whether congressional authorization
could be found in the absence of "unmistakably clear" statutory language. 2 13 Thus, the Court once again missed or ignored the crucial dis209. Id. at 2948.
210. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242; Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2948. Justice Powell assumed in
Welch, without deciding, that the fourteenth amendment was not the sole source of congressional authority to subject unconsenting states to suits in federal court. Parden had
concluded that Congress had such power under the commerce clause. Employees assumed
as much without discussion. Since Fitzpatnck, however, cases have assumed that this power
might be limited to the fourteenth amendment.
211. 107S. Ct. at2946.
212. The Court cannot entirely be blamed for this omission. Of the briefs filed with the
Court, only one amicus brief discussed Parden s constructive consent doctrine. Brief of the
Council of State Governments, International City Management Association, National Association of Counties, National Governors' Association, National League of Cities, and
U.S. Conference of Mayors as Amic Cuiae in Support of Respondents at 25-28, Welch v.
State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (No. 85-1716).
213. Justice White's dissent in Parden stated that "[o]nly when Congress has clearly
considered the problem and expressly declared that any State which undertakes given
regulable conduct will be deemed thereby to have waived its immunity should courts disallow the invocation of this defense." 377 U.S. at 198-99 (White, J., dissenting) (quoted in
Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2948). After quoting this language, the W1elch Court discussed the
requirement imposed by Employees and Atascadero that Congress state its intent to override
the eleventh amendment in express language. The Court concluded that Parden, being
inconsistent with this requirement, should be overruled. In reaching this conclusion, the
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tinction between the explicit congressional authorization analysis and
the constructive consent/implicit congressional authorization analysis
called for by Parden and its progeny.
Justice White's concurring opinion brings home the same point
from a different perspective. In the first sentence of Justice White's one
paragraph concurrence he notes approvingly the Court's refusal to address the question of "whether the Jones Act affords a remedy to
seamen employed by the States." '2 14 At first glance, this point seems
irreconcilable with the Court's holding. It would seem that in holding
that Congress did not make sufficiently clear its intent to subject states
to suits under the Jones Act, the Court necessarily resolves the very
2 15
question Justice White says is left open.
The only way Justice White's concurring opinion can be reconciled
with the Court's holding is by recognizing, as this article suggests, that
there are two distinct levels of congressional intent that need to be analyzed. The first level focuses on whether Congress intended to abrogate
the immunity of unconsenting states. The Court correctly concluded,
based on the "unmistakably clear" rule, that such intent could not be
found in the Jones Act. 2 1 6 The second level focuses on whether Congress intended that the Jones Act provisions give a remedy to seamen
against consenting states. The Court noted the concession by the parties that Texas had not expressly consented to this suit. 2 17 However,
the Court failed to address the question of whether, much less what kind
of, implied consent might suffice, other than by bare implication from its
decision to overrule Parden.
In the end, what makes Welch most paradoxical is the juxtaposition
of the Court's response to Justice Brennan's dissent and its discussion of
Parden. The Court's discussion of Parden disregards the fact that a whole
line of cases that could have overruled Parden did not; overlooks the implied consent strand of analysis which emerged from Parden and that
same line of cases; relies heavily on the one significant case (Atascadero)
that ignored Parden; and finally overrules Parden. Then the Court complains that the dissent urges that Hans v. Louisiana be overruled in violation of the long-standing doctrine of stare decisis, "any departure from
[which] demands special justification. ' 2 18 The Court would do a better
service to those who struggle to comprehend what has often been
viewed as the "Twilight Zone" of federal jurisdiction 2 19 if it would be
more mindful of its own pronouncements of the importance of stare decisis "by whose circumspect observance the wisdom of this Court as an
Court glossed over the fact that Employees had not found it necessary to overrule Parden on
grounds of inconsistency, and ignored the fact that the Employees express language requirement had been imposed only because no basis for state consent was found.

214. 107 S. Ct. at 2957 (White, J., concurring).
215. However, the Court confirms in a footnote that it is not resolving this question.
Id. at 2947 n.6.
216. Id. at 2947.
217. Id. at 2946.
218. Id. at 2948 (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
219. See Lichtenstein, supra note 1,at 381.
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institution transcending the moment can2 2 0alone be brought to bear on
the difficult problems that confront us."

220. 107 S. Ct. at 2948-49 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

WHEN ARE MERGER CLAUSES UNCONSCIONABLE?
By KERRY L. MACINTOSH*

INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario: buyer, a typical consumer wishing
to obtain goods or services, visits seller. Anxious to close the deal, seller
impresses buyer with oral representations and promises concerning the
goods or services. Buyer, enticed into making the purchase, signs a
preprinted form contract, failing either to notice or understand this deceptively harmless looking provision: "This writing is the final and entire agreement of the parties and there are no other representations,
promises, warranties or agreements of any kind." Buyer later discovers
that the goods or services do not live up to seller's representations and
promises. Angry, buyer sues seller for breach of express warranty or
contract. Will buyer win?
The answer lies in the parol evidence rule, a substantive doctrine'
included in both the common law of contracts and Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code). 2 The parol evidence rule
gives legal effect to any intention the contracting parties may have to
make a writing the final and perhaps complete expression of their agreement. 3 A writing intended as a final expression of one or more terms of
an agreement is an integrated agreement. 4 If adopted as a complete and
exclusive statement of the agreement, the writing is a completely integrated agreement; 5 otherwise, it is a partially integrated agreement. 6
Under the parol evidence rule, evidence of prior or contemporaneous
agreements or negotiations is not admissible to contradict a term of an
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder School of Law.
B.A. 1978, Pomona College; J.D. 1982, Stanford University.
I wish to thank my former employer, the University of Idaho College of Law, which
provided me with necessary support and encouragement during the production of this
article. Thanks are also due to Professor Joann Henderson, of the University of Idaho
College of Law, and Professor Robert Weisberg, of Stanford Law School, for their helpful
comments and suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank Andrea Siler,J.D. 1987, University of Idaho College of Law, for her research assistance.
1. The term "parol evidence rule" is a misnomer. The rule does not exclude certain
facts because they are undesirable or untrustworthy means of proof. Instead, it declares
that certain facts are legally ineffective, so that they may not be proven at all. Thus, the
parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law. 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2400, at 4 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-18 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-202
(1978).
3. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.3, at 451 (1982).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(1) (1979).
5. Id. § 210(1).
6.

Id. § 210(2).
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integrated agreement. 7 Further, evidence of consistent additional terms
is inadmissible to supplement a completely integrated agreement. 8
The parol evidence rule takes on special significance where the writing includes a merger or integration clause. Essentially, a merger clause
expressly provides that the writing constitutes the entire agreement between the parties, and that any prior or contemporaneous agreements,
representations, or warranties are excluded. 9 Since complete integration depends on the parties' intention, most courts view merger clauses
as conclusive evidence that the agreement is completely integrated.' 0
Armed with this knowledge, consider once again the opening hypothetical scenario. As part of the offer, seller's oral representations and
promises would ordinarily become terms of the contract.I I If the sale is
of goods, so that Article Two of the U.C.C. applies, 1 2 the oral representations and promises might even create express warranties' 3 which
could not be disclaimed.1 4 Nevertheless, because this harmless looking
7. Id. § 215. The Code's version of the parol evidence rule applies to "evidence of
any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement." U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978).
The parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent agreements. An integration
may, therefore, be contradicted by evidence which shows its subsequent modification. 4 S.
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 631, at 950-51 (3d ed. 1961).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216(1) (1979); U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1978).

9. Comment, The "Merger Clause" and the Parol Evidence Rule, 27 TEX. L. REV. 361
(1949).
10. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 458. But see, e.g., ARB, Inc. v. E-Systems,
Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Enrico Farms, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 629 F.2d
1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980) (dictum); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100
Idaho 175, 180, 595 P.2d 709, 714 (1979); Shoreham Developers, Inc. v. Randolph Hills,
Inc., 248 Md. 267, 272, 235 A.2d 735, 739 (1967).
The Second Restatement commentary states that a merger clause "if agreed to is
likely to conclude the issue whether the agreement is completely integrated." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 comment e (1979). However, "such a clause does not

control the question whether the writing was assented to as an integrated agreement, the
scope of the writing if completely integrated, or the interpretation of the written terms."
Id.
11. See I A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 11, at 23 (1963).
12. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978).
13. When a seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise to a buyer which relates to
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain, an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise is created. Id. at § 2-313(l)(a). Applying this
test to the facts of the opening hypothetical, it appears that seller's representations and
promises concerning the goods may be promises or affirmations of fact relating to the
goods. Because these promises or affirmations of fact enticed buyer into making the
purchase, they are probably part of the basis of the bargain. Thus, express warranties that
the goods conform to seller's representations and promises might arise.
14. See Comment, Contracts - IVarranties, Unconscionability, and the Parol Evidence Rule Industralease Automated & Scientific Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 27 BUFFALO L.
REV. 521, 525 (1978). That an express warranty may not be disclaimed follows from
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1978), which provides:
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on
parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to
the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
Because an express warranty and a disclaimer of express warranty are necessarily inconsistent with each other, § 2-316(1) does, in effect, prohibit the disclaimer by making it
inoperative. However, this prohibition is less complete than it might seem, because it is
subject to the parol evidence rule. If an express warranty were oral, and the written con-
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provision is a merger clause, the writing may very well be viewed by a
court as a completely integrated agreement. If so, buyer's evidence
proving the oral representations and promises as consistent additional
terms will be excluded,1 5 causing buyer to lose his lawsuit for breach of
express warranty or contract.16
This outcome is not inevitable. Several commentators have suggested, without elaboration, that a merger clause may, under the proper
circumstances, be invalidated for unconscionability. 17 If the merger
clause were so invalidated, buyer would have the chance to establish that
the preprinted form contract was only a partially integrated agreement,18 which could be supplemented by buyer's evidence of consistent
additional terms. 19
Modern unconscionability doctrine is embodied in section 2-302 of
the U.C.C., which provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
tract included a disclaimer of express warranty, then, assuming the written contract were
found to be the final expression of the agreement, the parol evidence rule would exclude
evidence of the contradictory oral express warranty. 2 W. HAWILAND, UNIFORM COMMER-

CIAL CODE SERIES § 2-316:06, at 389 (1982); Hester, Deceptive Sales Practicesand Form Contracts - Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy?, 1968 DUKE L.J. 831, 852.
15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. Depending on the facts he can prove and his jurisdiction, causes of action not
based on breach of contract or express warranty may still be available to buyer. For example, the merger clause would not eliminate evidence of implied warranties. This is because
the parol evidence rule has no application to implied warranties, which arise by operation
of law rather than by conduct of the parties. Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty
Under the U.C.C. - How to Succeed in Business Without Being Liablefor Not Really Trying, 46 DEN.
L.J. 579, 606 (1969). Moreover, the parol evidence rule does not generally preclude the
use of extrinsic evidence to show fraud. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 11, § 580, at 431; Annotation, Application of Parol Evidence Rule of UCC § 2-202 Where Fraud or Misrepresentation Is
Claimed in Sale of Goods, 71 A.L.R. 3d 1059, 1060 (1976). Such evidence is ordinarily admissible even in the face of a merger clause. 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 11, § 578, at 405-07.
17. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-12, at 93 (2d ed. 1980); Axelrod, Application of U.C.C. 2-202 - The Integrated Agreement, 12 CAP. U.L. REV. 1, 14 (1982); Hester, supra note 14, at 855.
Professors White and Summers have catalogued other strategies for defeating a
merger clause. For example, counsel could argue that the clause should be narrowly construed, or could challenge the clause as the product of duress, bad faith, or mistake requiring judicial reformation of the contract. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra, § 2-12, at 9295. An analysis of these alternative strategies is beyond the scope of this article.
18. According to the Second Restatement, any relevant evidence may be used to
prove that a writing is or is not a complete integration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-

TRACTS § 210 comment b (1979); see also id. § 214(b) (making even prior or contemporaneous agreements and negotiations admissible to establish whether agreement is completely
or partially integrated). This is because "a writing cannot of itself prove its own completeness, and wide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on the
intention of the parties." Id. § 210 comment b. This approach is in sharp contrast with
the earlier view that if a writing appeared on its face to be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement, it was a complete integration. See, e.g., Gianni v. R.
Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 323, 126 A. 791, 792 (1924).
The U.C.C. does not designate any particular test for determining whether a writing is
a complete integration. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978). However, any assumption that an integration is a complete integration is rejected. Id. comment 1. Evidence of consistent additional terms must be excluded when the terms are such that, if agreed upon, would
certainly have been included in the writing. Id. comment 3.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216(1) (1979); U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1978).
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clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present eviand effect to aid the
dence as to its commercial setting, purpose
20
court in making the determination.
Although section 2-302 is strictly applicable only to sales of goods falling within the purview of Article Two of the U.C.C., it has been applied
by analogy to cases not governed by Article Two, 2 1 and has been incorporated into the common law of contracts by the Second Restatement of
22
Contracts (Second Restatement).
It is the task of this article to explore more deeply the possibility
that a merger clause could be held unconscionable, thereby preserving
evidence of consistent additional express warranty or contract terms
which otherwise would be excluded under the parol evidence rule. This
article will first apply the fundamental principles of the modern unconscionability doctrine to determine whether a merger clause may ever be
unconscionable, and, if so, under what circumstances. It will then analyze four cases discussing the unconscionability of merger clauses. 2 3 As
20.
21.

U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

22. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 208 (1979), which provides:

If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
The idea of refusing to enforce unconscionable contracts originated with neither the
U.C.C. nor the Second Restatement. Equity courts had long refused to grant specific enforcement of unconscionable contracts. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 528-33 (1967). Whether equity cases may be
used as a guide to the meaning of unconscionability in U.C.C. § 2-302 has been disputed.
Compare Leff, supra, at 533 (equity cases not helpful) with Hillman, Debunking Some Iyths
About Unconscionability: A New Frameworkfor U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3541 (1981) (equity cases helpful).
23. Two cases which purport to address the unconscionability of a merger clause,
LeDonne v. Kessler, 256 Pa. Super. 280, 389 A.2d 1123 (1978), and Agristor Credit Corp.
v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Or. 1985), will not be fully analyzed in this article, for
the following reasons. First, it is doubtful whether a true merger clause was at issue in
LeDonne. There, paragraph six of the contract was referred to as an "integration clause."
Paragraph six provided: "The parties have full knowledge of the physical appearance of
the land and buildings and of the value thereof and there are no verbal representations as
to character or quality." LeDonne v. Kessler, 256 Pa. Super. 280, 285, 389 A.2d 1123,
1126 (1978). This term is too narrow to qualify as a recital of complete integration. Rather
than declaring all extrinsic representations, promises, and agreements to be without effect,
it disclaims only verbal representations regarding the character or quality of the real property to be sold. Moreover, the LeDonne court limited the term's effect still further by interpreting it as a denial of representations regarding reasonably apparent, but not hidden,
conditions. Ledonne, 256 Pa. Super. at 291, 389 A.2d at 1129.
Second, as already noted, the focus of this article is on the use of the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate the merger clause where it would otherwise exclude evidence of
consistent additional express warranty or contract terms under the parol evidence rule.
LeDonne and Agristor are not relevant to this focus. Neither case involves any attempt to
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a prelude, it is first necessary to give some background on the unconscionability doctrine itself.
I.

MODERN UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE

Certain aspects of modern unconscionability doctrine are well defined. The decision as to whether a contract or clause is unconscionable
is one of law to be made by the court. 24 In making this decision, the
25
court must assess the contract or clause as of the time it was made.
Also, in determining unconscionability, the court must judge the challenged contract or clause in light of its commercial setting, purpose and

effect. 2 6 Once it finds a contract or clause
court has several options available to it. It
contract, enforce the contract without the
limit the application of any unconscionable
2 7

to be unconscionable, the
may refuse to enforce the
unconscionable clause, or
clause so as to avoid any

unconscionable result.

The meaning of the term "unconscionable" is not defined in either
the Code or the Second Restatement. 28 The commentary to U.C.C. section 2-302 provides only limited assistance:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade
or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract.... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of
29
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.

argue that, under the parol evidence rule, a merger clause excluded evidence of consistent
additional contract or express warranty terms. Rather, in each case, a merger clause, or at
least a term denominated as such, was asserted in an effort to defeat a cause of action for
fraud. In LeDonne, the court held that the parol evidence rule barred testimony of alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations concerning water leakage which contradicted the terms of
the supposed "integration clause." Ledonne, 256 Pa. Super. at 292, 389 A.2d at 1129-30.
In Agristor, the merger clause stated in part: "I rely on no other promises or conditions and
regard that as reasonable because these are acceptable to me." Agristor Credit Corp. v.
Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (D. Or. 1985). An Oregon statute provided that the

truth of facts recited in the written instrument could not be denied by the parties. In light
of this statute, the Agritor court held that the merger clause established a conclusive presumption that there was no reliance on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Id. (citing
OR. REV. STAT. § 42.300 (1981)).
24. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment

f (1979).
25.

U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).

Thus, it has been held that an unexpected price increase subsequent to contracting which
makes performance of contract obligations onerous will not support a finding of unconscionability. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); Bradford v. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1249
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); J.L. McEntire & Sons, Inc. v. Hart
Cotton Co., 256 Ark. 937, 511 S.W.2d 179 (1974).
26. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment
f (1979).
27. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
28. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).

29. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1978) (citation omitted).
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Legal scholars have done their best to bridge this definitional gap.3 0
In his influential article, Professor Leff suggests that there are two basic
types of unconscionability: procedural unconscionability, which has to
do with misbehavior during the contracting process, and substantive unconscionability, which has to do with evils in the resulting contract
3
itself.
The Code commentary leads another author, Professor Spanogle,
to believe that procedural abuses are of two types: oppression, implying
compulsion resulting from a lack of opportunity to "codetermine"
terms, and unfair surprise, implying deception by artifice. 32 In his view,
oppression entails more than mere duress; oppression encompasses adhesory form contracts, which allow one party to choose whether to contract but not what the terms of the contract will be. 33 Unfair surprise
results from a variety of deceptive sales practices, including the use of
fine print to hide a clause, or the use of language incomprehensible to a
34
layperson.
Professor Spanogle further deduces that these procedural abuses
will render a term unconscionable only when coupled with substantive
abuses. 35 He proposes adopting a sliding scale approach, so that the
more procedural unconscionability is present, the less substantive unconscionability is required, and vice versa.3 6 Moreover, he argues, different substantive standards are applicable in situations involving
different procedural abuses in forming the contract.3 7 An oppressive,
nonbargained term is substantively suspect if it alters or impairs the fair
' ' 38
meaning of the bargained-for terms, or is "manifestly unreasonable.
The concept of manifest unreasonableness is based upon a weighing of
any legitimate commercial interest served by the nonbargained term
against any identifiable public policies offended by the term. 39 These
30. See e.g., Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PiTrr. L. REV. 337
(1970); Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV.
121 (1967); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Epstein,
Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcON. 293 (1975); Hillman, supra note 22;
Leff, supra note 22; Murray, Unconscionability:Unconscionability, 31 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1 (1969);
Schwartz, A Reexamination ofiVonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977);
Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent & Consumer Protection, 31 U. PtTrr. L. REV. 359 (1970).
31. Leff, supra note 22, at 487.
32. Spanogle, supra note 30, at 943.
33. Id. at 944.
34. Id. at 943.
35. Id. Professor Spanogle reasons that the commentary's indication that unfair surprise is to be prevented suggests "not only that there must be abuses in forming the contract, but also that such abuses have allowed the drafting party to take unfair advantage of
the non-drafting party." Id. Similarly, impermissible oppression can be distinguished
from permissible allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power by looking beyond the procedural abuse of nonbargaining to the difference between reasonable and
unreasonable resultant contract terms. Id. at 944.
36. Id. at 952.
37. Id. at 947.
38. Id. at 945.
39. Id. at 958. Terms offensive to public policy include not only those terms actually
prohibited, but also those disfavored by public policy. Id. at 960. Note that under the
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two standards are objective, for they depend on the court's view of the
term's fairness. 4 0 On the other hand, where the procedural abuse is unfair surprise, a term is subject to substantive abuse if it violates the surprised party's reasonable expectations. 4 1 Such a violation might occur if
the party who drafted the contract deliberately creates expectations in
4 2
the surprised party which are contrary to the terms of the contract.
This shift in emphasis from the court's view of the term's fairness to the
surprised party's reaction to the term is justified by the need to afford
43
additional protection where unfair surprise is involved.
Having determined that no procedural abuse is sufficient to render
a term unconscionable absent a substantive abuse, Professor Spanogle
also discusses the converse question: Could a substantive abuse alone
render a term unconscionable? He concedes that the word "oppression" could refer to terms having an oppressive effect, so that procedural abuses would be irrelevant. 4 4 Since a review of pre-Code
unconscionability cases indicates that an especially harsh term could by
itself constitute unconscionability, Professor Spanogle concludes that a
limited use of a purely substantive definition of oppression is
justifiable.

45

sliding scale approach, when a disfavored term is involved, a sufficiently egregious procedural abuse may justify voiding the term. Id.
40. Id. at 946.
41. Id. at 947-48. Professor Spanogle's theory that an unfairly surprising term is substantively suspect if it violates the reasonable expectations of the surprised party does not
appear to be based upon, and thus must be distinguished from, that principle of insurance
law which holds that a term of an insurance policy which is inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the insured will not be enforced. See R. KEETON, BASic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw 351 (1971). The drafters of the Second Restatement believed that this
"expectations principle" was valid with respect to all standardized agreements. Birnbaum,
Stahl & West, Standardized Agreements and the Parol Evidence Rule: Defining and Applying the
Expectations Principle, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 811 (1984). Accordingly, they adopted the following provision:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or
otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings
are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts
the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the
writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the
standard terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the
term is not part of the agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).
The commentary explains that
"[although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and are bound by
them without even appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation." Id. comment f.
The expectations principle is closely related to the unconscionability doctrine. See id.
An examination of this relationship is, however, beyond the scope of this article. For a
lucid analysis of the expectations principle in the Second Restatement, see Murray, The
Parol Evidence Process and StandardizedAgreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1342 (1975).
42. Spanogle, supra note 30, at 963.
43. Id. at 947.
44. Id. at 948.
45. Id. at 950. As Professor Spanogle points out, one consequence of this theory is

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

A review of the cases shows them to be consistent with much of
Professor Spanogle's analysis. Many of the factors identified by the
courts as supporting a finding of unconscionability fit within the two cat-

egories of procedural abuse, oppression and unfair surprise. Inequality
of bargaining power 4 6 and the use of a form contract containing nonnegotiable terms 4 7 may indicate oppression resulting from an inability
to codetermine the contract terms. 4 8 On the other hand, lack of education or business sophistication, 4 9 inability to read English, 50 use of con-

tract language incomprehensible to a layperson, 5 1 and burying of
provisions in fine print or on the reverse side of the contract 5 2 are all
factors suggesting that a challenged term is unfairly surprising to one
53
party, because it is hidden from or incomprehensible to him.
Case law defines substantive abuse broadly, asking whether the
challenged term is overly harsh 54 or unreasonably favorable. 55 These
that grossly excessive price, a form of substantive abuse, might render a contract unconscionable, even in the absence of any procedural abuse. Id. at 952.
46. See, e.g., Martin vJoseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 301 (6th Cir. 1985); Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Funiture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); A & M Produce Co. v.
FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 488, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (1982); Fischer v. General
Elec. Hotpoint, 108 Misc. 2d 683, 438 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1981).
The doctrine of unconscionability is not intended to disturb allocation of risk due to
superior bargaining power. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment I (1978); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment d (1979). Thus, superior bargaining power alone may be
insufficient to sustain a finding of unconscionability. See Seekings v.Jimmy GMC, Inc., 130
Ariz. 596, 602, 638 P.2d 210, 216 (1981).
47. See, e.g., Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 111 (S.D. Miss. 1979); A &
M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 125 (1982).
Some courts have declined to hold a nonnegotiable term unconscionable, where the complaining party was under no economic pressure and could have walked away from the deal.
See Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774, 778-79 (N.D. Ga.
1983); RJM Sales & Mktg. v. Banfi Prod. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (D. Minn. 1982).
48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
49. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 111 (S.D. Miss. 1979). Conversely, education or business sophistication may weigh against a finding of unconscionability. See, e.g.,
Fotomat Corp. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); K & C, Inc. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 308-09, 263 A.2d 390, 393 (1970).
50. See, e.g., Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 951, 371 N.Y.S.2d
289, 291 (1975);Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 141, 302 N.Y.S.2d
390, 393 (1969).
51. See Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 759, 549 P.2d 903, 907
(1976); see also Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 575 (8th Cir.
1975) (whether complaining party understood challenged term is a relevant consideration); Fischer v. General Elec. Hotpoint, 108 Misc. 2d 683, 684, 438 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691
(1981) (same).
52. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
124 (1982); Capital Assoc. v. Hudgens, 455 So. 2d 651, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); C &
J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 179 (Iowa 1975); Bogatz v.
Case Catering Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 1052, 1056, 383 N.Y.S.2d 535, 538 (1976).
53. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
54. See Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 951 (Ind. App. 1982); Funding Sys.
Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634 (Mo. App. 1979); Schroeder
v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 260, 544 P.2d 20, 23 (1975).
55. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp 774, 778 (N.D. Ga.
1983); RJM Sales & Mktg. v. Banfi Prod. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (D. Minn. 1982).
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definitions are sufficiently general to encompass the more specific substantive standards proposed by Professor Spanogle: impairment of bargained-for terms, manifest unreasonableness, and violation of
reasonable expectations.
As Professor Spanogle suggests, both procedural and substantive
abuses are generally required to render a term unconscionable. 5 6 His
sliding scale approach to the determination of unconscionability has also
been well received. 57 Finally, Professor Spanogle's conclusion that a severe substantive abuse alone can render a term unconscionable is reinforced by the commentary to the Second Restatement. The Second
Restatement states that some types of terms are not enforced, regardless
of context, and illustrates this principle with examples of unreasonably
large liquidated damages provisions and limitations on a debtor's right
58
to redeem collateral.
II.

UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE APPLIED TO THE MERGER CLAUSE

Can a merger clause be unconscionable? In an effort to answer this
question, the foregoing principles will be applied to the hypothetical
scenario set forth at the beginning of this article.

A merger clause, like any other clause, may be subject to the procedural abuses of oppression and unfair surprise. In the hypothetical scenario, buyer signs a preprinted form contract prepared by seller. Very
probably the contract's terms are nonnegotiable. Thus the procedural
abuse of oppression is almost certainly present. 59 Since buyer is a typical consumer, he may well lack business sophistication, or possibly even
a decent education. If he does not notice the merger clause, it may be
buried in fine print or located in a place that is easy to miss. If he does
not understand the meaning of the clause, perhaps it is written in language incomprehensible to a layperson. 60 Accordingly, the procedural
56. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 487, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
122 (1982); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634
(Mo. App. 1979); see, e.g., Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571, 57576 (8th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774, 778 (N.D. Ga.
1983); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Bank of
Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109 (S.D. Miss. 1979).
57. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 487, 186 Cal. Rptr.
114, 122 (1982); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624,
634 (Mo. App. 1979).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment e (1979). In theory, the
substantive abuse of grossly excessive price might be sufficient to render a contract unconscionable. See supra note 45. Some cases have held contracts unconscionable on the basis
of grossly excessive price. However, they arguably involved procedural abuses as well. See
Spanogle, supra note 30, at 964-67.
59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
60. Indeed, it would be a rare merger clause which would be comprehensible to a
layperson in any meaningful sense, given that laypeople are not generally aware of the
effect such a clause will have under the parol evidence rule. The following language has
been suggested in substitution of the traditional merger clause: "Write anything anyone
said about this sale which was important to you in the space that follows. Understand this:
If you haven't got it in writing, you haven't got it." A. CORBIN, supra note 1I, § 578, at 645
(Supp. 1984) (emphasis in original). This language is so clear that it seems unlikely a
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abuse of unfair surprise is probably present also. 6 1
The next step is to review the transaction for substantive abuse.
Since the procedural abuse of oppression is probably involved, the
merger clause will be unconscionable if it is manifestly unreasonable or
if it alters or impairs the fair meaning of the bargained-for terms. 62 An
argument that the clause is manifestly unreasonable would be difficult to
construct. Manifest unreasonableness is determined by weighing any
public policies offended by a term against legitimate commercial needs
or purposes served by that term. 6 3 There appear to be no identifiable
public policies offended by merger clauses in general. On the contrary,
the very existence of the parol evidence rule, a substantive doctrine
designed to enforce the parties' intent to make a writing the complete
and final expression of their agreement, 64 evidences the legitimacy of
merger clauses, which are no more than declarations of such intent.
Moreover, merger clauses serve many legitimate commercial purposes.
For example, parties to a contract may have engaged in lengthy negotiations, with several proposals made and rejected. The parties may insert
a merger clause to protect the integrity of the final agreement against
attempts to resurrect a superseded proposal. 65 Also, a principal may
find inclusion of a merger clause to be helpful in protecting himself
against the overenthusiastic, unauthorized representations of his
agent. 66 Finally, merger clauses serve the legitimate purpose of guarding against false allegations of consistent additional terms. 67 Thus, even
if this merger clause were offensive to public policy, its tendency to further a legitimate commercial purpose could render it manifestly
reasonable.
That this merger clause alters or impairs the fair meaning of the
bargained-for terms seems a more likely conclusion. Seller makes oral
representations and promises in an attempt to induce a sale of goods or
services and increase his profits. He succeeds. Buyer, enticed by those
representations and promises, decides to make the purchase. Seller's
representations and promises will ordinarily become express warranties
or contract terms. However, the preprinted form contract includes a
merger clause. As a recital of complete integration, the merger clause
has the effect under the parol evidence rule of excluding evidence of
these consistent additional terms. 6 8 By so doing, the clause impairs
these bargained-for terms.
seller would be willing to use it for fear of awakening the buyer to the fact that the sales
pitch meant nothing.
61. See supra notes 49, 51, and 52 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
65. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 2-12, at 90.
66. Id. at 91.
67. See id. § 12-4, at 437; see also U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 2 (1978) (parol evidence
rule provides protection against false allegations of oral warranties). Of course, since the
parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent agreements, the protection against perjury afforded by the merger clause is less than total. See supra note 7.
68.

See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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Professor Spanogle analogizes this prohibition of the alteration or
impairment of bargained-for terms to U.C.C. section 2-316(1),69 which
prohibits the disclaimer of express warranties. 70 To the extent this
merger clause prevents buyer from proving oral express warranties
made by seller, it has the same effect as a disclaimer of express
warranties.
Because the procedural abuse of unfair surprise is probably also involved in this transaction, the merger clause will be unconscionable if it
violates buyer's reasonable expectations under the contract. 7 1 Seller,
through his representations and promises, deliberately creates an expectation in buyer that he enjoys the benefit of additional contract or express warranty terms. By excluding evidence of these consistent
additional terms, the merger clause contradicts this expectation. 72
Since the merger clause is contrary to an expectation seller deliberately
created in buyer, buyer's reasonable expectations are frustrated by the
73
clause.
Thus, application of the unconscionability doctrine to the hypothetical scenario demonstrates that a merger clause may indeed be unconscionable. In fact, the hypothetical scenario is a perfect vehicle to
illustrate the merger clause's potential for unconscionability, since it involves both procedural and substantive abuses, as are generally required
to render a term unconscionable. 74 Yet, it has been suggested that particularly harsh terms may be unconscionable even in the absence of procedural abuses. 75 Some terms are so offensive to public policy or a
sense of decency that they will be considered unconscionable and unenforceable, even though the parties willingly and knowingly assented to
their inclusion in the contract. Could a merger clause which is freely
bargained for and understood by both parties ever be so offensive to
public policy as to be unconscionable? The answer appears to be no.
Although a merger clause may exclude evidence of consistent additional
terms which would have conferred valuable legal rights upon one of the
parties, whatever harshness may result is impliedly sanctioned by the
law, which, in the form of the parol evidence rule, enforces the merger
clause's declaration of complete integration. 7 6 Accordingly, the follow69.
70.
71.
72.

See
See
See
See

Spanogle, supra note 30, at 946.
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
text accompanying note 15 supra.

73. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 45 and 58 and accompanying text.
76. See text accompanying note 64 supra. Of course, the decision that the merger
clause itself is not unconscionable in the absence of procedural abuses does not preclude a
determination that other forms of purely substantive unconscionability are present. For
example, the possibility that grossly excessive price is an independent basis for finding
unconscionability, even in the absence of any procedural abuse, has been noted. See supra
notes 45 and 58. Where a merger clause is applied to eliminate terms conferring valuable
legal rights, the price charged for the remaining rights may turn out to be grossly excessive, and, therefore, unconscionable. Cf 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 14, § 2-302:04, at
171 (excessive price is the true basis for a determination that a disclaimer is
unconscionable).
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ing analysis of the cases addressing the unconscionability of a merger
clause will proceed on the assumption that both procedural and substantive abuses must be shown before a merger clause may be held
unconscionable.
III.

ANALYSIS OF CASES ADDRESSING THE UNCONSCIONABILITY OF A

MERGER CLAUSE

Four cases address the unconscionability of a merger clause asserted under the parol evidence rule as an impediment to proof of con77
sistent additional contract or express warranty terms.
A.

Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc.

Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc.78 provides the most detailed analysis in
support of a holding that a merger clause is unconscionable. There,
plaintiffs purchased a water pump for their farm from defendant. When
the pump failed to function, plaintiffs sued for breach of various express
oral warranties allegedly made by defendant in agreeing to install the
pump. Defendant argued that the written contract, which contained a
merger clause, was intended to be the complete and exclusive expression of the parties' agreement, which could not be supplemented by the
79
express oral warranties under the parol evidence rule.
The Oregon Court of Appeals disagreed, attacking the merger
clause on two grounds. First, the court noted, supplemental terms were
barred by the parol evidence rule only if both parties intended the writing as a complete expression of their agreement. Since the merger
clause was inconspicuous, it provided "little or no evidence of the parties' intentions, regardless of the defendant's intentions.''80 Second, the
court observed, under U.C.C. section 2-302, courts were to limit the application of contract provisions so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Citing the comments to section 2-302, the court stated that one princi77. The cases are: Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d 146 (5th
Cir. 1979); Smith v. Central Soya, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.C. 1985); Seibel v. Layne
& Bowler, Inc., 56 Or. App. 387, 641 P.2d 668 (1982); Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co.,
20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978), petition for review denied, 91 Wash. 2d 1004
(1978).
78. 56 Or. App. 387, 641 P.2d 668 (1982).
79. Id. at 391, 641 P.2d at 671.
80. Id. The Seibel court offered no explanation as to why the merger clause's inconspicuousness should render it a poor indicator of the parties' intentions. A suggestion
follows. Under the objective theory of contracts, a party is bound by the impression he
reasonably creates. This principle has given rise to the "duty to read" rule, providing that
a party who signs an instrument manifests assent, even if he did not read or understand it.
Calamari, Duty to Read - A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974). Nevertheless,
under traditional exceptions to the duty to read rule, a party is not bound by provisions
which are written illegibly, hidden in fine print, or placed in such a way that they are not
likely to come to his attention. Id. at 343. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Seibel, despite having entered into the written contract, arguably did not manifest their objective assent to
the merger clause, which was buried in fine print, and were not bound by its recital of
complete integration.
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pie underlying unconscionability was the prevention of unfair surprise.
It concluded:
We think that it would be unconscionable to permit an inconspicuous merger clause to exclude evidence of an express oral
warranty-especially in light of the policy expressed by ORS
72.3160. That is, a disclaimer of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability must be conspicuous to prevent surprise. We think that a merger clause which would deny effect
to an express warranty
must be conspicuous to prevent an even
81
greater surprise.
The Seibel court provided no independent explanation of why the
merger clause was inconspicuous. However, it did state that the merger
clause was as inconspicuous as the written contract's disclaimer of all
express and implied warranties. 8 2 Presumably the merger clause suffered from the same inadequacies as the disclaimer, which was hidden in
text which was printed in small type, in long and closely spaced lines,
83
and without indentation or extra spacing between paragraphs.
Having struck down the merger clause, the court was quick to add a
placatory footnote:
We recognize that a merger clause is appropriate where a seller
wishes to protect himself from his over-enthusiastic salesman's
unauthorized oral representations (and from a fabricated oral
representation). But unless the buyer is informed that the
seller is disavowing those representations,4 the seller cannot ex8
pect protection from his agent's errors.
The Seibel court's decision that the merger clause was unconscionable was founded squarely on the clause's inconspicuousness. Inconspicuousness, as the court itself suggested, is an indicator of the procedural
abuse of unfair surprise. 8 5 But, the unconscionability doctrine generally requires the presence of both substantive and procedural unconscionability before a clause may be struck down. 86 There was no direct
discussion in the Seibel opinion of the merger clause's substantive unconscionability. The court did see fit, however, to state that a merger clause
was an appropriate protection against unauthorized or fabricated representations. This statement supports the view that a merger clause is not
subject to the substantive abuse of manifest unreasonableness where it
87
serves these legitimate commercial purposes.
To complete the analysis which the Seibel court left unfinished, it is
necessary to apply the substantive standard corresponding to the proce81. Sebel, 56 Or. App. at 391-92, 641 P.2d at 671.
82. Id. at 391, 641 P.2d at 671. In an earlier section of its opinion, the Seibel court
invalidated this disclaimer for failure to conform to U.C.C. § 2-316(2), requiring that a
disclaimer of implied warranties be conspicuous. Seibel, 56 Or. App. at 391, 641 P.2d at

670.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Seibel, 56 Or. App. at 391, 641 P.2d at 670.
Id. at 392 n.1, 641 P.2d at 671 n.l.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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dural abuse of unfair surprise, that is, whether the challenged term
defeats the surprised party's reasonable expectations. 8 8 Here, the
merger clause would have excluded evidence of express oral warranties
made by defendant to plaintiffs. An express warranty is, by definition, a
guarantee that the goods will conform to an affirmation of fact or promise concerning the goods, any description of the goods, or any sample or
model which becomes or is made part of the basis of the bargain. 89 In
other words, an express warranty seeks to enforce expectations concerning the goods which seller deliberately induced in buyer. The merger
clause in Seibel would have effectively eliminated defendant's express
warranties, thereby foiling plaintiffs' reasonable expectations. Therefore, it appears that the Seibel court's conclusion, that the merger clause
was unconscionable, was justified on both procedural and substantive
grounds.
B.

Smith v. Central Soya, Inc.

In Smith v. Central Soya, Inc.,90 a federal district court applying North
Carolina law refused to find a merger clause unconscionable. Smith involved a series of written egg production contracts. Under these contracts, plaintiffs were obligated to furnish such housing, equipment,
utilities, litter, and labor as was necessary for the proper care and housing of chickens and the eggs they produced. Defendant, Central Soya of
Athens, Inc. (Central Soya), promised to supply chickens and pay plaintiffs a monthly sum for their services. Central Soya repeatedly renewed
these contracts by supplying plaintiffs with replacement flocks of chickens annually. Ten years after entering into the first egg production contract, Central Soya sold its business to the codefendant, Sun City
Industries, Inc. (Sun City), which assumed Central Soya's contractual
obligations. Sun City completed performance under the contracts for
the current egg production period, but did not supply further replacement chickens at the end of the laying cycle. 9 1
Plaintiffs sued, alleging that prior to execution of the written contracts, agents of Central Soya had orally represented that Central Soya
would continue to supply replacement chickens so that plaintiffs would
have an income for twenty years on their chicken houses. Thus, they
contended, Sun City's decision not to supply replacement chickens was a
92
breach of contract.
The primary obstacle to plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of contract was the merger clause in each of the egg production contracts.
Pointing out that evidence of prior and contemporaneous negotiations
and agreements could not be used to vary, add to, or contradict a total
88.

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

89.
90.
91.
92.

See U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1978).
604 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
Id. at 521-22.
Id. at 522-23.
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integration, 93 the Smith court stated that a merger clause created a presumption of total integration, which could be rebutted only by evidence
establishing fraud, bad faith, negligent omission, mistake in fact, or unconscionability. 94 Responding to plaintiffs' argument that the merger
clause was unconscionable, the court set forth a two-part test, requiring
plaintiffs to "demonstrate that (1) they had no meaningful choice but to
deal with the defendants and accept the contract as offered and (2) the
' 95
merger clause was unreasonably favorable to the defendants.
The court found that neither element of this test was satisfied.
First, although the egg production contracts were preprinted standardized contracts prepared by Central Soya, so that the merger clause was
nonnegotiable, plaintiffs had a choice because they were not under economic duress and did not have to enter into the contracts. Nor did Central Soya occupy a grossly superior bargaining position. Second, the
merger clause was not unreasonably advantageous to defendants. The
clause simply granted preclusive effect to the written terms of the contracts and, under other circumstances, could as easily have benefited
plaintiffs as defendants. Finally, the court observed, the evidence indicated that the plaintiffs signed the contracts with a complete understanding of their terms and with knowledge they were to last for one
year, not twenty. Therefore, the court held the merger clause was not
unconscionable, the contracts were total integrations, and plaintiffs' parol evidence should be excluded. 9 6 Summary judgment for defendants
97
on the breach of contract claim was granted.
In analyzing the Smith case in light of the adopted conceptual framework, it is first necessary to ask whether either of the two types of procedural abuse, unfair surprise or oppression, was present. It seems
unlikely that plaintiffs were unfairly surprised; the court emphasized that
they had read and completely understood the contract terms, which presumably included the merger clause. However, the egg production contracts were preprinted standardized contracts prepared by Central Soya,
making the merger clause nonnegotiable. This refusal to bargain constituted oppression. 9 8
By contrast, the Smith court made evident its belief that a more severe degree of oppression, that is, one party's refusal to bargain coupled
with the other party's inability to choose whether to contract at all, was
required before the merger clause could be held unconscionable. Such
a narrow view of oppression, though supported by some case law, 99
seems undesireable. It restricts the utility of the unconscionability doctrine as a means of strengthening freedom of contract, which implies not
only the ability to choose whether to enter into a contract, but also the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 524 (citing Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 185, 287 S.E.2d. 840, 845 (1982)).
Id. at 526.
Id.
Id. at 527.
Id.at 528.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47.
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mutual ability to determine the terms of the contract."0 0
Assuming that the procedural abuse of oppression was present, the
merger clause must next be examined to determine whether it was manifestly unreasonable, or altered or impaired the fair meaning of the bargained-for terms. 10 1 There seems little likelihood that the clause was
manifestly unreasonable. As already indicated, a merger clause does not
offend public policy; 10 2 and sufficient commercial justification for inclusion of the merger clause in Central Soya's standardized contracts could
have been found in Central Soya's need to protect itself against the unauthorized representations of its agents.' 0 3 Moreover, in this particular
case, it seems doubtful that the merger clause altered or impaired the
fair meaning of the bargained-for terms. As an alternative basis for its
grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, the Smith
court held that the oral representations regarding the continuation of
the business relationship for twenty years were at best mere expressions
of belief or opinion which created absolutely no contractual obligation. 10 4 Thus, the merger clause in Smith did not impair any bargainedfor term, because the evidence excluded by the clause was itself legally
insufficient to establish any such term. It follows that there was no substantive abuse justifying a holding that the merger clause was
0 5
unconscionable. 1
The Smith court appears to have reached the correct conclusion, but
for the wrong reasons. In examining whether the merger clause was
unreasonably favorable to the defendants, the court was applying a test
of substantive unconscionability. It concluded that the merger clause
was not unreasonably favorable to the defendants because, under other
circumstances, the merger clause might have benefited plaintiffs as easily as defendants. This analysis is unsupportable for two reasons. First,
unconscionability doctrine requires a challenged term to be judged in
1 06
light of the particular facts of the case, not some hypothetical facts.
Second, the court's analysis implies that a term which applies equally to
both parties cannot be substantively unconscionable. If this standard
0 7
were adopted, no merger clause or any other even-handed clause'
could ever be substantively unconscionable. Yet the tendency of the
100. Spanogle, supra note 30, at 935-36.

101. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
102. See text accompanying note 64 supra.

103. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. That Central Soya did its business
through agents can be inferred from plaintiffs' allegation that agents of Central Soya orally
represented to them that replacement chickens would be supplied for twenty years. Smith
v. Central Soya, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 518, 522 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
104. Smith, 604 F. Supp. at 527. Smith claimed that Central Soya stated, "[w]e're in the
chicken business to stay," and that "the chicken houses will last for twenty years." Id.
105. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
106. Spanogle, supra note 30, at 937.

107. In Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774, 779 (N.D. Ga.
1983), a case cited by the Smith court, an unconscionability challenge to a termination
clause in a distributorship contract was rejected, at least in part on the rationale that the
clause gave either party to the contract the unilateral power to terminate the contract upon
30 days notice.
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merger clause to foster such substantive abuses as impairing bargainedfor terms or defeating reasonable expectations has already been
demonstrated.10 8
C.

Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co.

In Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co. ,109 the buyer of a defective portable sawmill sued the seller for breach of express and implied warranties.
In support of an argument that no such warranties had been made, the
seller offered into evidence a purchase order which included a merger
clause and a disclaimer of all express and implied warranties.' 10 The
trial court excluded the purchase order, and the jury subsequently rendered a verdict for the buyer. The Washington state Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court's ruling that the merger clause was both unreasonable and unconscionable. I"'However, the court did not analyze
the clause in traditional unconscionability terms. Instead, it noted that,
in one sentence of the purchase order, the subject matter of the sale was
referred to as a "motor vehicle."' 12 In view of this "outright inaccuracy," the court reasoned, the purchase order was not an integrated contract, and its admission into evidence without excision of the merger
clause would, therefore, have constituted prejudicial error.' 13
This reasoning is opaque. To begin with, there seems to be no reason why the parties could not have intended the purchase order as a
complete integration, despite the fact that it was apparently a form contract ordinarily used in motor vehicle sales. 114 Further, the Butcher court
utterly failed to explain why its conclusion that the purchase order was
not a complete integration, despite the merger clause, justified its adoption of the trial court's ruling that the merger clause was
unconscionable.
Constructing a more appropriate analysis is not an easy task. The
Butcher opinion did not discuss any facts which would allow a determination of whether the merger clause was affected by the procedural abuse
of unfair surprise. That the purchase order inappropriately referred to
the subject matter of the sale as a motor vehicle suggests that it was a
form contract. If, in addition, the merger clause was nonnegotiable,
then the clause was subject to the procedural abuse of oppression. t5
108. See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
109. 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978), petition for review denied, 91 Wash. 2d
1004 (1978).
110. Id. at 365-66, 581 P.2d at 1356-57.
111. Id. at 367, 581 P.2d at 1357.
112. The offending sentence provided: "I hereby certify that no credit has been extended to me for the purchase of this motor vehicle except as appears in writing on the face
of this agreement." Id. at 368, 581 P.2d at 1357 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 368, 581 P.2d at 1358.
114. It seems unlikely that the use of the words "motor vehicle" would have caused any
true confusion. Elsewhere in the purchase order, the subject matter of the sale was identified as "one Garrett Ecologizer," the brand name of the portable sawmill. Id. at 367, 581
P.2d at 1357.
115. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Since the seller asserted the merger clause for the purpose of defeating
express warranty claims, it might be concluded that the clause impaired
these bargained-for express warranties, a form of substantive abuse.1 16
Thus, the Butcher court's holding that the merger clause was unconscionable was arguably justified.
D.

Franz Chemical Corp. v. PhiladelphiaQuartz Co.

The decision of the unconscionability issue in Franz Chemical Corp. v.
PhiladelphiaQuartz Co. 117 was still more cryptic. There, plaintiff sued defendant for damages resulting when a protective ship hull coating which
had been purchased from defendant and resold to a third party cracked
and failed to adhere properly. The lower court granted summary judgment for defendant, relying on a sales order acknowledgment form and
warranty which limited plaintiff's remedy for breach to replacement of
the goods. The lower court also held that a patent licensing agreement,
whereby defendant licensed plaintiff to sell its protective coating, was
merely an agreement by defendant not to sue plaintiff for infringement
of intellectual property rights, and was not part of the contract for sale
1 18
so as to nullify the limitation of remedy.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the lower court erred in finding that
there was a bare licensing agreement as a matter of law, since evidence
of additional terms raised factual issues as to what the parties intended
to include in the license agreement. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected this contention and affirmed the grant of summary judgment.
The license agreement, it noted, included a merger clause, indicating
intent to completely integrate the agreement. Therefore, the parol evidence rule precluded consideration of any evidence of consistent additional terms. 1 19 In passing, the Franz court summarily rejected the
possibility that the merger clause was unconscionable, stating: "we can
find no indication that the merger clause should be deemed unconscion12
able under U.C.C. 2-302." 0
The Franz opinion did not provide sufficient facts to allow analysis
under the conceptual framework adopted in this article. The court did
not indicate whether indicia of oppression, such as inequality of bargaining power 12 1 or the use of a form contract containing nonnegotiable
terms, 122 were present. Nor did the court mention any facts which
would allow a determination of whether the merger clause was unfairly
surprising. 12 3 Given that both procedural and substantive abuses must
116. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

117.
118.
119.
120.

594 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id.

121. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
123. In another section of its opinion dealing with the unconscionability of the remedy
limitation, the Franz court noted that the president of the plaintiff corporation was an experienced businessman. Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d 146, 149

(5th Cir. 1979). Lack of education or business experience is a factor which might make it
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be present to justify a holding of unconscionability, 1 24 the inability to
resolve these procedural issues dooms any attempt to resolve the
broader unconscionability issue.
CONCLUSION

As a theoretical matter, the commentators' suggestion that a merger
clause may be unconscionable is well founded. Both procedural and
substantive abuses must generally be present before a term may be held
unconscionable. A merger clause, like any other term, may be obtained
through a flawed bargaining process, so that it is subject to the procedural abuses of oppression or unfair surprise. Moreover, even though a
merger clause does not violate public policy and is unlikely to lack commercial justification, it may be subject to other substantive abuses. The
effect of the merger clause under the parol evidence rule is to exclude
evidence of consistent additional terms. Therefore, a nonbargained
merger clause may impair bargained-for terms of the agreement. Likewise, an unfairly surprising merger clause may violate the surprised
party's reasonable expectations.
As a practical matter, the very existence of the four merger clause
cases discussed in this article indicates that some lawyers and judges
have accepted the suggestion that a merger clause may be unconscionable. That there are only four such cases indicates at the same time that
the concept has not yet gained wide currency in the legal community.
As application of the adopted conceptual framework to the opening hypothetical demonstrated, a merger clause in a standardized form contract is vulnerable to an unconscionability challenge. Given the
frequency with which merger clauses appear in form contracts, counsel
for non-drafting contracting parties are presented with abundant opportunities for bringing successful unconscionability challenges. It seems
odd that these opportunities have not been more vigorously pursued.
Moreover, the courts which have considered the unconscionability
of a merger clause have generally failed to render a complete analysis of
the issue. For example, the Seibel court ignored the general requirment
that both procedural and substantive abuses must be present when it
held a merger clause unconscionable on procedural grounds alone.
Worse yet, the Butcher and Franz courts decided the unconscionability
issue in a conclusory fashion, without discussing either procedural or
substantive abuses. Unconscionability doctrine is powerful stuff; it
should not be used, as in the Butcher case, to strike down a merger clause
without a full explanation of its applicability. Nor is it appropriate to
reject an unconscionability challenge summarily, as the Franz court did.
In so doing, these courts left future lawyers and their clients mystified as
to the circumstances under which a merger clause will be held invalid.
more likely that a party was unfairly surprised by a particular term. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text. However, business experience, in and of itself, is insufficient to prove
the absence of unfair surprise.
124. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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There is a possible explanation for both the paucity of cases involving unconscionability challenges to merger clauses, and the courts' tendency towards incomplete legal analysis of those challenges brought.
Despite occasional scholarly suggestions that a merger clause could be
attacked for unconscionability, a fuller, more carefully reasoned analysis
of the clause's potential for unconscionability was lacking, until now. It
is hoped this article, by explaining the circumstances under which a
merger clause may be unconscionable, will encourage practitioners to
bring more unconscionability challenges to merger clauses and guide
courts in deciding those challenges.
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INTRODUCTION

Justice Holmes once said concerning Justice Brewer: "[a] very
pleasant man in private, but he had the itch for public speaking and writing and made me shudder many times." ' Today in America, there are
still many who would prefer that upon appointment, the Brethren of the
Robe 2 take a vow of public silence and communicate only through the
formal media of written opinions or official rulings from the bench. For
such traditionalists, the power of the judiciary lies in its separation from
earthly interchange. The transgression of public comment and debate
only denigrates judicial authority and independence by raising inferences of politics and prejudice. Such an appearance of mortality, it is
claimed, will diminish public trust by tearing down thejudiciary's image
of fairness and objectivity in an otherwise biased and self-interested
society.
Our complex world has put incredible pressures on the legal system. With increasing frequency, our courts are called upon to decide
issues of grave public importance. The demarcation between law and
policy has grayed and disintegrated with the rise of special interest politics. The once defined provinces of legislative and judicial responsibility
have merged into the more nebulous concept of the "public issue." Yet
despite the growing importance of the judicial role in public controversy, the legal system remains a mystery to many. The vast majority of
citizens have no ready source of information regarding the operation of
our courts. What few insights are available tend to be twisted by undue
simplicity, misunderstanding, and political posturing. Unlike many
other public officials, judges are constantly translating and explaining
the intricacies of the legal system. Due to their intimacy with the legal
process, judicial participation in public education would help to cool irrational fires, raise the level of debate, and assist in governmental reform by focusing attention on the truly relevant issues of the day.
The purpose of this article is to explore the legal, ethical, and policy
considerations regarding the public role of judges. It is my hope this
article will lead others to the conclusion that the benefits ofjudicial participation in education of the public far outweigh any illusory fears of
tainting judicial objectivity and disrupting the antiquated myth ofjudicial power. Here, the path of realism can only help us to grow and mature as citizens and free our judges to more easily satisfy the heavy
responsibilities we have placed upon them.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

JudicialIndependence and the Traditional View Towards the Role of Judges
Despite the particular means ofjudicial selection,3 it is clear judges

1. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK L-rERS 160 (M. Howe
2. Throughout this article, male pronouns and
of convenience and are not intended to suggest the
3. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.

ed. 1961).
metaphors are used only as a matter
proper gender for a judge.
It should be noted that even elected
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must be free to make objective decisions based on a fair application of
the law to the specific facts before them. Thus, judicial independence
from political pressure is considered a crucial prerequisite to the proper
4
functioning of democratic government.
This notion ofjudicial independence is central to the traditionalist
argument against public expression by the judiciary. A most pristine
statement of this view was made by Dean Acheson:
Speeches and lectures by judges and Justices should be restricted to legal subjects (including eulogies of deceased jurists) and to legal audiences. The judiciary will only invite
trouble if it intrudes into other fields.
This practice [of participation in nonjudicial work or organizations] should be flatly prohibited. The most important extrajudicial assignments distract from judicial tasks, and lesser ones
may bring involvement in controversies detracting from judicial impartiality and aloofness.
I recommend a strong stand against the appointment of any
judge or Justice to political office within a given number of
years after his leaving a judicial office. When a man shuttles
back and forth between judicial and executive office, he does
curnot give the assurance of impartiality and aloofness from
5
rent issues that the judge's special position requires.
Without question, this strict theory ofjudicial sacrifice and respon6
sibility is sincerely held by many good and thoughtful individuals.
judges are substantially restrained in their political activities by the ABA MODEL CODE OF
Canon 7 (1972)[hereinafter CODE].
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (J. Madison)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961)("Were the executive magistrate, or the judges not independent of the legislature in the particular, their
independence in every other [department] would be merely nominal"); Kaufman, Chilling
Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 684 (1979)("Adjudication based on the noble precept 'equal justice under law' requires impartiality, and impartiality demands freedom
from political pressure"). For a more expansive discussion of the Anglo-American history
ofjudicial independence, see Ervin, Separation ofPowers:Judicial Independence, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108 (1970).
5. Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A.J. 919-20 (1969).
6. For example, Judge Abner Mikva follows the traditionalist approach to judicial
activity:
The arena in which policy decisions are made in no way can, or should, resemble the arena in which individual justice is distributed. Pejorative as it may
sound, the suggestion that judges go "out on the hustings" conjures up the image of the judge explaining his decision in the public square as the citizenry decides to put thumbs up or thumbs down.
Mikva, A Rejoinder to "The Judges Role in Educating the Public About the Law," 31 CATH. U.L.
REV. 209, 210-11 (1982) (footnotes omitted). See also Reavley, Free Speech forJudges, 9 LITIGATION 5 (Fall 1982). Justice Brennan has been severely criticized for his public comments
regarding Attorney General Meese:
While extramural pontificating may do the justices' psyche a world of good, it is
What
hardly helpful to the image - and the independence - of the court ....
gives the court its credibility and makes people pay attention to its rulings is its
reputation for independent judgment. The business of the court isn't politics as
usual but reasoned interpretation - principled interpretation - of the Constitution, free from tugs of partisanship. That's what has earned the justices their reJUDICIAL CONDUCT
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However, one wonders whether a judicial vow of silence is really necessary to preserve judicial independence.
B.

The Myth of Judicial Power

Perhaps the traditionalist approach is really a throwback to some
archaic notion regarding the myth ofjudicial superiority, authority, and
transcendental infallibility. Anyone who has spent any time in court cannot help but be impressed by the aura of ritualism that surrounds such
proceedings. The design of the typical courtroom induces a pyschological effect not unlike that of a church. High ceilings and subdued lighting
immediately impress the visitor with the message that he is now in an
important and sacred place. With this realization, the noisy haggling of
the street is left behind. Conversation becomes purposeful and conducted in hushed and respectful tones. Observers may not enter into
the well, but must, instead, take seats in the pews set aside for the laymen congregation. On the other, more hallowed, side of the bar, officers and participants take their predetermined places. All focus and
attention is on the sacrosanct and monolithic bench.
The proceedings begin with a call to order, the recitation of some
ancient words, and the processional of the black-robed judge from his
private entrance to the bench. Welcomes are given and the rite begins.
Witnesses are sworn and testimony considered. Texts are interpreted
and debated. Often, decisions are revealed only after secret and quiet
deliberation. 7 Thus, the entire ceremony hints of transcendental religiosity and the direct intervention of a higher authority. 8
Preservation of this imagery and illusion is based on a belief that
such ritualism 9 is necessary both to promote obedience to court decrees
spect. Once that perception of judicial independence goes, the Supreme Court
becomes fair game for all sorts of political marauding.
Kirp, Court Slips a Notch With Brennan's Slap at Meese, L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, § II, at 5,
col. 4; Brennan Opposes Legal View Urged by Administration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § A, at

1, col. 2.
7. The secrecy ofjudicial deliberations is a source of both mysticism and speculation.
As described in the context of the United States Supreme Court:
For those nearly two hundred years, the Court has made its decisions in absolute secrecy, handing down its judgments in formal written opinions. Only
these opinions, final and unreviewable, are published. No American institution

has so completely controlled the way it is viewed by the public. The Court's deliberative process - its internal debates, the tentative positions taken by the Justices, the preliminary votes, the various drafts of written opinions, the
negotiations, confrontations, and compromises - is hidden from public view.
The Court has developed certain traditions and rules, largely unwritten, that
are designed to preserve the secrecy of its deliberations. The few previous attempts to describe the Court's internal workings - biographies of particularJustices or histories of individual cases - have been published years, often decades,
after the events, or have reflected the viewpoints of only a few Justices.
B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 1 (1979). For a severe criticism of ThE
BRETHREN and the methods and perceptions of its authors, see Anastaplo, Legal Realism, the
NewJournalism, and The Brethren, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1045.
8. For an analysis of the element of transcendental religiosity which has been carried
along by the concept of natural law, see R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 76-83 (1976).
9. The formal decoration and decorum ofjudicial proceedings has also been likened
to theater and dramatic productions. See Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection
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and to perpetuate the myth of judicial power.' 0 The proponents and
defenders of the myth argue that the courts are responsible for the
moral legitimization and continuity of authority in our rule of law society. '1 In such a society, where there is no one homogeneous morality,
the courts must maintain the image that their decisions are the product
of a high moral authority. In order to cultivate this priest-like appearance, judges should speak only from the bench, refraining from public
expression that might raise doubt regarding the strength or infallibility
of the judgment. This illusion is required to put an end to disputes between warring parties and to give the appearance of teeth to judicial
decrees which, in reality, are dependent on the executive branch for
enforcement. 12
on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81 (1975). It has been argued that the
props and soliloquy of "judicial theater": 1) encourage impartiality and objectivity; 2) facilitate good judgments through live presentation and the communication of nonverbal
information; 3) induce creativity and imaginative alternatives; 4) redirect aggression; and
5) maintain a sense of fairness apart from the rest of the world. Id. at 100-08. Through its
reenactment of events and presentation of illusion and conflicting viewpoints, the trial has
the potential to provide a deeper truth than might otherwise be possible. Id. at 91-92.
However, deviation from the classic trial/theater metaphor results in the invalidation of
the proceedings. In Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916), the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that crossing the line between judicial theater and dramatic theater
was inappropriate.
The court removed the trial from the courtroom to the theater, and stated as
a reason therefor:
"By reason of the insufficiency of the courtroom to seat and accommodate
the people applying for admission . . . it is by the court ordered that the further
trial of this cause be had at the Keith Theater, and thereupon the court was adjourned to Keith Theater, where trial proceeded."
The stage was occupied by court, counsel, jury, witnesses, and officers connected with the trial. The theater proper was crowded with curious spectators.
Before the trial was completed it was returned to the courtroom and concluded
there. At the adjournment of court on one occasion the bailiff announced from
the stage: "The regular show will be to-morrow(sic); matinee in the afternoon
and another performance at 8:30. Court is now adjourned until 7:30."
Id. at 203; 158 N.W. at 931-32.
10. As one commentator has observed:
Judges embody the law. If the law is august, majestic, mysterious, impersonal, objective, above party or ideology, and immune to fear or favor, ourjudges
must be the same. On the bench, we cloak them in black, raise them above litigants and lawyers, and equate them with the court itself. Off the bench, the
judges are anonymous, and some critics would cloister them in a social, economic, and professional monastery, allowing them to talk only to other lawyers or
perhaps only to other judges.
Tucker, The Judges Role in Educating the Public About the Law, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 201, 203
(1982).
11. As such, we have imbibed our judicial system with an image of immortality. Unlike the legislative and executive branches, the courts and the rule of law do not change
from term to term. Instead, a change in membership does not affect the life or nature of
the institution which, itself, exists in perpetuity. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 30-33 (1962).
12. The school integration decisions of the 1950's and 1960's provide a good example
regarding the enforcement ofjudicial decrees. After the initial decision in Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), there was some minor compliance, but the majority of
school districts ignored the Court's ruling and prepared to stall or impede its effect. By
doing so, these political entities stretched the authority of the courts to the near breaking
point and demonstrated that the assumed power was, by itself, simply a myth. It was only
after the power of the executive branch was brought to bear that Brown and integration
became the law of the land. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 244-72. ChiefJustice Earl Warren
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Modernity and the Expanding Role of Judges

Although there may be a comfortable logic in the traditionalist approach, one tends to wonder whether our acceptance of this approach is
based on real necessity or upon our traditional training as lawyers and
citizens, complete with its built-in assumptions and biases.13
Despite the influence of our ancestral teachings, there is substantial
room to argue that our customary perceptions ofjudicial authority not
only insult our maturity as citizens, but are simply inappropriate for our
complex, rapidly changing society and for the new roles the courts have
been called upon to play.' 4 The United States is a rule of law system
and our laws represent an attempt to establish a common denominator
for a vastly heterogeneous society. In other words, all that James
Madison's conflicting factions and special interest groups 15 may have in
common is a relatively uniform system of laws and the procedural means
16
to enforce those norms of behavior.
Throughout American history, our courts have been called upon to
decide "symbolic"' 7 questions that, because of their highly politicized
18
and controversial nature, were not subject to legislative resolution.
However, with the rise of modem America and the pervasive growth of
the regulatory state, 19 citizens have increasingly turned to the courts for
answers to the most fundamental and far-reaching issues of government
and social policy. Failure of other governmental institutions to meet the
problems of the day, 20 has caused the judicial branch to become an "acused his own authority on the Court to achieve a unanimous vote. By speaking with one
unified voice, the Court attempted to negate any doubt concerning its resolve regarding
the issue. H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 331-32 (4th ed. 1982).
13. J. FRANK, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 259-61 (1963). More than fifty years ago,
Jerome Frank commented on the image of the judiciary as a father figure:
Men in any of life's relations will never be completely free of delusions. But
delusions can be diminished. And those who desire the healthy growth of the law
will with courage seek to diminish legal delusions and, to that end, to comprehend the nature and sources of their own weaknesses, and of the powerful yearning in themselves as well as others for unrealities in law....
A coming-of-age has its perils for the children and its pains for the parents.
Yet if our legal critics are to play the role of wise fathers, they must have the
courage to let their "children" grow up....
Growing up means throwing off dependence upon external authority. It
means self-reliance, the acceptance of responsibility. It means questioning-not
hastily, angrily, rebelliously, but calmly and dispassionately--our bequests from
the past, our social heritage.
Id.
14. Tucker, supra note 10, at 203.
15. As defined by Madison:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
16. Id. at 77-84.
17. See Downing, Judicial Ethics and the Political Role of the Courts, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 94, 101 (1970).

18. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); D. FEHRENBACHER,
(1978).
19. See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 686-89.
20. See Downing, supra note 17, at 97.
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celerator of governmental activity. '"21 It has been attributed with defacto
responsibility for critical policy issues such as racial integration, legislative apportionment, abortion, religious exercise and establishment, obscenity, unpopular wars, unethical presidents, the rights of the
criminally insane, and the protection of the environment.
D.

The Need for Public Knowledge of the Legal System

Judicial consideration of policy issues has brought the courts to the
forefront of public controversy and criticism. Questions of such societal
importance are inherently nebulous and not subject to clear-cut determination. In addition, the conflict surrounding judicial resolution of social issues is enhanced by the fact that such questions often lie at the
heart of one issue or special interest politics.

22

In reaction to the tur-

moil of our modern world, citizens are demanding that courts provide
simple answers to complex problems. As a result, where a legal/policy
question is the only agenda item of two "right thinking" political
groups, dissatisfaction and outrage will necessarily follow any judicial
decision. While a loss of public confidence in the courts may actually
23
represent a diffused feeling of frustration with the overall legal system,
the new policymaking role of the judiciary has made it a focal point of
social and governmental controversy. The contemporary function and
character of our judicial system therefore magnifies the importance of
the question with which I began: should our judges respond to public
criticism and conjecture with isolation and silence or with openness, explanation and education?
Our law, like the society from which it is derived, is large and complex. Its nuances, fictions and methods may not be readily understandable by those who have not dedicated vast amounts of time and energy to
legal study and thought. Thus, to a large number of citizens, the law
may appear to be a secret and suspect system within the exclusive control of a select elite. 24 However, considering the interrelation of public
21. Kaufman, supra note 4. at 685.
22. The rise of special interest politics is really a creature of the Twentieth Century.
See A. KELLY, W. HARBISON, & H. BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 662-81, 731-39 (6th ed. 1983)[hereinafter THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION].

[Als society fragments into discrete groups unchecked by any overarching consensus - or at least any consensus that can be translated into coherent public
policy - there is likely to be increased reliance on the forms and institutions of
law. The litigation explosion of the 1970's appears to bear this out. In absence
of shared community values, however, the motive force behind the proliferating
legal action - and behind the continuing judicial and administrative lawmaking
which it engenders - is political expediency and ideology. . . . [I]f the trend
toward ideologically based single-issue politics continues, it will threaten the bal-

ance between law and politics that has been the essential condition of constitutional government in the United States.
Id. at 739.
23. Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some ,Votes and Reflections, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 70 (1970); see also THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 22, at 683-

702.
24. The controversy and interest surrounding the publication of B. WOODWARD & S.
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979) tends to support the proposition that "there is a vast
public hunger for knowledge about the legal system." Tucker, supra note 10, at 203.
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and legal controversies, the de facto segregation of legal knowledge is
incongruent with democratic theory and process. The public's ignorance of the substance and workings of the law can give rise to a number
of undesirable effects. First, as to the well-intentioned but ill-informed
citizen, a lack of legal knowledge may cause him to chart the course of
his activities far away from the actual demarcation between allowed and
prohibited behavior. The result of such ignorance is an unwarranted
loss of potential freedom and choice. Secondly, public ignorance gives
great power to those who do know the law and elevates them to the
status of moral priests in a rule of law society. The result can be an
unnecessary relinquishment of power which rightfully belongs to the
people. Finally, the public's ignorance of the law can cause misunderstandings concerning the legal process and the subtleties of its application to public and private controversies. Such misunderstandings lead
to frustration and disillusionment, resulting in legal evolution based on
emotional reaction rather than rational, informed, and objective
deliberation.
Because of the importance of law in modern society, the public
needs reliable and understandable sources of information concerning
our legal system. Without such information, the public cannot accurately scrutinize the legal process and correct its abuses. Unfortunately,
many citizens possess simplistic insights into the workings of our legal
system. Therefore, if we are to bring the public back into democratic
lawmaking, someone should be responsible for continuing public legal
education.
E.

Who Should Educate the Public?

There are several potential sources from which the public can receive information regarding the workings of the legal process. For example, elected officials, the practicing bar, and the press can do much to
interpret and explain the legal process. However, each group suffers
from deficiencies of motivation and/or knowledge which make reliance
on any or all of them inadequate to achieve the goals of public
education.
Elected officials, whether they be part of the executive or legislative
branches, by the nature of their positions, are in constant contact with
their constituents. As such, they would seem to be an excellent source
of public information and insight into the legal process. The political
realities of achieving and retaining office, however, make it unlikely that
elected officials can be relied upon to speak the whole truth during a
public controversy. Instead, there may be a tendency to avoid unpopular viewpoints and cloud the real focus of responsibility since total disclosure would be politically unproductive.
The practicing bar has both the education and experience to contribute much to public understanding of the legal system. In fact, the
bar, at both local and national levels, has sponsored events and forums
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for public education. 2 5 The scope of such endeavors, however, has been
far from adequate. This may be attributed to the reluctance of the profession, for both class and economic reasons, to give away too much of
what gives it its mystery and social position. 26 The shortcomings of the
bar are perpetuated by a separate legal language that serves as a barrier
to exclude the public from legal comprehension.
Journalists, although not motivated by political or professional protectionism, may be inadequate decipherers of legal minutiae because of
both a lack of legal sophistication and the inherent differences of perception imposed by newsgathering methods. Certainly, the media are
an invaluable part of our democracy. Throughout our history,2 7 the
press has informed citizens about the workings of American government. However, the generalist orientation of journalists tends to be
much more effective in the expansive arena of politics and public opinion than in the more technical territory of lawmaking and its application. 2 8 Although both the law and journalism have the common goal of
truthseeking, journalists are concerned with all facts surrounding a
given event, while the legal process is only concerned with those facts
which are relevant to the claims that have been made. Therefore, because of their different orientation and lack of sophisticated legal understanding, journalists tend to focus on the "living" aspects of a legal
dispute, thereby subjecting their profession to charges of sensationalism
by judges and the bar.2 9 As a result, the media may be able to answer
the basic "who, why, when, where, and how" but not the more subtle
and technical issues that are at the heart of a legal controversy. Unfortu25.

See Id.

26. Id. For an analogous argument regarding the development of the medical profession, see generally, P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
It is arguable that, for these same reasons, the bar has supported and perpetuated judicial
isolation in order to maintain its position as the only group which is sanctioned to communicate with the judiciary. Tucker, supra note 10, at 203.
27. During the last thirty years, the gentlemanly days of informal press/government
liaisons came to an end. Instead, the sly winks and private meetings between press and

party gave way to a full-fledged adversary relationship. See E. EMERY & M.

EMERY,

THE

PRESS AND AMERICA 541-85 (5th ed. 1984). The first hints of the potential and direction of

the modern press began with the rise of objective reporting during the McCarthy era. See
A. SMITH, GOODBYE GUTENBERG: THE NEWSPAPER REVOLUTION OF THE 1980s 170 (1980).

However, the period of conflict between media and government had its true beginnings
during the Vietnam War where new technology brought the faces of dead and dying American soldiers into the living room and contributed to popular reaction against a previously
unchallenged foreign policy. Mandelbaum, Vietnam: The Television War, 3 DAEDALUS 157
(Fall 1982). Likewise, Watergate further demonstrated the power and attitude of the modern press and resulted in the resignation of an American president and the creation of a
political crisis of confidence. See C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
(1975). Most recently, an "invisible journalistic threshold" was crossed when a reporter
from the Washington Post asked Gary Hart, "Have you ever committed adultery?" Alter,
Character Cops on Patrol, NEWSWEEK May 18, 1987, at 26.
28. For example, the "process of inclusion and exclusion in journalism.., is markedly
different from the process of inclusion and exclusion in the law." L. DENNISTON, THE

(1980).
29. Id. at 51. This difference in perspective can be seen by comparing an appellate
docket with the decisions the press has seen as sufficiently significant to report. For example, if the docket contains two cases, one involving a formalistic appeal from a death sentence that is without legal merit, and another challenging a common law rule such as the
REPORTER AND THE LAW: TECHNIQUES OF COVERING THE COURTS 5
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nately, these technical issues must be understood before the public can
determine whether a fair decision has been made or an adequate policy
adopted.
Judges, on the other hand, do not suffer from the infirmities of the
other groups examined, thereby rendering them the best source available to the public for thoughtful insights into the legal process. Depending on their method of appointment, judges are generally free from
the types of financial or political interests which might discourage candor. By the very nature of their positions, judges are perceived as decision-makers and carry an aura of authority. These factors would allow
judges to take an active role in the education of the public, while still
maintaining public respect for the bench and its official decisions.
Perhaps most importantly, their career experiences as both attorneys and jurists provide judges with the insight necessary to adequately
explain the practical and conceptual workings of the law. Judges constantly observe the operation of the legal process and are well qualified
to discuss the successes and failures of the law as well as answer questions posed by the public.3 0 Through participation in public comment,
judges could point out the weaknesses and strengths thereby contributing to the overall performance of the system.
This is not to say that judges would be entirely free to make public
comments without legal or ethical constraints. Successful fulfillment of
judicial responsibility requires conscious prudence in order to preserve
independence, impartiality and public confidence. However, as the following discussion demonstrates, the maintenance of judicial integrity
does not require an all-encompassing vow of silence. Instead of such
formalistic prohibitions, the judiciary need merely contemplate whether
the specific type of public participation in question can be approached
without harm to the proper functioning of the legal system as a whole.
negligence doctrine of tender years, the press will be inclined to cover the more sensational death penalty while not recognizing the importance of the latter, more subtle, issue.
One commentator has described the differences between legal and journalistic perceptions as follows:
The journalist tells his story by moving from the most significant to the least.
The lawyer often builds his case the other way around.
The journalist hopes for immediate impact with his audiences - and usually
can expect it. The lawyer works toward a contemplative judgment from the
courts - often, much later.
The journalist pursues the novel. The lawyer searches for the familiar.
The journalist is fascinated by the illogical. The lawyer reduces events and
emotions to logic.
Obviously, then, when the journalist undertakes to cover the law and write
about it, the potential for division and misunderstanding between reporter and

sources is quite large.
Id. at 6-7.
30. Judges can also offer great insight into the more conceptual workings of the legal
process such as the effect of precedent, the role of the judiciary in reviewing legislative
acts, and what it really means to say that a particular judge is conservative or liberal. See
Shetreet, On Assessing the Role of Courts in Society, 10 MANITOBA L.J. 357, 375-88 (1980).
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III.

THE ETHICAL BOUNDARIES OF JUDICIAL COMMENT

A. Judicial Taxonomy
Before analyzing the legal and ethical boundaries of public expression by judges, it should be noted that there are different types of
judges. Each jurisdiction has different categories ofjudges and different
methods by which judges acquire their positions. 3' The law of the particular jurisdiction determines how a judge is appointed, 3 2 under what
circumstances he may be disciplined or removed,"3 and the force of the
various ethical standards and codes which may be applied to judicial activities. 34 Therefore, it is difficult to generalize concerning the legal restraints upon public judicial expression.
Likewise, as a policy consideration, the method by which a judge
achieves office may be an important factor in determining the bounds of
properjudicial behavior. For example, it would be difficult to argue that
a judge running for judicial office against a political opponent should
refrain from all public comment.3 5 On the other hand, appointed
judges, who may never be subject to review by the electorate, are secure
in their positions and have little reason to publicly account for their actions. Due to the independence of such life tenure judges, policy considerations that favor their participation in public debate and education
apply equally or with greater force to judges subject to election or
36
retention.
An examination of the legal and ethical propriety of public statements by federal judges provides a useful model which can easily be
applied to similar activities by judges of different jurisdictions. First,
federal Article III judges represent the highest degree of judicial independence in that they are part of a separate constitutional branch of
government, appointed for life and only subject to removal by impeachment as provided in Articles II and III of the United States Constitution. 3 7 Second, the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial
31. Wheeler & Levin, Judicial Discipline and Removal in the United States, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER STAFF PAPER 7-9 (1979).
32. Id. at 14-28; see generally, Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and How Four States Deal

With It, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1970)(discusses how NewJersey, California, Illinois, and New York treat judicial misconduct).
33. Braithwaite, supra note 32.
34. See Wheeler & Levin, supra note 31, at 49; Bray, The Problem of Sanctions, 19 UNIVERsITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS 42 (1964); Martineau, Enforcement of the Code ofJudicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410, 412-15.

35. See Comment, First Amendment Rights of Attorneys andJudges in Judicial Election Cam-

paigns, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 201 (1986).
36. As one commentator has argued:
Elected judges have a special responsibility to explain their decisions. An
elective system presupposes that what a judge does is worthy of public judgment.
The political impact of judicial decisions is an accepted factor in their decisionmaking. By educating citizens about their decisions, elected judges do not leave
the total responsibility to others like the press and their opponents.
Tucker, supra note 10, at 207.
37. See N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT 208 (1973); Miller, supra
note 23, at 71; Kaufman, supra note 4, at 681.
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Judges,
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Conduct, which has been adopted as the ethical standard for federal
judges, also governs the ethical conduct of judges in at least forty-four
states.3 8 Third, despite the various laws and ethical standards which
may be applied in different jurisdictions, the policy implications of public comments by judges remain relatively constant.
B.

The Code of Judicial Conduct

The crisis of public confidence which infected the United States in
the late 1960's and early 1970's brought virtually all of our governmental institutions under a shadow of suspicion.3 9 The national scandal that
resulted in the resignation of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas 40 created a great deal of confusion among the judiciary and prompted a reformulation of judicial ethics and behavior. 4' As Dean McKay
explained, "[t]he ethical expectations of the public have risen even more
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... " This language creates a problem of interpretation in that Article III neither
defines "good behaviour" nor prescribes a procedure for the determination of a breach of
such behavior. It is generally assumed that this gap is filled by U.S. CONST. art II, § 4,
which reads: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Some commentators argue that the "good behavior" language implies that "the standard imposed by the Constitution on federal
judges is higher than that constitutionally demanded of other civil officers," and should be
enforceable by procedures other than impeachment. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 49 n.5 (1978). See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 130
(1973); Shipley, Legislative Control ofJudicialBehavior, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 178, 182
(1970).
Nevertheless, the practical fact of the matter, supported by 200 years of history, is that
impeachment is the only official method by which to discipline or remove an Article III
judge. See Kaufman, supra note 4, passim. See also R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS:
COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971).
The United States Supreme Court cast some doubt on the exclusivity of impeachment
as a method to remove judges in Chandler v.Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970), where it
sidestepped the issue of whether the Judicial Council of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could refuse to assign cases to one of its memberjudges. This
slight did not go unnoticed in the dissenting opinions by Justices Douglas and Black who
argued that a judge possessed the same first amendment rights as any ordinary citizen and
that the court's action represented a great insult to judicial independence. Id. at 129
(Douglas,J., dissenting); Id. at 141 (Black, J., dissenting). Although Chandler remains as a
source of speculation, it has not served as precedent for any further limiting actions.
38. The ABA Model Code ofJudicial Conduct has been adopted in full by 44 states.
Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Rhode Island. and Wisconsin have established
separate codes ofjudicial conduct or ethics which do not conform to the Code. Memorandum, Ref. No. RIS 84.032, National Center for State Courts (1984). For a detailed breakdown of the various state codes, see D. FRETZ, R. PEEPLES & T. WICKER, ETHICS FOR JUDGES
6 (1982).
39. See Downing, supra note 17, at 94-95.
40. Justice Fortas was the heir apparent to Chief Justice Earl Warren's seat when it
was discovered that he had secretly been receiving $20,000 a year from a private foundation. Edwards, Commentary on Judicial Ethics, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 259, 259-60 (1969-70).
The surrounding controversy also involved an attempt to impeachJustice William Douglas
and caused Justice William Brennan to give up his position as head of the Appellate
Judge's Seminar at New York University Law School. See Tucker, supra, note 10, at 204 n.
4-6.
41. See generally, Hearings on Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Judges and Other Federal
Judges, before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
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rapidly than have the perceptions of the judges of what is now expected
42
of them."
In 1969, the American Bar Association began a three year effort
which resulted in the adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct in
1972. 4 3 The drafters of the Code intended that its provisions be made
mandatory and given the force of law. 44 A number of the states that
have adopted the Code have followed this intent and use the Code as a
standard for the discipline of state judges. 4 5 However, when applied to
federal judges, the Code has never been considered legally binding.
At the same time the American Bar Association was writing the
Code of Judicial Conduct, the Interim Advisory Committee on Judicial
Activities was created by Chief Justice Warren Burger to provide advi46
sory opinions to federal judges seeking direction on ethical matters.
The Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities, however, does not have
the authority to make decisions which carry the force of law. 4 7 As stated
at the end of each letter opinion: "The Committee's function is solely
advisory. The final decision in any ethical situation must remain the responsibility of the individual judicial officer."' 48 With this background in
mind, it is appropriate to examine those provisions of the Code most
relevant to an analysis of public judicial expression.
C.

The FoundationalPrinciples: Independence, Avoidance of Impropriety,
and Impartiality

The foundational principles underlying the guidelines of the Code
can best be stated as independence, impartiality, and the avoidance of
42. McKay, TheJudiciary and NAonJudicialActivities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1970).
43. The Code replaced the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which were adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1924. The new Code is structured to be subject to
mandatory application and is thus distinguished from the original Canons, which were
'characterized by moral posturing and generalized exhortation." Lubet, Participation by
Judges in Civic and Charitable Activities: H'hat are the Limits? 69 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (Aug.-Sept.
1985)(footnote omitted).
44. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 43 (1973). See also
Kaufman, Lions orJackals: The Function ofa Code ofJudicialEthics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

3, 6 (1970)(a proper code of ethics "must aim at prompting a dialogue between a judge's
own ethical sense and generally recognized communal moral standards").
45. Martineau, supra note 34, passim.

46. See Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Preface.
The first 26 opinions of the Interim Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities were published prior to the adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct by the
Judicial Conference of the United States. Following the approval of the Code the
name of the Interim Advisory Committee was changed to the "Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities." The advisory opinions beginning with Advisory Opinion No. 27 have been issued following the adoption of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for United States Judges.
ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES FOR UNITED STATES 11-63 (1973).

47. See Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Preface.
48. Any attempt to give such force of law to the Code as to federal judges would raise
substantial statutory and constitutional problems. See generally Ervin, supra note 4 (dis-

cusses historical basis forjudicial independence); Holloman, The JudicialReform Act: Histor,
Analysis, and Comment, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 128 (1970)(general discussion of the
Judicial Reform Act).
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the appearance of impropriety. All other rules revolve around these
three principles, as do the ethical and policy considerations regarding
the effect of public expression by judges. The variety of public statements which may trigger ethical scrutiny are not all easily defined or
subject to clear categorization. The types of public statements which
could be made by judges are innumerable and carry with them a variety
of distinct as well as subtle implications. In order to understand the
categories of public activities and expression in which judges should be
encouraged to engage, it is important to analyze these basic principles of
the Code as well as those canons which more directly address the
49
problem.
1.

Canon One - Judicial Integrity and Independence

Canon 1 of the Code admonishes: "A Judge Should Uphold The
Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary. ' '5 0 This has been interpreted to include both the independence of the judiciary as a branch of
government and the independence of the individual judge. As stated by
Justice Black in Chandler v. Judicial Council:
One of the great advances made in the structure of government by our Constitution was its provision for an independent
judiciary-for judges who could do their duty as they saw it
without having to account to superior court judges or to any51
one else except the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment.
It has even been argued that in order to preserve judicial independence, the American Bar Association should have had no part in the
52
drafting of the Code.
2.

Canon Two -

Impropriety

Canon 2 states: "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities."15 3 Included in this pro49. See infra notes 82-126 and accompanying text.

50. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 1. Canon 1 reads as follows:
A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing,
and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code
should be construed and applied to further that objective.
Id. This language is meant to clarify "that if ajudge is aware of a need for new or changed
standards, he has an obligation to work toward their establishment." E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 47 (1973).
51. 382 U.S. 1003, 1005-06 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
52. See Miller, supra note 23, at 71. Contra Ainsworth,Judicial Ethics - The FederalJudiciary Seeks Modern Standards of Conduct, 45 NOTRE DAME LAw 470 (1970) (standards should be
set by judges themselves with the help of the bar, especially the ABA).
53. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 2. Canon 2 reads:
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His
Activities
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
B. Ajudge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence
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scription is the warning that a judge will be "the subject of constant
public scrutiny" 54 and must therefore accept restrictions on his conduct
not suffered by "ordinary citizen[s]. "' 5 5 The real thrust of the rule, howbe prostituted" by
ever, seems to be that the "judicial office should not
56
activities.
unofficial
in
prestige
judge's
a
of
the use
3.

Canon Three
a. Impartiality and Diligence

Official activity and comment is governed by Canon 3, one of the
more detailed and specific canons in the Code. The rule admonishes a
judge to "Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently."' 5 7 In achieving this goal, "[a] judge should be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence in it, ' 5 8 avoid ex parte communication concerning a pending matter, 59 and "abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court."'60 In
a judge in
addition, the canon sets forth the standards to be applied 6by
1
considering his own disqualification from a given matter.
To be fully understood, Canon 3 must be interpreted in light of its
main focus, regulation of purely official judicial activities.62 Interpreting
Canon 3 with this in mind indicates that the canon's restraints are not
nearly as far reaching as might be assumed from first reading. For example, the requirement that judges "maintain professional competence
in [the law]" 63 does not operate to restrict judicial activities. Rather, it
encourages judicial expression in the form of writing and public speakhis judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor should he convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify voluntarily as a character witness.
Id.
54. Id. at Canon 2, Commentary.
55. Id.
56. E. THODE, supra note 50, at 49.
57. See CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3.
58. Id. at Canon 3(A)(1).
59. Id. at Canon 3(A)(4). This portion of Canon 3 provides:
A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding,
or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by
law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a
pending or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a
disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him if he gives
notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and
affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.
Id. Included in this prohibition is outside consultation with experts in a particular area of
law including other lawyers and law professors. Id. at Canon 3(A)(4), Commentary; E.
THODE, supra note 50, at 52-54.
60. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(A)(6). This portion of Canon 3 provides:
A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court
personnel subject to his direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit
judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from
explaining for public information the procedures of the court.
61. See Id. at Canon 3(C).
62. See E. THODE, supra note 50, at 50.
63. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(A)l).
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ing. Such involvement in human debate and interchange can only help
to bring a judge in touch with the world and the issues of the day, thus
improving his insight into matters brought before him in his official
capacity.
b.

Ex Parte Communications

The Canon's restrictions on ex parte communications and comments
regarding pending proceedings present a separate set of barriers, which,
when dissected, can be substantially limited to the purpose intended by
the canon. As to ex parte communications, any analysis must focus on
' 64
whether the situation involves "a pending or impending proceeding."
Although the Canon prohibits ex parte and other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding, it would seem to allow ex
65
parte and other communications for purposes of general consultation.
Further, the Canon allows a judge to seek out an expert for advice on an
issue pending before him if the requisite notice is given. This simple
requirement does not prohibit a judge from generally consulting with
experts who can advise him as to developments in the law or in regard to
problems which are continually being brought before the court. Such
an interpretation embodies the basic goal of judicial competence and
growth.
c.

Public Comment

The Canon's prohibition against "public comment about a pending
or impending proceeding in any court' ' 66 must be interpreted in light of
the entire subsection which explicitly states that judges are not prohibited "from making public statements in the course of their official duties
or from explaining for public information the procedures of the
court."' 6 7 Certainly, it is important to ensure the fundamental fairness

of an official proceeding and prevent it from being tried in the streets or
by the press. 68 This does not mean, though, that a judge should be the
martyr for the entire legal system. The canon seems to allow a judge to
point out, for example, that the reason a suspected criminal was released
was because the district attorney refused to prosecute the case or because the police conducted an illegal search. By explaining the rationale
for a particular disposition, a judge will not only protect the public im64. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(A)(4).
65. Dalton, Off the Bench and Into the Mire: Judging Extrajudicial Behavior, 91 YALE L.J.
1708, 1720 (1982). Most recently, this problem has arisen due to revelations regarding
the off bench relationship between Justice Brandeis and, then, Professor Felix Frankfurter.
See B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982). For discussion and criticism of Murphy's thesis, see Book Review, The Extra-JudicialActivities of Supreme CourtJustices:
lhere Should the Line be Drawn? 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 494 (1983)
66. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(A)(6).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Statements in this category
possess the inherent danger of effecting the outcome of the specific case from which they
are derived and the quality ofjustice which is dispensed to the particular parties before the
court.
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age of the judiciary, but also focus public attention on those officials
responsible. The rationale of the Canon, however, should be carried
one step further, allowing a judge, once a matter is no longer pending,
to accept the obligation of explaining his decision so that the winners,
the losers, and the general public have a chance to understand and see
that justice was done.
d.

Disqualification Standards

Finally, Canon 3's disqualification standards 69 must be closely examined to determine if ajudge's public expression regarding an issue of
law or public policy would require him to decline from hearing a case
raising that issue. The relevant part states:
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which
his impartialitymight reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts
70
concerning the proceeding;
The emphasized language of the Canon provides the key to its application in the problem at hand. First, the general "impartiality"
benchmark sets the tone for this section and is to be employed in situations where a judge's conduct raises a reasonable question concerning
his ability to render a fair decision in a given matter. 7 1However, the
"personal bias or prejudice" standard provides the true insight into the
intent of the drafters. 72 The Committee explicitly rejected the notion
that ajudge should disqualify himself because of a fixed belief regarding
a legal issue. 7 3 Thus, this rule, which is virtually identical to the statutory provision for the disqualification of federal judges, 74 is, with rare
69. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 3(C).
70. Id. at Canon 3(C)(l)(a) (emphasis added).
71. See E. THODE, supra note 50, at 60-61.
72. Canon 3(C) is primarily concerned with the type of bias that can result from family
relationships, former legal practice, and business dealings. Id. See Advisory Committee on
Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 62 (1979)(discusses in detail the types of problems and
situations that fall under Canon 3(C)).
73. As the Reporter noted:
Subsection (a) has gone through several formulations in drafting. At one
time the language provided for disqualification if ajudge "had a fixed belief concerning the merits." . . . The Committee was confronted, however, by the interpretation of many able judges and law professors that would require a judge to
disqualify himself if he had a fixed belief about the law applicable to a given case.
For example, it was argued that a judge with a fixed belief that the First Amendment precludes a libel action by a public official against a newspaper in the absence of proof of malice should disqualify himself in a libel case of that general
character. This interpretation was not intended; indeed, the Committee recognized the necessity and the value of judges' having fixed beliefs about constitutional principles and many other facets of the law. As a result of the apparent
ambiguity of the proposed language, the Committee adopted instead the standard of "personal bias or prejudice."
E. THODE, supra note 50, at 61.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. 1986) was modeled after Canon 3(C) of the Code. See
13(a) WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3549, at 612
(1984)[hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE]. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982) states in part:
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exceptions, 75 not applicable to the types of comments a judge might
make in attempting to educate the public.
Given their narrowest interpretation, Canons 1, 2, and 3 could be
interpreted to prohibit any comment by a judge other than through a
written opinion or oral decision. A more liberal interpretation does not
support this conclusion. The policies behind Canons 1, 2, and 3 are
concerned with maintaining public trust and confidence in the judiciary.
In order to perpetuate and nurture such confidence, the public must
believe that judicial decisions are made impartially and are not based on
private favors or alliances. 76 It is, however, not clear that this public
confidence will be eroded through thoughtful judicial expression concerning the law. Certainly, it is better for the public to hear judicial
thoughts, both to identify any bias that may exist as well as to learn
something about our legal process. By fostering and encouraging such
expression, respect and public confidence in the judiciary will certainly
increase.
There is little merit in the argument that public expression of attitudes and opinions will detract from a judge's impartiality. According to
Judge Kaufman: "If such were the standard, few judges would be able
to adjudicate any controversies. Revelation of a judge's position in a
speech differs little from adoption of a stance in a prior judicial opinion."' 7 7 In addition, it is possible that by expressing an opinion a judge
may become more aware of his own biases and be better able to comWhenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,
such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned
to hear such proceeding.
These provisions have been interpreted in line with Canon 3(C) and are not intended to
apply to fixed beliefs regarding legal and policy issues. See FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, at

§ 3542, at 568 n.19 and decisions collected therein.
In light of the above discussion concerning Article III, see supra note 37, it would appear that in order for a judge to be subject to discipline and/or impeachment, he would
have to commit a statutorily defined criminal offense. The only two federal statutes relevant to this discussion concerning public judicial comment are the general disqualification
statutes. It is highly doubtful that violation of the disqualification statutes would amount
to the type of "crime" which could subject a judge to impeachment. The restraints embodied in the statutes are, in the first instance, self-imposed, to be backed up by appellate
review. In addition, in order for the disqualification statutes, or any of the similarly vague
provisions of the Judicial Code to carry criminal sanctions and to pass the specificity requirements of due process, they would have to more narrowly and precisely describe the
evil which was to be proscribed. See PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw 4 (2d ed. 1969). But see
Clark,JudicialSelf-Regulation - Its Potential, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 42 (1970)(au-

thor suggests that it would be possible to give the Code the effect of criminal sanction).
75. It is possible that a personal bias regarding a distinct group could rise to the level
of discrimination and justify disqualification. See Note, Civil Procedure-Judicial Disqualification - Extra-JudicialAssociations and the Appearance-of-Preudice Test of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) Idaho v. Freeman, 31 KAN. L. REV. 200 (1982) (argues that a federal judge, who was also a
leader in the Mormon Church, should have disqualified himself from considering a case
regarding the Equal Rights Amendment); Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw.
U.L. REv. 983, 999-1004 (1984-85) (judge subjected to disciplinary proceedings for making a racial remark in a news story).
76. See Lubet, supra note 75, at 985-90.
77. KaufmanJudges Must Speak Out, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1982, at 23, col. I.
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pensate for them while acting in his official capacity. Judges are trained
to repress their personal opinions when making official decisions. The
judicial method requires that judges decide cases on the merits after applying the law to a given set of facts. Public expression of a general legal
opinion should not detract from this process. 7 8 As observed by Justice
Cardozo:
The training of the judge, if coupled with what is styled the
judicial temperament, will help in some degree to emancipate
him from the suggestive power of individual dislikes and prepossessions. It will help to broaden the group to which his subconscious loyalties are due. Never will these loyalties be utterly
extinguished while human nature is what it is. We may wonder
sometimes how from the play of all these forces of individualism, there can come anything coherent, anything but chaos and
the void. Those are the moments in which we exaggerate the
elements of difference. In the end there emerges7 something
which has a composite shape and truth and order. 9
There are safeguards to prevent or correct decisions that are tainted
by bias. The first and most effective is self-regulation. If ajudge feels he
cannot objectively decide a case, he can always disqualify himself. Secondly, there is the "potent tool" of peer pressure. 80 In private, judges
are prone to argue and haggle like the advocates they once were. It is
unlikely that a decision based on bias rather than on the merits of the
case would go unnoticed and without comment by judicial brethren. Finally, there is the remedy of appellate review. "The appellate process
... is hardly a toothless animal; it is able to excise not only error but also
bias, impropriety, irrationality, and abuse of discretion." 8

D.

1

Off-The-Bench Activity: Its Definitions and Limits

While Canons 1, 2, and 3 provide the basic principles of judicial
ethics and dictate the bounds of official judicial behavior, the remainder
of the Code addresses unofficial or off-the-bench behavior. Canons 4, 5,
and 7 attempt to define and establish guidelines for the quasi-judicial,
extra-judicial, and political activities. The Code's drafters attempted to
categorize these activities for the purposes of distinct regulation. However, the lines separating the classifications quickly blur and the underlying considerations intermingle to the point of confusion, particularly in
light of the modern role of the judiciary in public policy and debate.
1. Canon Four

-

Quasi-Judicial Activities

The quasi-judicial activities provision speaks most directly to the
question of judicial expression. Standing by itself, Canon 4 seems
rather straightforward and reasonable. It provides: "A Judge May En78. Id.

79. B. CARDOZO,

THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

176 (1949).

80. See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 709 (discussing peer pressure and retirement).
81. Id. at 707.
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gage in Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal System, and the Administration of Justice. ' 8 2 In particular, as long as a judge's impartiality is
not put into question:
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in
other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and
the administration of justice.
B. He may appear at a public hearing before an executive or
legislative body or official on matters concerning the law,
the legal system, and the administration ofjustice, and he
may otherwise consult with an executive or legislative body
or official, but only on matters concerning the administration of justice.
C. He may serve as a member, officer, or director of an organization or governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of
justice. He may assist such an organization in raising funds
and may participate in their management and investment,
but should not personally participate in public fund raising
activities. He may make recommendations to public and
private fund-granting agencies on projects and programs
concerning the83law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.
The commentary to Canon 4 states a judge is a "person specially
learned in the law" and is "encouraged" to "contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice,"
either independently or through legal organizations such as bar
84
associations.
The language of Canon 4 sets forth a broad mandate which can be
construed as sanctioning judicial comment or participation in virtually
any setting involving issues of law and policy as they bear upon the legal
system and the administration of justice. The actual interpretation of
the canon, however, has been limited because of the strong influence of
the principles of impartiality, the appearance of impropriety, and an un82. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 4.

83. Id.
84. Id. at Canon 4, Commentary. The Reporter's Notes are helpful in defining the
type of statements that are encouraged by the canon and which do not subject a judge to

charges of impropriety and, accordingly, disqualification.
The line between appropriate quasi-judicial activities and those that are likely
to lead to a judge's disqualification is not as difficult to draw as may first appear.
For example, a judge may write or lecture on a legal issue, analyzing the present
law and its history, its virtue and its shortcomings; he may commend the present
law or propose legal reform without compromising his capacity to decide impartially the very issue on which he has spoken or written. There is a significant
difference between the statement, "I will grant all divorce actions that come
before me - whatever the strength of the evidence to support the statutory
ground for divorce - because I believe that persons who no longer live in harmony should be divorced," and the statement, "I believe that limited statutory
grounds for divorce are not in the public interest. The law should be changed to
allow persons who no longer live in harmony to obtain a divorce." The latter
does not compromise a judge's capacity to apply impartially the law as written,
although it clearly states his position about improvements in the law.
E. THODE, supra note 50, at 74.
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necessarily limited vision of the judicial role and the relation of law to
public policy. For example, Canon 4(A) would seem to justify a full
range ofjudicial expression aimed at a wide variety of groups. However,
the advisory opinions which have applied the canon have constrained its
effect to more traditionally accepted forms of legal communication such
as lecturing at legal seminars, speaking to bar associations, teaching at
law schools, and writing scholarly legal articles. 8 5 Expression and activities which are not so purely legal have been put in the category of extrajudicial activities and addressed under Canon 5.86
The language of Canon 4(B) also seems to rest on a broad assumption regarding the benefits of public expression. This section, which
regulates the judicial relationship with other branches of government,
recognizes the advantages of seeking judicial insight on questions of
lawmaking 8 7 and seems to adopt a relatively modern notion8 8 that what
is said about government is best said in public. Here, the Code's limitations on private consultation with other branches to matters ofjudicial
administration 8 9 acknowledge the practicalities of governmental operation while protecting the interests of litigants and citizens in general by
requiring that judicial input into legislative policy and executive decisions be made openly where all can benefit and scrutinize. 90
85. The issue of legal teaching is addressed by three Interim Advisory Committee
opinions. See Interim Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. I (1970)(law
school teaching); Id. at Advisory Op. 6 (1970)(participating as a member of the Appellate
Judges Seminar); Id. at Advisory Op. 7 (1970)(serving as a faculty member of the National
College of State Trial Judges). Interestingly, the Interim Advisory Committee reluctantly
approved a judge's participation as a faculty member in a seminar on humanistic studies
because of the possibility that the judge's presence would encourage other persons to
participate in the event. See id. at Advisory Op. 2. Traditional forms of legal scholarship
have also been approved. However, the need for caution has been expressed where the
writings are being offered for sale or where the writings deal with decisions made by the
particular judge. See id. at Advisory Op. 8; Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory
Op. 55.
86. See infra notes 106-18 & accompanying text. The implication seems to be that the
type of judicial expression encouraged by Canon 4 has been limited to legal thoughts
presented to "right thinking" and adequately educated audiences who have been properly
sanitized and indoctrinated into the legal order. This interpretation is much narrower
than that envisioned by the drafters of the Code. As stated by Judge Irving Kaufman, a
member of the drafting committee, "The message is clear: Judges may not merely express
their views on matters within their judicial province, but have an obligation to do so in the
public interest." Kaufman, supra note 77.
87. As one commentator suggested before the drafting of the Code:
No one is better qualified to speak on law reform and questions of improvement in judicial administration than judges. Even though the efforts necessary to
accomplish significant change are often substantial, no barrier should be raised
against judicial participation in such activities beyond assurance that the obligations ofjudicial office are met. A good case could even be made for the proposition that judges have an affirmative obligation to work for improvement in judicial
administration.
McKay, supra note 42, at 21.
88. This portion of Canon 4 seems to adopt a philosophy similar to that behind open
meetings laws. See D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAw 264-68 (3d ed. 1984).

89. While the terms "law, legal system, or the administration of justice" might be
difficult to distinguish, the Reporter's Notes to the Code suggest that the latter term is
limited to such matters as "court personnel, budget, housing, and procedures related to
the operation and administration of the courts." E. THODE, supra note 50, at 75.
90. The Advisory Committee On Judicial Activities has chosen to disregard the expan-
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Finally, Canon 4(C) provides a general authorization for judicial
participation in organizations and governmental agencies "devoted to
the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of
justice." 9 1 The provision is intended to keep "the judge in contact with
the world around him and [to make] his expertise available in the evercontinuing effort to improve the law." ' 92 Arguably, the only limitations
on the scope of this provision would be associations that would cast
doubt on a judge's impartiality because of the organization's political
stance or penchant for litigation 9 3 and membership in a governmental
body concerned with issues of fact or policy rather than with matters of
94
law.
In relation to the first of these limitations, bar association membership and leadership have been approved 95 while judicial participation on
96
legal aid boards and other advocacy organizations is not allowed.
sive potential of Canon 4, applying an unduly narrow interpretation of the provision. The
Reporter's Notes to Canon 4 clearly authorize a judge "to engage in projects directed to
the drafting of legislation." E. THODE, supra note 50, at 75. However, in its only published
opinion concerning this section, the Committee stated:
Less clear, however, is the propriety of a judge's appearing on behalf of, or
against, particular proposed legislation that relates to subject matter other than
the administration of justice. Legislation aimed at the vital policy issues of the
day, and that which embraces policy (examples: the Equal Rights Amendment,
social legislation, changes in the Internal Revenue Code), may well pose
problems for the judge despite the fact that he, too, is a citizen and, as such, may
be affected by the legislation. Such matters also may spawn litigation likely to
come before the judge. Although Canon 4 speaks of "matters concerning the
law," and although that precise phrase could be broadly construed to embrace
nearly all legislation and executive decisions, the Committee is of the view that
the reach of the Canon is not that broad and, indeed, was intended to be comparatively narrow. The Thode Notes so indicate.
The Committee, therefore, has concluded that under the Canon.... a judge
may appear before a legislative or executive body or official relative to matters
not concerning judicial administration, only when (1) the hearing is public and
(2) the subject matter reasonably may be considered to merit the attention and
comment of a judge as a judge, and not merely as an individual.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 50 (1977). See Reavley, supra note 6,
at 5-6, 56-57.
Interestingly, commentators have criticized Canon 4(B) as being both too narrow and
too broad. See Nathanson, Book Review, The Extra-JudicialActivities of Supreme Court Justices:
Where Should the Line be Drawn?, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 494, 521-23 (1983)(finding no distinction
between public testimony and private consultation); Dalton, supra note 65, at 1721-23
(considers matters of administration of justice to be highly subject to judicial bias not in
public interest).
91. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 4(C).
92. E. THODE, supra note 50, at 76.
93. Id.
94. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5(G), which is the basis for this limitation, provides:
Extra-judicial Appointments. A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental committee, commission, or other position that is concerned with issues
of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice. A judge, however, may represent his
country, state, or locality on ceremonial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, and cultural activities.
95. See Interim Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 14 (1970); Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 34 (1974). E. THODE, supra note 50, at 76.
96. Interim Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 12 (1970)(legal aid
board); Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 40 (1975)(Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith, the Sierra Club, and the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People). See infra notes 106-18 & accompanying text.
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Since both the bar association and other advocacy organizations are involved in legislative lobbying and litigation, any attempted distinction is
tenuous at best. However, the Advisory Committee has sanctioned judicial involvement in bar associations, subject to the restriction that a
judge refrain from engaging in bar activities which involve questions of
litigation. 9 7 Although there are solid arguments for limiting judicial
participation in any advocacy group, there is no reason why participation
on a legal aid board could not be similarly limited to administrative matters which do not involve questions of potential litigation. The only real
distinction, then, must be that bar associations, because of their traditional "right thinking" place in our legal heritage, have been granted
grandfather treatment in the Code.
The second restriction on judicial participation on governmental
boards that are concerned with questions of fact and policy, suffers from
a lack of vision and understanding about the interrelation of law and
policy in public decision making. First, it is not at all clear why participation in policymaking is less important or more threatening to the judicial
principles than the same sort of activities directed at legal reform. Certainly, the potential for conflicts and disqualification exists at both
levels. The Code's only justification for this limitation can be found in
the Reporter's Notes, which state "[t]he Committee adopted the view
that the time and prestige of the judiciary should not be expended on
98
the resolution of nonjudicial public issues."
Secondly, it is black letter law that under the umbrella of the due
process clause, policy decisions, such as those made by civil service or
personnel boards, 9 9 carry a force of law similar to that of legislation.' 0 0
A judge's participation in such policymaking could improve the legal
system by assisting in the creation of fair and constitutionally valid policy. Although some restriction on judicial participation in lawmaking
functions may be appropriate, the position adopted by the Code simply
fails to adequately recognize the role of law and courts in modern
society.101

In sum, Canon 4 has the potential to provide a judge with a great
deal of freedom of expression and to allow participation in advocacy
organizations. As stated in the Reporter's Notes, "a broad range of organizations and projects fall within Canon 4, corresponding to the range
of concerns that present themselves in the law under modern condi97. The spirit and intent of the [Code is] satisfied where the judge abstains from
discussion, debate and vote on matters which may present a conflict of interest or
which might give the appearance of impropriety if the judge did participate in
debate and vote.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 34 (1974).
98. E. THODE, supra note 50, at 91 (commenting on the Code, Canon 5(G)).

99. See Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 43 (1975) (judge prohibited from serving as a statutory member of a citizens' supervisory commission of the personnel board of the county of his residence).
100. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972).
101. See supra notes 3-30 and accompanying text.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

tions."l 0 2 Arguably, the only explicit limitation imposed on judicial expression by Canon 4 relates to private consultation as discussed in
Canon 4(B). Beyond that, the boundaries of a judge's expressional activities should be essentially self-imposed and defined by the interplay of
the basic principles ofjudicial ethics 10 3 and the scope of "quasi-judicial"
activities and "law, legal system, and the administration ofjustice"10 4 as
determined by the individual judge. As such, the field of acceptable expression should be treated as a flexible concept which can keep pace
with the ever changing and evolving role of law in public policy. In the
final analysis, a strong presumption of propriety should attach to the
views
expressional choices made by the judiciary and to their personal
10 5
regarding their duties as lawyers, jurists, and public servants.
Canon Five -

2.

Extra-Judicial Activities

Although the bulk of guidance regarding judicial expression is
found in Canon 4, it is important to examine the restrictions placed on
extra-judicial activity by Canon 5 and the restrictions placed on political
participation by Canon 7 in order to refine the central issue of this
article.
Canon 5 admonishes: "Ajudge Should Regulate His Extra-Judicial
10 6
Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with His Judicial Duties."'
The drafting committee intentionally chose not to require a stricter duty
because under such a higher standard, "[t]he only way ...a judge can
avoid conflict is not to engage in extra-judicial activities.' 1 7 In addition, the Committee recognized that "[c]omplete separation of a judge
from extra-judicial activities is neither possible nor wise; he should not
become isolated from the society in which he lives."' 0 8
The implied thrust of Canon 5 is that if the questioned activity is an
extra-judicial activity, as opposed to a judicial or quasi-judicial activity, a
judge should avoid participation if the activity would raise questions regarding his impartiality or otherwise conflict with his judicial duties by
taking excessive time away from the business ofjudging.°0 Although a
102. E.
103.

THODE,

supra note 50, at 77.

See supra notes 49-81 and accompanying text.

104. E. THODE supra note 50, at 75.
105.

A full discussion of the first amendment rights of judges is beyond the scope of

this article. Even so, it is obvious that, by accepting their position, judges must give up
certain rights of expression held by the general public. See Lubet, supra note 75, at 998-99.
As a matter of wise policy, however, when considering the limitation of expressional rights
granted to a given group, we must be careful to avoid relying on the "worst case" scenario
and the perception of false conflicts. Thus, as to judicial expression, it is probably better
to err on the side of permissiveness, with comfort in the belief that what few problems

actually arise can be corrected by collateral attack and appellate review. By focusing only
on actual injuries instead of illusory slights to position and prestige, the range of judicial
thought and expression available to the public is greatly expanded and can certainly contribute to the maturation of our understanding and appreciation of law and judicial
responsibilities.
106. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5 (emphasis added).
107.
108.

E. THOnE, supra note 50, at 78.
CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5(A), Commentary.

109. However, as one judge has observed:
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definition of "extra-judicial activity" is not provided, the canon regulates a wide range of business and family relationships. Most importantly for the purposes at hand, Canon 5(A) provides that a judge "may
write, lecture, teach, and speak on non-legal subjects. '1 1° Unfortunately, when considered in conjunction with Canon 4, it appears that
judges are merely allowed to lecture on non-legal subjects, while they are
encouraged to lecture on legal subjects. Since the non-legal topics of history, economics, political science, sociology, and the physical sciences
are inextricably intertwined with traditional black letter law, judges
should be encouraged to lecture, teach, and speak on non-legal subjects
as well.
The limits on civic and charitable activities found in Canon 5(B),'''
on the other hand, bear some defensible relationship to the real world in
accordance with the overall purpose of Canon 5. The major focus of
Canon 5(B) is to limit judicial participation in organizations, thereby decreasing the chance that a judge will need to be disqualified from hearing a case. 1 12 For example, the Code accurately recognizes that "[t]he
changing nature of some organizations and of their relationship to the
law makes it necessary for a judge regularly to reexamine the activities of
each organization with which he is affiliated to determine if it is proper
for him to continue his relationship with it.''

3

The purpose of this

advice is to help a judge determine whether a given organization is one
that is likely to "be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come
before him or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any
court."'1 4 For example, it has been determined that it is inappropriate
for a judge to participate in groups such as the Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith, the Sierra Club, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 115 and Mothers Against Drunk DrivFor an appellate judge, we know exactly what it is we must do before we can
turn outside our chambers. The trial judge also knows which undecided motions
and pending decisions have priority. The backlog of untried cases is a different
matter. If a trial judge were forbidden to do anything outside the chambers until
there were no cases awaiting trial, we would never see a trial judge outside of the
chambers of courtroom. The well-being of the trial judge requires that a limit be
placed upon the number of days confinement to the courtroom itself.
Reavley, supra note 6, at 56.
110. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5(A) (emphasis added).
111. Id. at Canon 5(B) reads in part:
Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic and charitable
activities that do not reflect adversely upon his impartiality or interfere with the
performance of his judicial duties. A judge may serve as an officer, director,
trustee, or non-legal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or
civic organization not conducted for the economic or political advantage of its
members, subject to the following limitations:
(1)A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be engaged in proceedings that ordinarily come before him or will be regularly
engaged in adversary proceedings in any court.
112. As stated in the Reporter's Notes to Canon 5(B), "[rlegular disqualification is too
high a price for the judicial system and the public to pay for allowing a judge to serve as an
officer or director of such an organization." E. THODE, supra note 50, at 79.
113. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 5(B)(1), Commentary.
114. Id. at Canon 5(B)(1).
115. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 40 (1975).
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ing.'16 However, within the context of Canon 5(B)(1), the degree of
participation that is considered sufficient to raise suspicion is where a
judge is identified as a leader or integral part of a given organization. In
particular, this section of the Code is "limited by its terms to service as
an officer, director, trustee or non-legal advisor."' 1 17 Thus, merely
speaking to such a group or participating in a program for the education
of its members should not be viewed as rising to the level where the
interests of the judge and the organization are seen as one." 8
3.

Canon Seven -

Political Activities

Finally, Canon 7 states: "A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity Inappropriate to His Judicial Office."' 19 Certainly, overt political
activity is inconsistent with the basic principle of judicial independence. 120 However, politics are also inherent in government and law
and, on the practical level, difficult to separate.' 2 ' The Code seeks to
address some of these problems, but in the process raises others. As
would be expected, Canon 7 states that a judge should not "hold any
office in a political organization" or "make speeches for a political organization or candidate or publicly endorse a candidate for public office."' 122 Such activities go to the heart of partisan politics and,
accordingly, the canon's restrictions are quite reasonable.
The canon also suggests that a judge should not "attend political
gatherings."' 123 At the same time, the canon explicitly allows ajudge to
engage in "political activity . . .on behalf of measures to improve the
law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.' 124 As the Reporter's Notes explain: "[t]he Committee, recognizing that such activities are political in a broad sense, approved them because of the
important and sometimes essential role of judges in legal reform."' 1 25

As applied to judicial expression, these two provisions seem to present a
116. See Lubet, supra note 75, at 984 n.l 1,997-1007.
117. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Advisory Op. 40 (1975).
118. It should be noted that "[a] judge may receive compensation and reimbursement
of expenses for the quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code."
CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 6. However, such income should be reported as required by
the rules of the particular jurisdiction.
119. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 7.
120. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. The evils present in this type of
expression are the soiling of the judiciary's appearance as a nonpartisan body and the
potential for conflict of interest should a supported or opposed elected official later appear
in an official capacity as a party to a lawsuit. It should be noted that Canon 7 does provide
a separate set of standards for judges who are subject to partisan election or retention
election. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 7(B).
121. See Dalton, supra note 65, at 1721-22.
122. CODE, supra note 3, at Canon 7(A)(1)(a)-(b). This section of the Code was the
subject of recent controversy. In April 1986, Justice O'Connor addressed 38 Republican
party donors and officers as part of a Washington tour designed to encourage party donations. It was unclear whether Justice O'Connor was aware of the group's political nature.
She subsequently withdrew from similar speaking appearances. Lowy,Justice's talk may have
violated ethics, Rocky Mtn. News, May 2, 1987, at 8, col.l.
123. Id.at Canon 7(A)(l)(c).
124. Id. at Canon 7(A)(4).
125. E. THODE, supra note 50, at 97.
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fundamental inconsistency. How can ajudge use the political process to
achieve legal reform if he cannot attend political gatherings? In order to
reconcile this conflict, it is necessary to limit the scope of the restriction
by looking to the overall purpose of Canon 7. If the purpose is to prevent both the appearance of impropriety and the erosion of judicial independence that can result from participation in party politics, then the
limitations of Canon 7 must be read to only restrict the type of attendance at political gatherings which gives the impression that the judge is
an active member of the party.1 26 As such, as long as a judge's relationship with a given political organization is solely limited to speaking to its
members about legal issues and legal reform, his attendance at the political gathering could not reasonably be seen as joining as a soldier in the
causes of the party.
IV.

GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL EXPRESSION UNDER THE CODE

In sum, a reading of the Code well within the intention of the drafters provides a great deal of freedom for judicial expression. The major
problem in determining the allowable scope of expression centers
around the organization of the Code which seeks to establish categorical
distinctions. Because of the nebulous nature of the concept of "judicial
expression," the canons tend to overlap, thereby rendering any attempt
to determine the propriety of a specific type of expression both frustrating and confusing. In such cases, the distinctions between judicial activities, quasi-judicial activities, extra-judicial activities, and political
participation become blurred and provide only limited guidance.
Therefore, this section attempts to establish guidelines for judicial expression based upon a synthesis of the Code and supporting materials.
As such, it is intended to provide direction to the judge who wishes to
contribute to society in ways which go beyond his official duties.
A.

FoundationalPrinciples

Certainly, the foundational principles ofjudicial ethics regarding independence, impartiality, and the avoidance of impropriety, must rest at
the base of every decision regarding judicial expression. These principles, however, tend to be applied in a negative manner which only discourages judicial expression. Therefore, it is important to identify other
foundational principles which weigh on the side of encouraging judicial
expression. Dean McKay has suggested that the propriety of nonjudicial
activities can be subjected to a risk/benefit analysis:
Nonjudicial activities, whether quasi-judicial or extra-judi126. Here, it is necessary to draw a distinction between politically active groups such as
the League of Women Voters and more traditional political parties. Certainly, the former
were not intended to be covered by Canon 7 since it is essentially bipartisan in nature and
dedicated to the improvement of the political system. Likewise, special interest groups,
such as the Sierra Club, should fall outside of the Canon. Their political interests are
based on achieving a particular goal and not, necessarily, on the perpetuation of a given
party.
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cial in nature, should not be allowed if there is a substantiallikelihood that the undertaking will
I. [sic] interfere with the performance of official duty;
2. interfere, or seem to interfere with the impartiality of
the participating judge; or
3. impair the dignity and prestige of the judicial office.
Where these hazards are not involved, there are reasons to permit, even to encourage, nonjudicial activities if their performance will
I. [sic] help to prevent judicial shortsightedness arising
from loss of contact with the world outside the court;
2. continue the education and development of essential
skills in law and judicial administration; or
3. enrich and educate the audiences to which the judge
lectures, writes, or teaches. 127
This formulation provides a convenient starting place for a judge seeking guidance regarding judicial expression. However, any determination regarding the existence of one of the above-enumerated risks
should be based on a finding of a real and substantial threat. The identification of such risks should be specific to the particular circumstance
and should not be relied upon as an easy way to avoid controversy or
criticism. In making this determination, a judge should be mindful that
most perceived conflicts are actually false and do not carry a real risk of
harm to the basic principles underlying the Code. Thus, a rebuttable
presumption of propriety should attach to virtually all forms ofjudicial
expression.
B.

Speaking, Writing, Lecturing, and Teaching

In light of the Code's foundational principles, a judge should be
encouraged to speak, write, lecture, and teach on any subject which
bears an arguable relationship to law, the legal system, or the administration ofjustice. In light of the interdisciplinary nature of law and the
subjects it encompasses, the above admonishment should be broadly interpreted. In addition, no distinction should be drawn as to the type of
audience a judge seeks to address, whether it be the annual convention
of the American Bar Association or the monthly meeting of the "F"
Street Garden Club.
While speaking to virtually any organization should be allowed and
encouraged, a judge must ensure that his appearance before that organization does not give the impression that he is an active member or a
soldier in its causes. This restriction is particularly important in regard
to organizations which are political in nature and seek to publicly advocate their positions. Therefore, in order to avoid the appearance ofjoining such political organizations, a judge should be allowed to participate
as a speaker but should make efforts to maintain his public appearance
of impartiality by avoiding activities such as buying tickets, paying mem127.

McKay, supra note 42, at 19-20 (emphasis added).
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bership fees, attending meetings where he is not speaking, or appearing
in pictures for publication.
Finally, the only hard and fast restriction ofjudicial expression is in
the context of proceedings before the particular judge. A judge should
limit his comments regarding pending cases to explanations of court
procedures and a careful statement of official rulings. This does not
mean that a judge may not answer public charges and criticism regarding his handling of a given matter when the fault, if any, lies with another branch of government, such as where the District Attorney refused
to prosecute or the legislature passed an obviously unconstitutional, yet
popular law. Once a matter has reached final disposition, a judge
should be free to comment on the case for the general enlightenment of
the public and to assure the participants that their arguments were
heard and justice was done.
C. Judicial Expression With Other Governmental Branches
Ajudge should be encouraged to make his experience and expertise
available to the legislative and executive branches for the improvement
of the law, the legal system, and the administration ofjustice. Except for
matters dealing with judicial administration, such contacts should be
made in a public forum because the restrictions on private consultation
in Canon 4(B) are well founded. Public trust in the belief that what a
judge has to say about government will be said in public will go far to
eliminate suspicions of private lobbying or informal advisory opinions.
D.

OrganizationalParticipation

A judge should be encouraged to participate in public or private
organizations devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system,
or the administration of justice. No distinction should be drawn as to
whether the given organization is primarily concerned with "law" or
"policy." Because public policy rests at the heart of the law and often
carries the force of law, attempts to distinguish the two concepts are
generally fruitless. In addition, considering that in our modern society a
judge is often both jurist and policymaker, his experience and insight
can be beneficial to this more expansive view of public action.
In addition, a judge should be encouraged to participate in a wide
range of civic and social organizations completely unrelated to law. People, not abstract concepts, are the subject of the law and a growing understanding of human nature will further enlighten a judge and
contribute to the fulfillment of his judicial duties. Also, a judge should
be encouraged to participate in both "legal" and "nonlegal" educational activities. As such, he should be allowed to accept scholarships
and fellowships. Certainly, he should avoid the gross use of his participation in order to further the enterprise, however, a judge's participation will certainly draw interest to an educational event. Thus, some
promotional use of his prestige cannot be avoided.
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Finally, while a judge should be encouraged to participate in organizational activities, he should avoid participating in organizations actively involved in litigation or which take public political positions which
might give the impression that the judge is contributing to those causes
as a member or a leader.
V.

CONCLUSION:

THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL EXPRESSION

It clearly can be argued that, as a public servant, a judge has a duty
to help educate the public. As Judge Irving Kaufman stated: "The
message is clear: Judges may not merely express their views on matters
within theirjudicial province, but have an obligation to do so in the public interest."' 128 Generally, judges have a wealth of experience with the
law. They have the opportunity to observe its theoretical and practical
application and to analyze its strong and weak points. In addition, at
least in theory, judges are in the position to view the law from an objective and impartial point of view. Of all public officials, judges may be the
best qualified to perform the task of public education.1 29
Like most personal choices, a judge's decision regarding public judicial expression will, undoubtedly, involve a wide variety of official and
unofficial factors. However, if they are willing, judges are capable in taking the lead in the legal maturation of the public. Because of the public
respect they already hold, their participation in this educational process
has the potential to create a more enlightened public and to further the
democratic ideal of self-governance. In order to achieve these goals,
however, judges must be willing to accept a degree of criticism. They
must realize that a controversial issue will be no less controversial because they remain silent but, instead, will only be addressed at a more
emotional and superficial level because of their failure to participate and
educate. Judges must be strong and trust in the axiom that more
speech, not less, is the proper way to deal with a public controversy.
They should be willing to address groups affected by their decisions in
order to help assure the losers that their arguments were heard and that
justice was done. Although there will be many who will not react favorably to such judicial activities, the chances are that, in the long run, demonstrations of actual openness and fairness will only increase public
respect for the judiciary.

128. Kaufman, supra note 77.
129. See Rifkind, The Public Concern in aJudges Privale Life, 19 -'HE UNI'ERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS 25, 33 (1964)(a judge can interject
rationality into, and raise the level of,an otherwise irrational public debate); Tucker, supra
note 10 (a judge's public expression can lead to a more enlightened electorate, incite more
public debate, and enhance the qiuality of future decisions): Kaufman, supra note 77 (a
judge's advice could be invaluable in the writing and passing of better laws).
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PEREMPTORY

CHALLENGES REDEFINED
I.

INTRODUCTION

Racial discrimination in the selection of representative juries' is an
issue that has plagued the courts for over one hundred years. Each step
2
3
Attack
of the jury selection process has been examined and litigated.
on the racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges, however, has afforded little relief.4 Consequently, prosecutorial exercise of

peremptory challenges to remove non-white members of the panel often
purposefully results in the selection of an all-white jury to determine the
guilt or innocence of a non-white defendant. 5 This practice finally
prompted the Supreme Court, in Batson v. Kentucky, 6 to attempt to create
a valid curb on the racial abuse of the use of peremptory challenges.
This article first examines the history of the peremptory challenge,
including discussions of the development of both the equal protection/due process analysis 7 and the sixth amendment/fair cross-section
1. The term "representative jury" indicates that the prospective jurors were summoned in accordance with a racially neutral process. See Note, Peremptory Challenge - Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157, 159-60 (1967)
[hereinafter Peremptory Challenges - Systematic Exclusion](racial neutrality in the jury selection
process). Other meanings, however, are given to the term "representative jury;" see, e.g.,
Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning ofJury Representation, 89 YALE LJ. 1177 (1980),
(equating a representative jury with a petit jury chosen from an array that contains a representative cross-section of the community); see also infra notes 61-111 and accompanying
text.
2. The jury selection process includes several stages.
First, a list of eligible jurors is compiled by means of voter registration lists, directories, a key-man system, or similar methods. From that pool, a venire is randomly selected for service during a particular court term. After excuses for
hardship, health, or similar reasons, the venire is examined and challenges are
made. The petit jury is selected from those jurors who remain.
Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Mn. L. REV. 337, 339 n. ll (1982).
3. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 400 U.S. 316 (1942); Carter
v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900) (challenges to discriminatory selection procedures in
grand jury selection); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545 (1967); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880) (challenges to discriminatory procedures in selecting the jury venire);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Patton v.
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1881); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (challenges to discriminatory
procedures in selection of the petit jury).
4. Swain v. Alabama was the first case in which the United States Supreme Court
examined a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Since that 1964
decision, few defendants have been successful in challenging discriminatory procedures in
selecting the jury panel. See infra notes 34-36 and 87-111 and accompanying text.
5. See Doyel, In Search of a Remedy for the Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 385 (1985).
6. 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).
7. See infra notes 21-60 and accompanying text.
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doctrine. 8 Next, it explores the Court's most recent decision in this
area, Batson v. Kentucky. The article concludes by comparing some implications of the Batson decision with the sixth amendment approach to
challenging unfair jury selection procedures.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

History of the Peremptory Challenge

Prior to The Ordinance for Inquests 9 enacted in 1305, the prosecutor had a right in all felony trials to challenge any number ofjurors without cause. The defendant was allowed thirty-five peremptory
challenges. 10 As a result of the Ordinance for Inquests, the king could
challenge no jurors without assigning a cause certain to be tried and
approved by the court. II Yet the prosecution was not required to assign
cause unless, after standing the jurors aside, 12 there remained a deficiency in the number ofjurors required. This system became the settled
law in England. 13
Since peremptory challenges by the king were abolished in 1305,
today's peremptory challenges by the state are not part of the common
law as adopted from England, but rather are statutorily created. In
1856, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's right
to stand jurors aside was not part of the adopted common law, and
therefore was applicable in federal courts only if the state in which a
federal court sat extended that right to jurors. 14 The defendant's right
to peremptory challenges in federal cases was codified in 179015 and
was finally extended to all federal prosecutors in 1865.16
Although there is no constitutional right requiring Congress to
grant peremptory challenges to the defendant, 17 the peremptory challenge has been considered "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused." 1 8 It provides a way to eliminate those
prospective jurors who the lawyer intuitively believes, but cannot prove,
will be less than impartial.' 9 Thus, while the peremptory challenge itself
8. See infra notes 61-111 and accompanying text.
9. 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305).
10. Peremptory Challenges - Systematic Exclusion, supra note 1, at 158 (citing I E. COKE, A

COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON, 156(b) (1st Amer. ed. 1853)).
11.

33 Edw. 1,Stat. 4 (1305). The defendant retained the privilege of the peremptory

challenge to be used for protection against jurors who appeared to be prejudiced against
him and to allow the defendant to remove a juror whom he had offended by an unsuccessful challenge for cause. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
346-47 (1st ed. 1769).

12. "Standing aside" allowed the prosecution to direct any juror, after voir dire examination, to stand aside until the entire panel had been examined and the defendant had
exercised his challenges.
13.
14.

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213 n.12 (1965).
United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. 588, 590 (1856).

15. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119.
16. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500.
17.

Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).

18. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
19. See generally, Younger, Unlauful Peremptory Challenges, 7 LITIGATION 23 (1980) (dis-
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has not been the subject of attack, its discriminatory use to remove prospective jurors on a racial basis has been challenged often over the past
century. 20 The question raised is whether there has been a denial of
constitutional rights by the exclusion of jurors on a racial basis. The
constitutional rights in question are the defendant's fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection of the laws and his sixth amendment
right to trial by an impartial jury.
B.

Development of the Equal Protection Analysis

In 1875, Congress enacted a statute making it a crime to exclude
21
any qualified citizen from a grand or petit jury on the basis of race.
The Supreme Court upheld the statute on the grounds that such exclusion would violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 2 In Strauder v. West Virginia,23 the Supreme Court invalidated a
West Virginia statute which prohibited blacks from serving as jurors.
Basing its decision on the Constitution, the Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment makes no attempt to enumerate the rights it is designed to protect. It speaks in general
terms, and those are as comprehensive as possible. Its language is prohibitory; but every prohibition implies the existence of rights and immunities, prominent among which is an
immunity from inequality of legal protection, either for life, liberty, or property. Any state action that denies this 2immunity
to
4
a colored man is in conflict with the Constitution.
Twenty years later, the Court elaborated on this principle of prohibited
25
state action in Carter v. Texas:
Whenever by any action of a State, whether through its
legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or administrative officers, all persons of the African race are excluded, solely because of their race or color, from serving as
grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of the African race, the equal protection of the laws is denied to him, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
26
United States.
cussing the desirability of preserving challenges and approaching reform of the jury selection process with caution).
20. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12
N.W.2d 466 (1943), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 749 (1944); Whitney v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. App.
197, 63 S.W. 879 (1901).
21. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336.
22. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
23. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Strauder did not address whether blacks could be excluded
from the jury through peremptory challenges, because no blacks had ever been summoned
to serve on the venire to be challenged. Id. at 310.
24. Id. The protection of Strauder was extended to Mexican-Americans in Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
25. 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
26. Id. at 447 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880); and Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896)). In Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935), the Supreme Court described this paragraph as
"[slumming up precisely the effect of earlier decisions."

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

In Strauder, the Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment
does not require a jury composed in whole or part of persons of the
defendant's race. 2 7 A mixed jury in a particular case is not essential to
the equal protection of the laws, 28 but equal protection does guarantee
members are summoned purthat a defendant be tried by a jury whose
29
suant to nondiscriminatory criteria.
The core of the equal protection notion was later defined as the
idea that jurors "should be selected as individuals, on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as members of a race." 30 The fact that jury
competence is an individual matter, rather than a group matter, was felt
to be a cornerstone of the jury system. "To disregard [this principle] is
to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury."'
In Swain v. Alabama,32 a black defendant used an equal protection
analysis to challenge a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges
to obtain an all-white jury. Swain is the only United States Supreme
Court decision other than Batson v. Kentucky to address directly the constitutional validity of the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. A much criticized decision, 33 Swain has resulted in the
to a prosecuelimination of all but two 3 4 equal protection challenges
35
tor's alleged discriminatory use of peremptories.
Robert Swain, a black man, was indicted, convicted of rape and sentenced to death by an all-white jury. Eight blacks were summoned to the
venire, two were exempt and six were peremptorily struck by the prosecutor. No black had served on any other petit jury since approximately
1950.36 Discussing the function of the peremptory challenge, the Court
noted that its use not only eliminated extremes of partiality, but assured
that jurors would decide the case on the basis of the evidence placed
before them. 37 In upholding the right to unqualified peremptories for
both the defendant and the prosecutor, the Court stated "that the sys27.
28.
29.
(1880).
30.
31.
32.

Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 335 (1880).
See Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906); Ex ParteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950).
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
380 U.S. 202 (1965).

33. See, e.g.,J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT
To REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977); Imlay, FederalJuryReformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 247, 269-70 (1973); Winick, ProsecutorialPeremptory Challenge Practices inCapital Cases: An EmpiricalStudy and a ConstitutionalAnalysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10-1 I
(1982); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE
L.J. 1715, 1723-24 & n.36 (1977); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprintfor
the Perpetuation of the All-W1'hite Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1160-75 (1966).
34. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d
751 (La. 1979).
35. "[T~he individual defendant is unlikely to have either the time or the resources to
compile and analyze the raw data necessary to [make] a statistical attack on the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges." United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1317 (8th
Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
36. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
37. Id. at 219.
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tem should guarantee 'not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between
him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.' "38
The Court in Swain differentiated "challenges for cause," as those
defined on a specified basis, from peremptory challenges, those challenges exercised "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without
being subject to the court's control."'3 9 In exercising a peremptory challenge, the attorney does not decide "whether a juror of a particular race
or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is
less likely to be." 40 Under Swain, therefore, jurors could be excused on
the basis of their group affiliation, including race, religion, and
4
nationality. '
The Swain Court held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a particular case is immune from constitutional inquiry based
on the equal protection clause. 4 2 The opinion suggested, however, that
statistical evidence establishing a pattern of racial bias by a prosecutor in
a particular jurisdiction, in case after case, regardless of the circumstances or severity of the crime, may provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie fourteenth amendment case. 43 Swain foreclosed an
equal protection attack on a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
in a single case and erected an insurmountable burden on the defendant
to establish the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges
44
against blacks over time.

The difficulty of overcoming the Swain burden of proof is the result
of a combination of many factors. There are no records regarding the
race of members of the venire, the nature of the challenges, whether
45
peremptory or for cause, or the party making a particular challenge.
Indigent defendants cannot bear the costs of investigation and data development 4 6 and, since the abuse of peremptory challenges does not
appear until the trial begins, little time is afforded to conduct an investigation. 4 7 This departure from basic equal protection ideas prompted
48
Justice Marshall's campaign for the reconsideration of Swain.
38. Id. at 220 (quoting Haves v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
39. Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386, 202 P.2d 1037 (1949); Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).
40. Id. at 220-21 (footnote omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 221-22.
43. Id. at 223. Labeling this burden of proof "Mission Impossible," the Second Circuit noted that almost no other defendant in two decades had successfully met this standard of proof. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986).
44. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.
45. Doyel, supra note 5, at 405.
46. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 263, 583 P.2d 748, 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
893 (1978).
47. Id.
48. See Harris v. Texas, 467 U.S. 1261 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Williams v. Illinois, 466 U.S. 981 (1984) (MarshallJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963-70 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting
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Further Development of the Equal Protection Analysis as Applied to Jury
Venires

Since Swain, the Court has fully articulated the components of a
prima facie case for an equal protection challenge to a discriminatory
selection of the venire. 49 Justice Blackmun initially set forth these standards in Castaneda v. Partida.50 The first step is to demonstrate that the
excluded group is one that is "a recognizable, distinct class, singled out
51
Second, the defendant 5 2
for different treatment under the laws."
53
must establish that the group is substantially underrepresented.
The essential purpose of the equal protection clause is to prevent
governmental discrimination on the basis of race. 54 But the equal protection clause requires that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 55 Therefore, underrepresentation alone is not enough
to establish a violation of the equal protection clause. Discriminatory
intent is also required. 56 Intent may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances in a series of cases or in a single case and may include
proof of disproportionate impact 5 7 coupled with evidence that the venire was selected under a system providing an opportunity for discrimination. 58 Once a prima facie case of discrimination is presented by the
defendant, "the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by demonstrating that permissible
racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the
monochromatic result."' 5 9 The development of the equal protection
analysis has expanded its application to discrimination in each phase of
the jury selection process - the selection of grand juries, jury venires,
and finally to the selection of an individual petit jury.
D.

Development of the Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-Section Analysis

Three years after Swain, in Duncan v. Louisiana,6 0 the Supreme Court
imposed upon the states the sixth amendment requirement ofjury trials
from denial of certiorari). See also Thompson v. United States, 469 U.S. 1024, 1024-27
(1984) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
49. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1721-23 (1986).
50. 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). Although Castaneda involved discrimination with regard
to grand juries, it is based on ajury venire case. See also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954).
51. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494.
52. As in any equal protection case, the burden is on the defendant "to prove the
existence of purposeful discrimination." Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967) (citing Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519, 520 (1903)).
53. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494. Under this rule of exclusion, once underrepresentation is shown, a presumption of discrimination arises. Id. at 493.
54. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
55. Id. at 240.
56. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493.
57. Wl'ashington, 426 U.S. at 266.
58. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. at 552.
59. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972).
60. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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in criminal cases. 6 1 Then, in Taylor v. Louisiana,6 2 the Court interpreted
the sixth amendment to require that the jury venire be selected from a
representative cross-section of the community. 6 3 A procedure granting
automatic jury service exemptions to women was invalidated in this case
because it fostered misrepresentation by providing jury venires com4
6
posed almost totally of men.

The foundation for the Taylor sixth amendment decision was laid in
a series of equal protection cases beginning nearly thirty-five years earlier with Smith v. Texas. 6 5 Reversing a black defendant's state conviction
based on a violation of the equal protection clause, the Smith Court
stated:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial discrimination to result
in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups
not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it
but is at war with our basic concepts
of a democratic society
66
and a representative government.
In Glasser v. United States,67 the Court entertained the question of
whether systematic exclusion from a federal jury venire of all women
who were not members of the League of Women Voters would violate
the sixth amendment. Although the Court rejected the defendants' argument on the ground of insufficient proof, it reaffirmed the requirement of a representative venire. 68

Extending the cross-section principle, the Court, in Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co.,69 reversed a civil judgment because the jury process had systematically excluded all daily wage earners. Although the guarantee of
an impartial jury did not require that each jury "contain representatives
of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical
groups of the community,"' 70 the Court held that it does require a venire
selected "without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these
7
groups." 1
Reaffirming Thiel in Ballardv. United States, 72 the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of two defendants because women had been intentionally and systematically excluded from the jury venire. Rejecting
the view that an all male venire summoned from various groups in the
73
community could be representative, the Ballard Court in an oft-quoted
61. Id. at 149.

62. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 528.
Id. at 527.
311 U.S. 128 (1940).
Id.at 130, quoted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 527.

67. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.at 86.
328 U.S. 217 (1945).
Id.at 220.
Id.

72. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
73. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 531-32; Booker v.Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 769
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paragraph stated:
[I]t is not enough to say that women when sitting as jurors
neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men likewise do not act as
a class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot, who would
claim that a jury was truly representative of the community if all
men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the
panel? The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay7 4of influence of one
on the other is among the imponderables.
The Court went on to say that the injury sustained from the systematic
and intentional exclusion of a group is not limited to the defendant but
extends "to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of
our courts."

75

In summarizing the collective teachings of the Supreme Court in
Glasser, Thiel and Ballard, the Sixth Circuit 76 recently recognized that
although these cases were decided prior to Duncan, and therefore prior
to the application of the sixth amendment to the states, their principles
have been adopted and developed by the Court's sixth amendment analysis. 7 7 These three cases demonstrate the use of the court systems' su-

pervisory powers to mitigate racial discrimination in the jury selection
process.
In Peters v. Kif,7 8 the United States Supreme Court considered a

white defendant's challenge to the systematic exclusion of blacks from
jury service. 79 Based on due process grounds, the Court rejected the
state's contention that because the defendant himself was not black he
was not harmed by the exclusion. Justice Marshall elaborated as follows:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is
excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.
It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its
exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events
(6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Michigan v. Booker, 106 S.Ct.

3289 (1986); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 756. See also Doyel, supra note 5, at 418-19.
74. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 195.
76. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub
nom. Michigan v. Booker, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986). The principles of these cases, as
presented in Booker are: an impartial jury is a product of methods that do not systematically
exclude members of a distinct group; competence is an individual characteristic; the violation lies in the exclusionary conduct or policy, not in a bias of a particular jury; and it is the
integrity of the system and the public's right to a representative jury that are impaired. Id.
at 769.
77. Id. at 769.
78. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
79. The Court was unable to entertain the sixth amendment challenge because
Destafano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) prohibited the Duncan decision from being applied retroactively.
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unsuspected importance in any case that may be
that may have
80
presented.
In reviewing the historical progression of the holdings of the series of
cases beginning with Smith, the Taylor cross-section rule explicitly provides that petit juries need not mirror the community, even though no
distinctive group may be systematically excluded from jury venires. 81
Refining the Taylor decision, Duren v. Missouri8 2 delineated the stan-

dards for proving a violation of the fair cross-section doctrine with respect to the venire:
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be
excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community; and (3) that this underexclusion of the group in
representation is due to systematic
83
the jury-selection process.
Discriminatory purpose or intent need not be demonstrated because it is the disproportionate representation itself which violates the
sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement. Once the defendant
makes a prima facie showing of underrepresentation, the state bears the
burden of showing that a significant state interest is promoted by the
underrepresentation.84
E.

State Court Development of the Sixth Amendment Analysis

The Taylor holding applied to the representativeness ofjury venires,
not the composition of the petit jury. Although some commentators
contend that the holding of Taylor should not be applied to limit distortion of the petit jury by peremptory challenges, 85 others argue that the
Court's reasoning compels the rule's extension. 86 Dissatisfied with the
barrier presented by Swain and tempted by the representative cross-section approach, some courts have been willing to reexamine the validity
of racially based peremptory challenges.
Circumventing the Swain hurdle, the California Supreme Court ex80. Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 (footnote omitted). Although Peters was based on due
process grounds, the Taylor Court cited Peters for the proposition that to present a claim, a

defendant need not be a member of the group excluded from jury service. Taylor, 419 U.S.
at 526.
81. 419 U.S. at 538.
82. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
83. Id. at 364.
84. Id. at 368.
85. See, e.g., Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality

and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337 (1982); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning
ofJury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177 (1980).
86. See, e.g., J. Van Dyke, supra note 34; Note, People v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenge
May Not Be Used to Remove Jurors Solely for Group Association, 58 N.C.L. REV. 152 (1979);
Comment, People v. Wheeler, Peremptory Challenges - A \ezw Interpretation, 14 NEw EN. L.
REV. 370 (1978).
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tended the Taylor holding in People v. Wheeler, 8 7 by allowing individual
defendants to challenge the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges
on a case-by-case basis. The court equated the requirement that venires
be representative of a cross-section of the community with the impartiality of a petit jury, 88 the theory being that impartiality is to be achieved
through the interaction of varying values and experiences that the jurors
bring from their respective groups. 89 To ensure this interaction, the use
of peremptory challenges to eliminate specific bias was held permissible,
but the court felt that elimination of bias based solely upon group affiliation would thwart the primary purpose of the representative cross-section requirement. 90
Relying on its state's Declaration of Rights, the Massachusetts court
in Commonwealth v. Soares 9 ' followed much the same reasoning as the
Wheeler court. The Soares court adopted the mechanics developed in
Wheeler to enforce the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury. To
overcome a rebuttable presumption that the peremptories were exercised constitutionally, the Court stated, the challenging party must show
"that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group," coupled with a "strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged
because of their group association."-9 2 Unlike Wheeler, Soares identified
93
those "discrete groups" which cannot be discriminated against.
Before the 1978 Wheeler decision, state courts were unanimous in
following the Swain principle. 9 4 Though Swain remains the overwhelming majority rule among the states,9 5 at least five states9 6 and two federal circuit courts of appeals 97 have recognized alternatives to Swain.
These cases relied at least in part on a representative cross-section analysis under the sixth amendment to guarantee trial by an impartial jury.
87. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). The
court evaded the conflict with federal law by independently basing its decision on the California Constitution.
88. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03.
89. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
90. Id. at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
91. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1986).
92. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
93. Soares, 377 Mass. at 461, 387 N.E.2d at 516. Relying on the Massachusetts equal
rights amendment, MASS. CONST. art. 1, § 102 (amended 1976), the court limited application of the new rule to groups identified on the basis of sex, race, color, creed or national
origin.
94. See Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude from Jury Persons Belonging to a
Class or Race, 79 A.L.R. 3d 14, 19 (1977).
95. United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 551 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted andjudgment
vacated, 107 S.Ct. 1267 (1987).
96. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); State
v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d
499 (1979); State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389, 489 A.2d 1175 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1985); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980).
97. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted andjudgment vacated sub
nom. Michigan v. Booker, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986).
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Sixth Amendment Analysis as Applied in the Federal Courts

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit to find a
sixth amendment alternative to the Swain approach. In McCray v.
Abrans,9 8 the court of appeals objectionably followed the equal protection holding of Swain, but found that the Swain decision did not foreclose a claim brought under the sixth amendment. 99
The court held that each defendant is to have the right to trial by an
impartial jury, which requires each case to be decided on the practices
complained of in that very case.10 0 Adapting the Duren standard to show
0
a prima facie violation with regard to the venire,' lthe
Second Circuit
provided the following test to be applied to the petit jury:
[T]he defendant must show that in his case, (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a cognizable group in the community,
and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the challenges leading to this exclusion have been made on the basis of the individual venireperson group affiliation rather than because of any
indication of a possible inability to decide the case on the basis
02
of the evidence presented.'
The first step is virtually the same as in Duren, exchanging the term
"distinctive group" for "cognizable group," although no explanation or
definition for the term "cognizable group" was provided. Duren's second step, showing that underrepresentation in the venire was unreasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community,' 0 3 was
omitted altogether. Since disproportionate underrepresentation is the
crux of the fair cross-section rationale, it is puzzling that the Second
Circuit failed to incorporate this step into its test. 10 4 The second factor
of the McCray approach resembles the fourteenth amendment analysis
more than Duren's sixth amendment "systematic exclusion"' 1 5 requirement.10 6 Another parallel to the equal protection principle is that once
the burden shifts to the prosecution to rebut the defendant's prima facie
case, the state must show that "permissible racially neutral selection cri10 7
teria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result."'
10 8
This wording was taken directly from equal protection cases.
In Booker v. Jabe,10 9 the Sixth Circuit adopted the McCray test for
establishing a prima facie case without questioning its similarity to the
98. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 1124.
100. Id. at 1130-31.
101. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
102. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1131-32.
103. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
104. Doyel, supra note 5, at 429.
105. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
106. Doyel, supra note 5, at 430.
107. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1132 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977),
(quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (quoting Alexander v. Lousiana,
405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972))).
108. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1132. For further discussion see Doyel, supra note 5, at 42935.

109. 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985).
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fourteenth amendment cases. 1 0 The court, however, did require that
the challenging party show a "systematic" abuse of peremptory challenges before the burden would shift to the opposing party.' I1 The
sixth amendment challenge may be asserted successfully by either prosecutor or defense counsel when an unjustifiable systematic exclusion
occurs. 1 12
III.

A.

BATSON V. KENTUCKY

Facts

James Kirkland Batson, a black man, was tried and convicted by a
Kentucky jury of second degree burglary" 13 and receipt of stolen property. 114 At trial, a jury venire was presented and the judge conducted
voir dire examination. 115 After voir dire had been completed and jurors
were excused for cause, the parties exercised their peremptory challenges."16 Although the venire included four blacks, the prosecutor
used four of his six peremptory challenges 1 7 to produce an all-white
petit jury. Batson timely objected to the state's challenges, moved to
discharge the panel and later objected to the swearing of the jury. Citing the sixth and fourteenth amendments, he contended that his rights
to an impartial trial by a cross-section of the community and equal protection of the laws had been violated. The trial court overruled Batson's
objections, reasoning that the actual composition of the petit jury is not
subject to the fair cross-section rule.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges had deprived him of a jury drawn from a fair crosssection of the community. He conceded that Swain v. Alabama foreclosed an equal protection claim based on the use of peremptories in a
single case and urged the court to depart from Swain and to hold that his
sixth amendment rights had been violated. 1 18 He also asserted that the
prosecutor's challenge of all the black veniremen indicated that the challenges had been exercised solely on the basis of race, establishing an
110. Id. at 773.
111. Id. Both WcCray and Booker have been vacated and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Batson and Allen. See infra note 140. After consideration of Batson and Allen, the

Sixth Circuit reinstated its previous opinion of judgment in Booker v. Jabe, 801 F.2d 871
(6th Cir. 1986).
112. 775 F.2d at 772.
113. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1715 (1986).
114. Id.
115. Id. The trial court may conduct voir dire examination itself or allow counsel to so
do. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.38 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986-87).
116. Each side is given a list of the qualified jurors equal to the number ofjurors to be
seated plus the total number of peremptory challenges allowed to all parties. Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9.36, 9.40 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986-87).
117. In felony trials the prosecutor is allowed five peremptories plus one extra if an
alternate is chosen, and the defense is permitted eight plus the one extra. Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9.40 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986-87).
118. Batson urged the adoption of the decisions in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978) and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461,
387 N.E. 2d 499 (1979).
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equal protection claim under Swain. The Supreme Court of Kentucky
rejected his jury discrimination claim and affirmed the petitioner's conviction, declining to depart from the Swain rule.' 19
B.

The Supreme Court Opinion

The Court began its analysis of the defendant's equal protection
claim' 2 0 by reiterating the principles announced over one hundred
years ago in Strauder v. West Virginia.' 2 1 Emphasizing that the Strauder
principles never have been questioned, the Court explained it was the
application of those principles to particular facts that compelled repeated review.1 22 Looming in these cases is the question of whether the
defendant has sustained his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 123 The Court provided a thorough discussion of Swain 124 and reaffirmed Swain's contention that a "State's purposeful or deliberate
denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the
administration ofjustice violates the Equal Protection Clause."'1 2 5
Describing the Swain burden as "crippling," the Court observed
that the states' use of peremptory challenges is largely protected from
constitutional review. 12 6 The Court then delineated its reasons for rejecting the evidentiary standards required by Swain to establish a prima
facie equal protection violation. Drawing from its decisions following
Swain, the Court laid a foundation for extending the equal protection
analysis previously reserved for examining venire
selection
violations.127

The Court held that purposeful discrimination in petit jury selection may be established based solely on evidence concerning the state's
use of peremptories at the defendant's trial. 128 The following conditions were set forth as required elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination:

(1) "the defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group," ' 12 9 and "that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory chal119. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kentucky at 1,James Kirkland Batson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 84-SC-733-MR (Ky. Dec. 20, 1984).
120. Though Batson pressed his sixth amendment claim, the Court chose to overlook

that argument and review the case on equal protection grounds. See infra text accompanying notes 141-44.
121. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1716-19 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880)). See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 1719.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1719-21 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)). See supra notes 3349 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 1716 (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04).
126. Id. at 1720.
127. Id. at 1721-22. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 1722-23.
129. Id. at 1723 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1976)). Whether a
defendant not a member of the excluded group will be able to assert a fourteenth amendment challenge remains to be determined. See also Doyel, supra note 5, at 410. Cf Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (a white has standing to challenge the exclusion of blacks); and
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lenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race;"1 3 0
(2) "the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can
be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate;' "131
(3) "the defendant must show that these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to
3 2
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race."1
The Court required that the trial judge consider all relevant circumstances in determining whether the defendant had demonstrated a
prima facie case.' 33 Once the requisite showing is made, the burden
shifts to the prosecution to come forward with racially neutral reasons
for excluding non-white veniremen. 134 The Court did not require that
the explanation rise to the level of cause, but held that there must be an
articulable reason other than the assumption the juror will be biased due
35
to his racial affiliation.1
Because the trial court refused to make inquiry into the prosecutor's
reasons for his actions, the case was remanded for further proceedings.1 36 The Court directed that if racially neutral explanations could
13 7
not be articulated, the defendant's conviction should be reversed.
C.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

Justice White concurred with the majority, but elected to write separately to express his concern with allowing retroactive application of the
Court's decision. ' 38 Justice O'Connor,' 39 concurring, and ChiefJustice
Burger,
dissenting,
also
advocated
foreclosing
retroactive
application. 140
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1976) (requiring defendant to show substantial
underrepresentation of his race).
130. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The Court expressed no opinion whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptories by defense counsel. Id. at 1718
n.12.
131. Id. at 1723 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1725.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1726 (White, J., concurring). Justice White founded his argument on DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (holding that Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), could not be applied retroactively to trials beginning prior to the date of the
Duncan decision).
139. 106 S.Ct. at 1731 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
140. Id. at 1741 (Burger, J., concurring). A 1986 decision, Allen v. Hardy, 106 S.Ct.
2878 (1986) (per curiam) held that the Batson decision could not be applied retroactively
to collateral review of convictions that became final before the Batson opinion was announced. Final means "the judgment of the conviction was rendered, the availability of
appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed." Allen, 106 S.Ct. at
2880 n.l (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)). But see Griffith v.
Kentucky, 107 S.Ct. 708, 714 (1987), holding that Batson is to be applied retroactively to
all cases pending on direct review or not yet final at the time of the Batson decision. Griffith
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Justice Marshall, concurring, urged the total abolition of peremptory challenges. He opined that the Batson decision would not end racial
discrimination and that sacrificing the defendant's peremptory chal14 1
lenges would be a small price to pay to achieve the desired result.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, applauded the Court for
deciding the case on an equal protection ground. 14 2 In earlier decisions, 14 3 Justice Stevens had criticized the Court for entertaining argu144
ments not presented in a defendant's petition for certiorari.
Justifying his acceptance of the Batson decision, Justice Stevens distinguished it based on the appealing party's reliance on the equal protection issue.
In a weak dissent, ChiefJustice Burger offered historical support for
keeping the peremptory challenge intact and concluded that a pure
equal protection analysis has no application to peremptory challenges
exercised in any particular case.1 4 5 Dismissing Justice Stevens' explanation, Justice Burger reasoned that since the equal protection claim was
not pressed in either the Kentucky Supreme Court or in the petition to
grant certiorari, the Court had improperly entertained the equal protec46

tion issue. 1

Justice Rehnquist felt that the state's use of peremptories to exclude
minorities on the assumption they would be more likely to favor the defendant should be upheld. 147 He dissented from the Court's decision to
overrule this application of the peremptory challenge. He also argued
that the Court offered no support for its decision. 14 8 Justice Rehnquist
continued to rely on the reasoning of the Swain decision, and found that
49
the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case.1
overturned the Court's "clear break exception" described in United States v.Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 549-50 (1982), that disallowed retroactive application where a new rule is a
"clean break" with past precedent. 457 U.S. at 549-50.
141. 106 S.Ct. at 1728-29 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall was concerned
that the prosecutor can too easily justify his reason for exercising peremptory strikes.
142. Id. at 1729-30 (Stevens, J., and Brennan, J., concurring).
143. Colorado v. Connelly, 106 S.Ct. 785 (1986) (memorandum of Brennan, J., joined
by Stevens, J.), and New Jersey v. T.L.O, 468 U.S. 1214 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Although Supreme Court Rule 21. 1(a) requires that "[olnly questions set forth in
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court," SuP. CT. R.
21.1 (a), the Court has repeatedly heard cases without briefing or oral argument. See Colorado v. Connelly, 106 S.Ct. 785 (1986); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380. 386 n.3 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214 (1984), Justice Stevens,
dissenting, opined that the adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on
the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for
review." 468 U.S. at 1216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1734-41 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1731-34. Justice Burger suggested that when the Court granted certiorari it
could have at least directed the parties to address the equal protection issue or, following
oral argument, directed reargument on the particular question.
147. Id. at 1744-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1745 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS

"Challenges for cause obviously have to be explained; by definition,
peremptory challenges do not."' 150 In light of the Batson decision, the
peremptory challenge has been redefined. Never before has the Court
advocated inquiry into the prosecutor's basis for exercising a peremptory strike; but, never before has the Court offered a remedy to end racial discrimination in petit jury selection.
The Batson Court chose to ignore the defendant's sixth amendment
challenge and instead chose to reexamine a longstanding precedent' 5 1
that offered an unworkable and inadequate cure to racial discrimination
in jury selection procedures. 152 While Batson reaffirmed the principle
that a "State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of
race of participation as jurors in the administration ofjustice violates the
Equal Protection Clause," 1 53 the Court rejected Swain's difficult evidentiary standard regarding whether the defendant had met his burden of
proving intentional discrimination by the state. 154 Batson adopted new
standards, derived from an equal protection analysis, that now afford a
defendant the opportunity to establish purposeful discrimination in se15 5
lection of the petit jury by relying solely on the facts in his case.
Although ChiefJustice Burger claimed that an unadulterated equal protection analysis could not be applied to jury selection in a particular
case,1 5 6 the majority recognized that judicially created procedures must
57
give way if a constitutional provision so demands.1
The Court's standards for establishing a prima facie case were
adapted from the equal protection rationale as applied to jury
venires. 158 Previous decisions indicate that this test has practical appli150. Id. at 1739 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
151. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1964).
152. The defendant based his argument on the grounds that the prosecutor's conduct
violated his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community. The state, however, insisted that the defendant
was claiming a denial of equal protection, thereby urging the Court to base its finding on
Swain. The Court chose to ignore the defendant's argument and agreed with the state that
the defendant's claim was based on equal protection principles. The result was a reexamination of Swain and a side-stepping of the sixth amendment claim. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at
1716 n.4.
Justice Stevens applauded the Court for resolving the issue based on an equal protection analysis although the defendant failed to present an equal protection argument in his
brief. Justice Stevens justified the Court's decision on the grounds that the state had relied
on these grounds in defending the judgment. Id. at 1729-30 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger stated that review of an equal protection argument is improper because the defendant expressly declined to raise this issue both in the United State
Supreme Court and in the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Id. at 1731-34 (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
153. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1716 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04
(1965)).
154. Id. at 1720-21. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
155. Id. at 1722. See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 1737.
157. Id. at 1724.
158. See supra notes 50-84 and accompanying text.
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cability, 159 but its usefulness in the petit jury context will need to be
determined. The Court's focus on the elimination of racial discrimination limited the scope of the Batson holding and disposed of the problem
of defining what constitutes a "suspect" or "cognizable" group. 160 This
narrow approach avoids overtaxing the system and stops short of an
analysis which could lead to the demise of the peremptory challenge.
Borrowing from Castaneda v. Partida,1 6 1 the Court appeared to suggest that a defendant who is not a member of the excluded racial group
does not have standing to exert an equal protection challenge to discriminatoryjury selection procedures.1 6 2 Members of these groups undoubtedly form the vast majority of potential jurors who are excluded
for discriminatory reasons, yet arguably where a prosecutor discriminatorily exercises his peremptory challenges, non-member defendants are
entitled to protection as well.1 6 3 As noted in Batson, "the ultimate issue
is whether the state has discriminated in selecting the defendant's venire."164 Although Batson leaves open the question whether the defendant needs to be a member of the excluded group to raise an equal
protection challenge, it is clear that the sixth amendment cross-section
theory allows one not a member of the underrepresented class to assert
65

a claim. 1

In addition to limiting its focus to racial discrimination and limiting
standing by excluding non-member defendants, the Batson Court adopts
standards that make it more difficult for a defendant to prove a prima
facie case. Although the defendant is allowed to rely on the fact "that
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits
159. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The California courts have encountered few problems
in applying their version of inquiring into a prosecutor's reasons for exercising a strike.
See People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1983).
160. Although discrimination in any form has been a concern of the Court, the major
issue of the fourteenth amendment was to end governmental discrimination on account of
race. By focusing on racial discrimination alone, and avoiding discussion of sex, religion,
nationality or creed as a basis for challenging discrimination, the Court may have limited
the potential field of litigation.
161. 430 U.S. 482 (1976).
162. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 494); see United
States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 552-53 n.17 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[tlhe sixth amendment allows
one not a member of the underrepresented class to complain .... while this result is, or at
least was, less clear under the equal protection clause."). Compare Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 494 ("[t]he defendant must show ... substantial underrepresentation of his
race .... ) with Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (a white has standing to challenge the
exclusion of blacks). For a contrary analysis, see Comment, Batson v. Kentucky: Can the
"New" Peremptory Challenge Survive the Resurrection of Strauder v. West Virginia, 20 AKRON L.
REV. 355, 361-62 (1986) (Batson provides support for extending equal protection to areas
other than race).
163. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672
F.2d 1380 (11 th Cir. 1982) (male hispanic entitled to challenge exclusion of blacks and
women from serving as grand jury foreman).
164. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
165. Batson notes that discrimination harms not only the defendant, but also the excluded juror, and undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system. Id. at 1718.
If a non-member defendant is unable to challenge a discriminatory selection process, the
injury inflicted on the juror and the community is not addressed.
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Batson

requires a defendant to show that the facts and circumstances raise an
inference that the state has exercised its peremptory challenges to ex-

clude veniremen on account of their race.16 7 In contrast, a sixth amendment approach does not require a showing of discrimination because it
is the underrepresentation due to systematic exclusion of a group that is
the focus of a fair cross-section analysis. 168 In both approaches, once a
prima facie case is made out, the burden shifts to the state to come for1 69
ward with a neutral explanation for challenging the excluded jurors. 170
Such explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause.

The Court delineated the standards for assessing and rebutting a prima
facie case, however, it failed to provide procedures for the rule's implementation, relying on the state and federal trial courts to develop their
own.

17 1

The Court's silence as to the defendant's sixth amendment argument leaves unclear the question whether a sixth amendment challenge
to racially discriminatory use of peremptories is now foreclosed. Subsequently, however, the Court, resting on Batson, chose to vacate and remand for further consideration two cases 17 2 which challenged the Court
to accept the sixth amendment approach. If nothing else, the Court has
73
bided time before this issue will be settled. 1

166. Id. at 1723 (citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 82-84.
169. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (citing McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1132 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986) and Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d
762, 773 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted andjudgment vacatedsub noma. Michigan v. Booker, 106
S.Ct. 3289 (1986)). Although these two cases are sixth amendment cases, they borrowed
the facially neutral explanation criteria directly from an equal protection case, Castaneda
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). This prosecutor's burden is not as demanding as
Duren's rebuttal burden that the underrepresentation further a significant state interest.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369 (1979).
170. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. By inquiring into a prosecutor's reasons for exercising
his peremptory challenges, the Court presumes to provide a vehicle for eliminating discrimination in the jury selection process, yet it is doubtful that this alone can substantially
curb purposeful discrimination. It very likely will result in a more thoughtful and careful
voir dire by the prosecution, coupled with clever notetaking. It is hard to imagine that it
would be difficult to espouse racially neutral explanation for exercising multiple peremptory challenges.
171. Id. at 1724, 1725-26 (White, J., concurring) ("much litigation will be required to
spell out the contours of the Court's Equal Protection holding today .... "). For application of the Batson rule, see United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1987); Clay v.
State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2d 751 (1986); and Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132
(Wyo. 1986).
172. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub
nom. Michigan v. Booker, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986); see supra note 110.
173. The sixth amendment challenge continues to be asserted following the B-atson decision. See Fields v. People, No. 84-SC-382 (Colo. Feb. 17, 1987) (holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to systematically exclude Spanish-surnamed persons
from a jury violates a defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury guaranteed by the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution and article II, section 16 of the Colorado
Constitution; defendant's rights were not violated in this case); see also State v. Gilmore,
103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986) (holding that the state's exercise of its peremptory
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CONCLUSION

Batson v. Kentucky provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity
to overrule its overbearing decision in Swain. As a result, a defendant
may now establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the
state's use of peremptory challenges in a single case. There is nojustification for the Court's delay in overruling this holding. For over one
hundred years the Supreme Court has said that the courts are not to
discriminate, but until this decision no viable remedy has been provided.
Whether Batson relieves racial discrimination remains to be seen. Once
the inference of discrimination is raised, creative iawyering may provide
the prosecution with a means to rebut the defendant's claim.
Nevertheless, through the Batson decision, the Court, by denouncing the exercise of peremptories on racial grounds, has taken a giant
step in effectuating a cure. The Court could further emphasize its stand
on eliminating racial discrimination by entertaining the sixth amendment challenge and upholding that approach to curbing discriminatory
selection procedures. 174 If the approaches that have been developed
are not upheld and do not provide the necessary criteria for preventing
racial discrimination injury selection, the result could be the demise of
"one of the most important rights secured to the accused,"' 1 75 the peremptory challenge.
Mitzi Grove Ball

challenges to exclude all black prospective petit jurors violated the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury).
174. See Note, The Death Knell of the Insurmountable Burden.- Batson v. Kentucky, 31 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 473 (1987).
175. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).

BOWERS v. HARDWICK: THE SUPREME COURT CLOSES THE
DOOR ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND OPENS THE

DOOR TO THE
I.

BEDROOM

INTRODUCTION

The judicial system has struggled to determine how far the right to
privacy extends. Whether this right includes private, consensual, homosexual sodomy between adults has caused a great deal of controversy.
For many years, the United States Supreme Court refused to address
this issue,' thereby providing state legislatures free reign to decide the
scope of the right to privacy. Conflicting judicial decisions have resulted: 2 in some states, homosexual
sodomy is a protected right, 3 in
4
sentence.
prison
a
carries
it
others
In Bowers v. Hardwick,5 a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court finally addressed this issue and concluded that there is no constitutional right to
engage in private, consensual, homosexual sodomy. As a result, the
states may continue to decide for themselves whether such behavior is
legal. This comment will trace the historical development of the constitutional right to privacy and its expansion into various areas, including
the areas of private, consensual, homosexual and heterosexual behavior.
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick will be
discussed. 6 Finally, the Court's holding will be analyzed and its impact
on the area of the right to privacy will be examined. This article will
conclude by showing why the decision is improper from a constitutional
7
and moral perspective.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

History of Sodomy Statutes

Laws regulating homosexual behavior have existed throughout history. They can be traced to Hebraic laws which specifically prohibited
such behavior, 8 and which imposed the death penalty on those who engaged in such acts. 9 The term "sodomy" also stems from biblical times.
It is derived from the ancient city of Sodom, where the inhabitants reputedly engaged in various sexual activities. As a result of this conduct,
God destroyed the city. ' 0
1. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 n.1 (1986).
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 62-91 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 93-126 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Leviticus 18:22 which states: "[T]hou shall not lie with mankind as with
womankind; it is abomination."
9. Leviticus 20:13.
10. Genesis 19:1-29.
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During the middle ages, sodomy was a religious offense punishable
by the ecclesiastic courts. I The first secular legislation forbidding sodomy was passed in England during the reign of Henry VIII. At that
time, sodomy was defined as, "the detestable and abominable vice of
buggery committed with mankind or beast," and was punishable as a
felony.1 2 This definition was later changed by Blackstone, who characterized it as "so horrible a crime that it ought not to be named among
Christians."' 3 This negative attitude towards sodomy was subsequently
incorporated into early American law through sodomy statutes' 4 and
15
state court decisions.
Through the 1950s sodomy was punishable as a criminal offense in
all 50 states. In 1961, Illinois became the first state to decriminalize
private, consensual, sexual conduct between adults by adopting the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. 16 By the end of the 1970s,
legislators in twenty-one additional states had decriminalized such behavior. 17 Presently, 24 states and the District of Columbia provide criminal penalties, including prison sentences, for consensual sodomy
8
performed in private.'
B.

History of the Right to Privacy

There is no express constitutional right to privacy. In 1890, however, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis recognized the existence
of such a right. 19 Subsequently, in Olmstead v. U.S.,20 Brandeis' dissent
introduced the right into case law. He found that an individual should
be free from governmental wiretapping of his telephone, based upon
11. See Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alaska 1969) (citing Goodman, The Bedroom
Should Not Be Within the Province of the Law, 4 CAL. W.L. REV. 115 (1968)).
12. Id. at 649 (citing 25 Henry VIII, ch.6 (1533)).
13. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 215-16. Blackstone stated:

I will not act so disagreeable part, to my readers as well as myself, as to dwell any
longer upon a subject the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature. It
will be more eligible to imitate, in this respect, the delicacy of our English law,
which treats it in its very indictments as crime not fit to be named ....
14. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); Mo.

REV. STAT. § 563.230 (1959) (repealed 1979) (the Missouri statute provided: "any person
who shall be convicted of the detestable crime against nature, committed with mankind or
beast, with the sexual organs or with the mouth, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary not less than two years."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1985).
15. See, e.g., Kelly v. People, 192 Ill. 58, 59, 61 N.E. 425, 426 (1901) (stating that
sodomy is "a disgrace to human nature"); Honselman v. People, 168 Ill. 172, 175, 48 N.E.
304, 305 (1897); State v. Whitemarsh, 26 S.D. 426, 427, 128 N.W. 580, 581 (1910) (referring to the act as "so loathsome and disgusting that a discussion of it soils the pages of the
court's report").
16. Criminal Code of 1961, §§ 11-2, 11-3, 1961 Ill. Laws 1985-2006 (codified as
amended at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-2, 11-3 (Smith-Hund 1979 & Supp. 1983)); see
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5

(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
17. See Apasu-Gbatsu, Survey on the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 526-27, n.28 (1986) [hereinafter Apasu-Gbatsu,
Survey).
18. See id. at 524 n.9.
19. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
20. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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2
"the right to be let alone." '
In 1965, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.2 2 Appellants challenged a Connecticut
statute that forbade counselling married persons on the use of contraceptives, alleging that it violated their rights under the 14th Amendment.2 3 The Supreme Court found a zone of privacy, protected by the
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, that extended to the marital
24
relationship.
Subsequently, the right of privacy was extended to the protection of
the home from unwarranted governmental interference. 25 In Stanley v.
Georgia, 26 Stanley appealed his conviction under a criminal statute that
illegalized the private possession of obscene material.2 7 The obscene
films were inadvertently discovered during a police search for bookmaking equipment. 2 8 Based upon the fundamental right to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusions, the Court ruled that no justifications existed to warrant punishing the private use of obscene material in
29
one's home.

The next case in which the Court addressed the right to privacy was
Eisenstadt v. Baird,30 where it extended the right beyond the confines of
the marriage relationship to the individuals themselves. The Court also
ruled to be unconstitutional, a statute that prohibited the selling or giving away contraceptives to unmarried persons. 3 1 Finally, in 1973, the
Supreme Court expanded the privacy right to include a woman's decision to have an abortion. In the companion cases of Roe v. Wade 32 and
Doe v. Bolton, 3 3 the Court held that the right to privacy, although not
absolute, did encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 34 These decisions have been reaffirmed in several
35
recent Supreme Court decisions.
21. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that "the right to be let alone [is] the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.")

22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Id. at 480.
24. Id. at 484, 500. Although the majority found that the right to privacy emanated
from the first, third fourth, fifth and ninth amendments, the remaining justices differed as
to where it was to be found. Justice Goldberg concluded that the right stemmed from the
ninth amendment. Justice Harlan found it in the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Justices Black and Stewart dissented, finding that no constitutional right to privacy
existed.
25. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); see also U.S. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139
(1973) (holding that the right to possess obscene materials is limited to one's home); Paris
Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (right to view pornography limited to one's
home).
26. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
27. Id. at 558-59 n.l.
28. Id. at 558.
29. Id. at 564-65.
30. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
31. Id. at 453.
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
35. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S.
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The Right of Privacy As It Extends to Private, Consensual, Homosexual
Behavior: Pre-Hardwick
1. Supreme Court Decisions

Although the Supreme Court has established the existence of a constitutional right to privacy, its boundaries remain unclear. One example
is private, consensual sexual activity, in particular, homosexual sodomy.
The first case in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of private, consensual, behavior between adults was the landmark case of Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond.3 6 In this case, two
homosexuals (appellants) challenged a Virginia sodomy statute that prohibited anal and oral sodomy between a person and any man, woman, or
animal. 37 The appellants contended that the statute violated their rights
of privacy, freedoms of association and expression, and denied them
3 8
their assurance of due process.
The three-judge Federal District Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Virginia statute. The court reasoned that because homosexuality
has no place in marriage, home or family life, the state can regulate such
behavior in order to promote morality and decency. 39 Justice Merhige
delivered a stinging dissent. 40 He contended that the majority misinter41
preted the issue by focusing on morality instead of the right to privacy.
Despite this controversy within the deciding Federal Court, the United
States Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision without
42
opinion.
In Carey v. Population Services International,43 the Court was once
again called upon to address the privacy right as it relates to adult sexual
relations. In Carey, however, the Court again failed to clarify any boundaries. Although the Court held that the fundamental decision to bear a
Ct. 2169 (1986) (portions of a statute imposing requirements on abortions held unconstitutional); see also City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983) (provisions of the ordinance imposing requirements on abortions performed in the
second-trimester held invalid). But see Simopoulos v. Virginia, 426 U.S. 506 (1983) (requirement that second-trimesters abortions be performed in licensed clinics held
constitutional).
36. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
37. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1202. See Note, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Extension of the Right to Privacy to
Private Consensual Homosexual Conduct, 10 NOVA L.J. 175, 183 n.41 (1985), for a detailed
discussion of the poor quality of the Doe court's reasoning.
40. d. at 1203 (Merhige,J., dissenting). Merhige argued "that every individual has a
right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's decisions on private
matters of intimate concern." The choice of a sexual partner is a decision so private and
intimate, that absent evidence of harm, the state has no legitimate interest that justifies
interfering with it. Id.
41. Id. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
42. Doe, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens voted to hear
the case).
43. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Carey involved a constitutional challenge to a New York law
that banned the distribution of contraceptives to anyone under sixteen. The challenged
law only allowed pharmacists to distribute contraceptives to those over sixteen, and
banned the advertising or display of contraceptives.
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child is clearly within the right to privacy, 4 4 it refused to determine
whether the constitutional right to privacy extended to private, consen45
sual, sexual behavior.
46
In 1984, the Court granted certiorari to hear New York v. Uplinger,
which, like Doe, addressed the right to engage in private, consensual,
homosexual activity. The New York Court of Appeals had declared a
statute that prohibited loitering, for purposes of soliciting others to engage in deviate sexual behavior, unconstitutional. 4 7 After accepting
briefs from counsel and amici curiae, and hearing oral argument, the
Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that certiorari had been "improvidently
granted." '4 8 Once again, the Supreme Court dodged the privacy issue as
it relates to homosexual rights.
Finally in 1985, the Supreme Court agreed to hear another case
raising the same privacy issue. In National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education,49 plaintiffs brought an action challenging an Oklahoma statute
that permitted the dismissal or suspension of a teacher for engaging in
"public homosexual conduct." The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit had ruled that the statute violated the plaintiff's first
amendment rights. 50 In a 4-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment. 5 1 Again, prior to Hardwick, the Court refused to address
whether the right to privacy extended to private, consensual, homosexual behavior.
2.

Lower Court Decisions

The Supreme Court's refusal to address the privacy issue has had a
profound impact on state court decisions. Some states have chosen to
follow the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe,52 thereby finding that no right exists to engage in private, consensual, homosexual
conduct. These jurisdictions include the District of Columbia, the Fifth
Circuit and New Mexico.

53

Conversely, other states have chosen to fol-

44. Id. at 688-89.
45. Id. at 694 n.17.
46. 467 U.S. 246 (1984).
47. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(3) (McKinney 1980).
48. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 248-49. The Court reasoned that the statute was related to a
sodomy statute that the New York Court of Appeals had struck down in People v. Onofre,
51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied sub noma.
New York v.
Onofre, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). As such, a decision could not be made without a consideration of the earlier case. Additionally, the Court reasoned, due to ambiguities in the Court
of Appeals' opinion, it was unclear which federal question had been presented.
49. 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'dpercuriam, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
50. Id. at 1274.
51. 470 U.S. 903 (1985). Although several other cases came before the Supreme
Court, this comment addresses only those most relevant to this discussion. See also Lovisi
v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970) vacated 401 U.S. 989 (1971);
Canfield v. Oklahoma, 506 P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973), dismissedfor want of substantial
federal question, 414 U.S. 991 (1973); Pruett v. Texas, 463 S.W.2d 191 (1970), dismissedfor
want of substantialfederal question, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
52. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
53. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Navy regulation ordering mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct did not violate enlisted man's rights to
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low Judge Merhige's dissent in Doe,5 4 by finding the existence of such a
right. These states include Iowa, New Jersey, New York, and
55
Pennsylvania.
III.

A.

INSTANT CASE

Facts: Hardwick v. Bowers 56

In August 1982, Michael Hardwick was arrested for committing
sodomy with a consenting male adult in the bedroom of his own home.
This conduct violated a Georgia statute that criminalizes sodomy. 5 7 The
charges were subsequently dropped, but Hardwick filed a declaratory
action contending that the statute violated his constitutional right to privacy. 5 8 The district court dismissed, stating that the United States
59
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe was controlling.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that the district court had erred in applying Doe and that the
Georgia statute violated Hardwick's fundamental constitutional right to
sexual privacy. 60 After rehearing was denied, the defendant petitioned
the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, due to recent
contrary decisions in the circuit courts, granted certiorari. 61
privacy or equal protection); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd,
769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a statute prohibiting homosexual conduct is
constitutional, based upon the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe). But see
Apasu-Gbatsu, Survey, supra note 17, at 600 (stating that Baker stands as one of the best
expressions of the argument favoring a broad right to privacy); State of New Mexico v.
Elliott, 89 N.M. 305, 551 P.2d 1352 (1976) (ruling that a sodomy statute did not violate
unmarried defendant's rights of marital privacy and privacy of the home).
54. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
55. See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976) (ruling the sodomy statue was
unconstitutional as applied to private consensual sexual acts between heterosexual adults
because it invaded the individual's right to privacy); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381
A.2d 333 (1977) (sexual activities between adults are protected by the right to privacy and
the state's asserted interest in protecting morality is insufficient to support the fornication
statute); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert.
denied sub nora., New York v. Onofre, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (right to privacy extends to private, consensual, homosexual behavior); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d
47 (1980) (no sufficient state interest justifies legislation of norms where no harm occurs).
56. 760 F.2d 1202 (11 th Cir. 1985).
57. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) provides:
A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another ....
A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more that 20 years.
Note that the statute is not limited to homosexual acts.
58. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204. Hardwick was joined in the suit by John and Mary
Doe, a married couple who claimed the right to engage in the sexual activity proscribed by
the statute, but had been "chilled and deterred" by its prohibitions and by Hardwick's
arrest. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of the Does' complaint
for lack of standing. Id. at 1207.
59. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
60. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1213.
61. Bowers v Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986).
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B.

Reasoning
1.

Majority Opinion

Justice White's majority opinion addressed one issue: whether the
Constitution confers upon homosexuals a fundamental right to engage
in sodomy. 6 2 The Court held that it does not, for five reasons. First, the
right of privacy does not extend to homosexual sodomy because sodomy
has no relation to those areas which have traditionally been protected:
family, marriage and procreation. 63 Second, sodomy does not fulfill
either formulation required for the existence of a fundamental right. It
is neither "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," nor "deeply
rooted in the nation's history and tradition." '64 Third, the Court refused
to expand the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 6 5 Fourth, privacy of the home, as espoused in Stanley, does not
extend to homosexual conduct, because Stanley was based on a first
amendment challenge unlike the right asserted by Harwick. 66 Finally,
67
based on notions of morality, the sodomy statute is constitutional.
2.

Concurring Opinions

68
Justice Burger and Justice Powell each wrote concurring opinions.
They agreed with the majority that there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy. According to Justice Burger,
however, the question raised in this controversy is not based on personal preferences due to the long history of "moral teaching" against

sodomy. 69

Instead, Justice Burger found the statute constitutionally

based on the authority of state legislatures to regulate morality. Justice
Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, addressed the potential of an
eighth amendment challenge to the statute by focusing on the length of
a prison sentence for violation of the law.
3.

Dissenting Opinions
a. Justice Blackmun

In the first dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun contended that the
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2843-44 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), see supra notes
22-24 and accompanying text; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), see supra notes 2930 and accompanying text; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977)). The
Court cited Carey to support the assertion that the primary right found in Griswold did not
extend so far as to protect any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults.
Id.
64. Id. at 2844-46 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) and Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (Powell, J.)).
65. Id. at 2846 (reasoning that there should be great resistance to redefining fundamental rights).
66. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)); see supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 2847.
69. Id.
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majority had entirely misconstrued the issue. 70 He argued that the case
concerned "the right to be let alone," and not whether there was a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 7 1 He supported this
position by examining previous right to privacy cases. According to justice Blackmun, these cases have followed two complementary lines:
those that relate to decisions and those that relate to places. 72 Both are
relevant to the instant case.
Justice Blackmun first addressed the right to privacy as it relates to
decisions by focusing on the importance of personal autonomy in our
society. He contended that the freedom of the individual to define himself is the very essence of liberty. Such freedom allows a person to develop their identity through sexual intimacy with others. 73 He argued
that one should be free to decide with whom to share this bond. 74 The
fact that society is composed of diverse groups of individuals leads to
the inevitable conclusion that different lifestyles will be chosen.7 5 Accordingly, Justice Blackmun argued, the majority's opinion is an interference with an individual's fundamental right to control the nature of
76
his intimate associations with others.
Justice Blackmun then addressed the right to privacy as it relates to
places, in particular, the home. 7 7 Contrary to the majority's interpretation of Stanley, 7 8 he argued that its holding was based on both the fourth
and first amendments. 79 As such, the right to privacy protects individual
intimate relationships that occur in the home. 80
The second argument that Justice Blackmun presented in support
of his claim that the right to privacy extends to private, consensual, homosexual sodomy is that the Georgia statute constitutes an unjustifiable
infringement on individual liberty. 8' If a statute demonstrates an actual
connection between prohibiting certain conduct and promoting the general health, morality and decency, it will be upheld. 8 2 Since the record
failed to equate private, consensual, homosexual conduct with any criminal activities, under Stanley, the behavior falls within the right to privacy
70. Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
72. Id. at 2850-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
74. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63
(1973)).
75. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
79. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun reached
the conclusion that Stanley was based on the fourth amendment by focusing on the Stanley
Court's reliance on Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) which did not address a first amendment issue.
80. Id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81.

Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

82. See id. n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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in the home, and is therefore protected. 8 3 Additionally, Justice Blackmun noted, that the record is void of any evidence supporting the petitioner's assertion that acts of sodomy may seriously affect the public
84
health and welfare by spreading communicable diseases.
Justice Blackmun further argued that the record failed to support
the state's position that the statute is a legitimate regulation of morality. 85 He found no substance in the majority's argument that historical
religious or public intolerance of specific conduct justifies its regulation. 8 6 Additionally, he argued that the majority's argument was erroneous because it failed to recognize the distinction between laws that are
directed towards the protection of public sensibilities and those that en87
force private morality.
b. Justice Stevens
Based upon previous right to privacy cases, Justice Stevens argued
that the state cannot intrude into the privacy of the heterosexual bedroom. 88 The Georgia statute, however, is in conflict with these decisions because it prohibits all sodomy. He further argued, if the state
elects to enforce the law against just homosexuals, it must justify this
selective application, by either showing different liberty interests between homosexuals and heterosexuals or by showing the existence of a
89
legitimate state interest.
According to Justice Stevens, neither proposed justification for the
law is valid. Since "all men are created equal," all persons have the
same liberty interest in how they will conduct their personal associations, regardless of sexual preference. 90 The state may not intrude into
the private conduct of homosexuals, because it can not do so with respect to heterosexuals. Additionally, Georgia failed to identify a legitimate state interest in its selective enforcement of the law because, as the
majority points out, the statute has not been enforced for decades. 9 '
Therefore, he argued that the motion to dismiss Hardwick's claim was
92
improvidently granted because the statute was overbroad.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Over the years, United States Supreme Court decisions have re83. Id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). These activities include "the possession in
the home of drugs, firearms or stolen goods."
84. Id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2855 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

87. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381

U.S. 479 (1965)).
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2857-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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flected a trend of expanding the right to privacy. 93 As a result, the right
to engage in certain types of conduct have been correctly placed in the
hands of individuals. Thus, individuals are now able to regulate marital
and non-martial decisions relating to procreation, family life and contra94
ception, without interference from the state.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,9 5 the Supreme Court halted this trend. By
concluding that no fundamental right exists to engage in homosexual
behavior, 9 6 the Court has in effect returned power to the states to control this area of privacy. As history has demonstrated, conflicting statutes among the states have resulted. 9 7 In order to remedy the lack of
uniformity and obvious violation of individual rights, the Supreme
Court's decision in Hardwick must be reversed. A close examination of
the case supports this conclusion.
Society is composed of diverse groups of individuals, with different
expectations and different needs. 9 8 Despite these different needs, a basic element is common to all persons: the need to love and the need to
be loved. In our society, this is usually expressed by sexual intimacy.
Where heterosexuals fulfill this need by being intimate with a member
of the opposite sex, homosexuals do so by being intimate with a member
of the same sex. Indeed, the free expression of sexual intimacy has been
deemed to be at the very essence of liberty, 99 and a key element to personal autonomy.
In denying all homosexuals the right to engage in private, consensual sodomy, the Court is denying that person the right to freely satisfy
basic needs of sexual intimacy. Although one may attempt to argue that
the homosexual may fulfill this need by doing so with a member of the
opposite sex, such an argument is both naive and unpersuasive.
There are great differences of opinion regarding the causes of homosexuality.10 0 The prevailing views range from the psychological perspective, that the homosexual has no control over his or her sexual
preference, to the sociological perspective that one is a homosexual as a
result of experiences throughout his or her lifetime. 10 1 Two additional
theories, that sexual preference is genetically determined 10 2 and that
homosexuality results from a hormonal imbalance, have received little
93. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
95. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
96. Id. at 2843.
97. See supra notes 36-42 and 52-55 and accompanying text.
98. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Paris Adult Theater
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
100. See Note, The Constitutionalityof Laws ForbiddingPrivate Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH.
L. REV. 1613, 1625 (1974) (citing D. ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION
16 (1971)).

101 . See id.
102. See id. (citing D.

WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY

169 (1968)).
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attention.10 3 Regardless of what causes homosexuality, an individual's
sexual orientation once acquired is extremely difficult to change.1 0 4 It is
also contended that homosexuality is a trait over which the individual
has no control.' 0 5 Therefore, a homosexual will only be able to fulfill
the need for sexual intimacy with a member of the same sex. To deny
this need is to violate the homosexual's right to personal autonomy.
An argument which is closely related to this and which also refutes
Justice White's majority opinion, that the right to privacy does not extend to homosexual behavior, is the "intimate association" approach to
the right to privacy. ' 0 6 This approach was espoused by Justice Brennan
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees. 10 7 In Roberts, the Court recognized that
certain personal affiliations are entitled to constitutional protection because those relationships are fundamental to individual liberty.' 0 8
The Court in Roberts concluded that because the family is such an
intimate association, it is entitled to constitutional protection. In reaching this conclusion, the Court set forth specific elements which constitute an "intimate association." These include deep attachments and
commitments, the special sharing of thoughts, experiences and beliefs, a
high degree of selectivity in decisions relating to the relationship, and
seclusion from others in critical aspects concerning the relationship. ' 0 9
It can be argued that these factors may exist in a stable homosexual
relationship.l 1 0 Such a relationship can involve a deep attachment between two people in which intimate thoughts and experiences are
shared. Moreover, it may contain a high degree of selectivity in the initiation and maintenance of that relationship, and it is practiced in seclusion. Since a homosexual couple's relationship may include these
elements, under Justice Brennan's definition, it is an intimate association, and thereby entitled to constitutional protection.
The second error in the majority's argument in Hardwick, is its conclusion that the right to privacy in the home does not protect private,
homosexual conduct.'' 1 In Stanley, the Supreme Court recognized the
existence of that right, stating that the right was fundamental except in
very limited circumstances. 1 12 These "very limited circumstances" in13
clude the possession of firearms, drugs or stolen goods.'
103. See id. (citing W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 94-135 (1973)
and C. BERG & C. ALLEN, THE PROBLEM OF HOMOSEXUALITY 41 (1958)).

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 1626 (citing D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY at 266).
See id.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
Id. at 618-20.
Id. at 620.

110. See generally
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(1980).
111. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986). But see id. at 2852-54 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (arguing that Stanley stands for the proposition that the right to privacy
protects consensual, homosexual conduct in the home); See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
113. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).

610

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

Private, homosexual conduct cannot be equated with any of these
activities. Firearms and drugs are dangerous instrumentalities; it is very
likely that injury may extend beyond the individual possessing them and
include innocent third parties as well. In contrast, adults who engage in
private, consensual, homosexual sodomy do not harm anyone. The element of danger to third parties is virtually nonexistent.
The possession of stolen goods may not be equated with private,
consensual, homosexual sodomy either. As in the case of the possession
of firearms and drugs, the requisite element of harm is present because
the thief has taken something from the victim. Additionally, the thief is
hiding the evidence of his crime in his home which is dishonest and deceitful, and thus, harmful to society. When a homosexual engages in
consensual sodomy, his actions are neither dishonest nor deceitful.
Since private, consensual, homosexual sodomy does not fall within the
criminal act exceptions to the right to be free in one's home, it must be
protected there.
The majority's conclusion, that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, based on ancient proscriptions against
such acts,"14 is also unpersuasive. Throughout history, certain behaviors have been considered immoral. For example, interracial marriages
and abortions were disallowed based upon morality. As time has
progressed, society has changed, affecting public attitudes towards these
issues. Thus, in Loving v. Virginia,'15 the Court struck down miscegenation laws, and in Roe v. Wade," 6 women were given the legal option of
terminating their pregnancies within certain guidelines.
Public sentiment toward homosexuality has also changed. Prior to
1960, all 50 states had laws which prohibited homosexual conduct. Currently, half of the states have abolished such laws and have decriminalized homosexual behavior.' 1 7 This change in attitude is also reflected in
the judicial system."18 Despite the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe which upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia sodomy stat20
ute' 1 many state courts have refused to follow the decision.'
Furthermore, it is reflected in police behavior itself. Law enforcement
against homosexual conduct occurs infrequently, reflecting a more tol12 1
erant attitude towards homosexual activities.
To accommodate the evolution of public sentiment, the laws must
necessarily change:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was [sic] laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
114. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. But see id. at 2854-59 (BlackmunJ., dissenting) (arguing that morality is no basis for law); See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.

115. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
116. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
121. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since,22and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.1
Therefore, the Court's conclusion that moral attitudes, which are deeply
rooted in history, provide a sufficient basis for continuing to criminalize
private homosexual behavior is wrong. It fails to recognize the change
in attitude towards homosexual conduct.
The Supreme Court's decision is erroneous not only because of its
fallacious arguments, but also because it fails to address two important
areas, health and the element of harm. Advocates of state sodomy statutes support their position, in part, with the contention that the laws
prevent the spread of diseases, such as AIDS. 12 3 Therefore, they conclude that this constitutes a valid exercise of the police powers. Such an
argument, however, must fail.
First, it does not take into consideration that healthy homosexuals
also engage in such acts. Because the laws regulate them as well, they
are overbroad. Second, communicable diseases may also be spread by
heterosexual conduct, and yet the laws do not regulate this behavior. In
this respect, they are too narrow. Third, it is likely that the laws will
increase the spread of diseases rather than inhibit it. This would occur
where the laws dissuade people from reporting outbreaks, due to a fear
of criminal prosecution for the homosexual activity. 1 2 4 Finally, the laws
may in fact contribute to the spread of diseases by discouraging stable
25
relationships and encouraging furtive affairs.1

The second area that the Supreme Court fails to address concerns
the element of harm. The police power may be exercised to regulate
morals when it is necessary to protect individuals from harmful conduct. 1 2 6 With respect to private, consensual, homosexual behavior, this
required element is missing because such conduct is not harmful.
Therefore, the police power may not be properly invoked to validate the
Georgia sodomy statute.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United State Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick has effectively placed a limitation on the right to privacy, a previously expanding
area. In so doing, it has not only affected this protected right, but other
fundamental rights as well. Specifically, the decision interferes with an
individual's right to personal autonomy and his intimate associations
with others, by indirectly regulating with whom that person may be intimate. Additionally, it limits the individual's right to engage in certain
harmless, private conduct in his own home. Thus, the Hardwick decision
does not only affect the right of homosexuals to engage in private, con122.
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125.
126.

Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
See, e.g., Apasu-Gbatsu, Survey, supra note 17 at 623-35.
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See Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 94, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (1980).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

sensual sodomy, but in fact, affects the entire scheme of the constitutionally protected right to privacy. Therefore, in order to avoid these far
reaching consequences, the Supreme Court must reverse its decision
and find that the constitutional right to privacy includes private, consensual, homosexual conduct.
Caroline Wells Ferree*

*

The author wishes to acknowledge the editing contributions of Henry Rosen

